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ABSTRACT 
 
The argument of this thesis is twofold. First that psychoanalysis, more specifically 
approaches inspired by the teaching of Jacques Lacan, can still be useful in thinking 
encounters with art and, in particular cinema. At the same time, it is acknowledged 
that psychoanalysis, in its existing forms has its limitations and it is claimed -this is 
the second argument – that if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art it 
should draw on sources beyond the psychoanalytic tradition, in this case, the 
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. 
The thesis falls into two parts. The first considers what psychoanalysis can still 
contribute. Chapter one assays existing psychoanalytic approaches to cinema, argues 
that fewer of those theories are outmoded than is currently assumed and seeks to 
retrieve what is of continuing value. Chapter two is the longest chapter and the heart 
of the thesis. In support of the contention that the work of Freud and Lacan is still of 
moment, it explores a series of new psychoanalytic approaches to film and literature 
which it is claimed do more justice to the event of art. 
The second part of the thesis considers how Lacan’s teaching could be 
combined with the philosophy of Deleuze to develop these new approaches. Chapter 
three outlines the relevant aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy to establish a framework 
for the subsequent discussion. Chapter four examines the degree of convergence 
between the two thinkers and proposes a division of labour: psychoanalysis for 
artworks which transform subjectivity and Deleuzean thought for those which depart 
it. Chapter five considers how Deleuze’s cinema books point up the absence of any 
comparable creativity in psychoanalysis and what psychoanalytic film theory could 
learn from Deleuze’s achievement.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The point of departure for this thesis is Deleuze’s insistence that the question 
apropos of art is what a work does (PS:95). Plainly that question is too large for a 
single thesis so I shall, for the most part, confine myself to the examination of how 
selected instances of a particular art form, namely cinema, function and to a 
consideration of two of the most influential accounts of what film does: the 
psychoanalytic approaches inspired by the teaching of Jacques Lacan and the 
philosophy of cinema created by Gilles Deleuze (C1 and C2). The argument is twofold. 
First, while accepting the possibility mooted by Lacan that in a ‘very little time the 
whole world will be done with psychoanalysis,’ it is claimed that, for the moment, 
there are elements of Lacan’s teaching which can still usefully contribute to the task 
of thinking textual functioning (Lacan, 2010a:12). It is then further argued that, 
psychoanalytic approaches to film will have more of a future, if they follow Lacan’s 
example and draw on other, extra-psychoanalytic lines of thought. Deleuze and 
Guattari are proposed as the principal candidates. My claim is that, as there is more 
consonance between Lacan and Deleuze (both with and without Guattari) than 
initially appears, an ‘aparallel evolution’ is possible in which psychoanalysis can be 
reinvented (TRM:39-40).  
Developing Deleuze’s insistence that there is no other ethics than to not ‘be 
unworthy of what happens to us,’ the argument could be reframed as follows: 
psychoanalytic criticism has not always been worthy of the event of cinema but, with 
Deleuze, can be (LS:169). At one level, Deleuze’s notion of being worthy of the event 
straightforwardly belongs to the Stoic tradition. He cites as an exemplar Joe 
Bousquet, who suffered a terrible war-wound in 1918 ‘and remained bedridden until 
his death in 1950’ (Dosse, 2010:156). Rather than dwelling on the injustice of what 
had happened and succumbing to a life-hating ressentiment, he fashioned a new 
form of life by becoming a writer. The argument of this thesis is that, while 
psychoanalysis has not always been worthy of art created in such a spirit – it has been 
more comfortable explicating works given over to fantasy – Lacan’s teaching affords 
ample means to do so. The supporting argument takes as its point of departure 
Christian Fierens’s analysis of the ethical status of the unconscious set out by Lacan 
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in seminar eleven.  Recalling that in the ancient world dreams were regarded as 
messages from the gods, Lacan remarks ‘Ils en faisaient quelque chose’ - they made 
something of them (Lacan, 1973a:45). What counts in psychoanalysis is less the 
unconscious meaning of dreams or slips than what the analysand makes of them – 
what meanings are then produced. Fierens underlines the point: ‘what matters is not 
the message [of the gods] but what we make of it in the ethical dimension’. The 
argument of this thesis is that art can be an instance of this ‘movement of making 
something other of what appears’ and thereby can, in Deleuzean terms, be worthy 
of what happens to us (Fierens, 2010a:42).  
Art, as the making something new of what concerns us, takes innumerable 
forms. Most importantly works can critique realities with a certain currency to bring 
about political change. This is the achievement of a film like I, Daniel Blake (Loach, 
UK, 2016) which contests the widespread conviction that the benefits system 
rewards ‘skivers’ at the expense of ‘strivers’. More frequently, cinema has made a 
difference by (re)manufacturing, with negligible variations, that world of fantasy, 
which, as Histoire(s) du Cinéma (Godard, France/Switzerland, 1988-1998) underline, 
has been the staple of mainstream cinema: the world where couples are made for 
one another, where a heroic rescuer is always at hand and the good people always 
win through. More importantly for this thesis, there are works which, while referring 
to prevailing conceptions of reality, make something new of the issues, as happens 
in the works which will be the principal textual examples of this thesis: Éloge de 
l’amour (Godard, France, 2001) and India Song (Duras, France, 1975). 
It has long been established that psychoanalysis is useful in analysing the 
operation of films like those of Loach. We are so affected by the desperate hunger 
which drives Daniel Blake’s friend Katie to snatch and eat beans from a can at the 
food bank because we identify with her in her distress. Even more patently, 
psychoanalysis has proved valuable in analyzing how, in much mainstream cinema, 
women are pressed into the service of male narcissism and masculine desires. The 
contribution of this thesis is to claim psychoanalysis can also be useful when 
considering films in the third category: films like Éloge de l’amour  and India Song 
which are worthy of what happens to us in ways which are less reducible to 
representational content than the work of Ken Loach, that is works where, to use 
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Lyotard’s terms, there is an ‘it happens’ which is prior to and in excess of any 
determination of what is happening, that is, the specifiable content (Lyotard, 
1988:90). 
What occurs in such work is, I claim, a form of thinking. As Deleuze observes, 
‘the essence of cinema – which is not the majority of films – has thought as its higher 
purpose’ (C2:168). Similarly, although from a very different perspective, Badiou 
claims ‘art is a thought’ which is ‘irreducible to philosophy’ (Badiou, 1998:9). For 
Badiou, as Christopher Watkin succinctly puts it, ‘art itself thinks’ (Watkin, 2011:63). 
Exploring this line of thought, the claim of the thesis is that, if we develop Fierens’ 
reading of Lacan and conceive of art as a making, psychoanalysis can provide a 
further approach to the question of thought in art. What is thinking? There are, of 
course, countless forms but I want to begin with a quotidian form to argue that the 
thinking which occurs in many artworks is in no way removed from the everyday.  To 
emphasise this ordinariness, I will begin not with philosophers or theorists but with 
my elder grand-daughter. Isabella at the time was just over two years old. When she 
was put to bed and everybody else had left the room, she could be heard talking on 
the baby monitor. Typically, there were recollections – for example, of the ‘big bug’ 
which had alighted on her arm that afternoon – reflections – for example, on an 
altercation at nursery - with, in addition, snatches of stories, songs and nursery 
rhymes. As my son-in-law put it, she was ‘processing her day.’ Although she 
sometimes addressed remarks to her dolls, for the most part she was thinking aloud. 
My contention is that such thinking is coterminous with and ineliminable from 
human existence. Older humans may think silently and minus the nursery rhymes but 
everybody ‘processes’ their experiences. Thought in this form – where the forms are 
innumerable – is primordial in that it is prior to and never fully subsumed by more 
organised discourses such as those around such practices as science, medicine, 
jurisprudence, business, formal education, historical investigation, journalism and 
philosophy etc. It is distinguished from these other discourses by the degree to which 
it constitutes an existential rather than a cognitive undertaking. It considers what has 
befallen, is befalling and could befall the subject to make a difference; it considers 
what matters so that it matters differently. The aim is less to determine the nature 
of things than to lend our concerns a new sense, to arrive at a new evaluation so that 
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we can proceed differently. It is, to borrow a phrase from Heidegger, a ‘way-making’ 
(Heidegger, 1993:418). Coming to the thesis, the claim is that a psychoanalysis 
worthy of the event of art should conceive of, at least, certain artworks as engaged 
in similar forms of way-making. While many films may be dedicated to 
representation and the political struggles around the realities represented, there are 
films where, although representations occur, the principal purpose is not to limn 
reality but to alter our attitudes, evaluations and orientations. Wittgenstein famously 
claimed that philosophy - or at least his philosophy – ‘leaves everything as it is’ 
(Wittgenstein, 1953:49, 124). Thinking in art, in contrast, often seeks to transform. 
As psychoanalysis shares this aim, it possesses a continuing utility in thinking the 
thinking which occurs in such works.  
However, and this brings us to the second argument of this thesis, there is a 
dimension to the thinking in art which is often absent in other contexts: joy. While, 
for all too many ‘processing their day(s)’ can be a miserable experience – we will 
come back to the current mental health crisis in a moment – ‘processing’ in the form 
of art can afford joy. As Deleuze has it, ‘the essence of art is a kind of joy, and this is 
the very point of art’ (DI:134). This is widely attested. There is space for only three 
such testimonies. First Alfred Brendel on Schubert’s string quintet: ‘It makes you feel 
glad to be alive’ (Brendel, Alfred cited by Roger Graef. Desert Island Discs. (2014)). 
Second Miles Davis: ‘It makes me feel good if I compose something and all the fellas 
like it, y’ know that feeling you get when you accomplish something, you can’t even 
buy that - it’s better than any drug you know’ (Davis, 2017). Finally, the song-writer, 
Sian Martin, who was diagnosed with Non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma after the birth of her 
second baby. The tumours which had spread through her body made it difficult to 
walk, impossible to sleep lying down and left her in constant pain. To cope with her 
illness, her children and a ‘less than supportive partner,’ she turned to art. ‘Doing 
living for somebody like me,’ she explained, ‘means making stuff.’ ‘When I’m in that 
flow,’ she continued, ‘when I’m making something, it is better than sex, better than 
childbirth, it’s completely sublime’ (Martin, Sian Woman’s Hour, 2016).  
 Now, to an extent, psychoanalysis does ‘get’ this. In Lituraterre, Lacan 
acknowledged that, if James Joyce had undertaken an analysis, he ‘would not have 
gained anything from it since’ with his writing ‘he went straight to the best of what 
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one can expect of an analysis at its end’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Voruz, 2002:116). On 
Lacan’s account, ‘Joyce reached the equivalent of the end of an analysis through his 
writing’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Voruz, 2002:115-6). On Véronique Voruz’s account, 
(Voruz, 2002:140) Joyce found in writing what Lacan, in Telévision, termed ‘jouis-
sens’ (Lacan, 2001a:517) a pun combining jouissance and sens, which has been 
translated as ‘enjoymeant’ (T:10). In other words, Lacan recognized that Joyce found 
intense enjoyment in the creation of his work. More importantly, for present 
purposes, Lacan announced, ‘I am gay’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Nobus, 2016:40). In 
making this announcement, Lacan was not coming out of the closet as a gay man for 
that use of the word ‘gay’ hardly existed in the France of 1971 (Nobus, 2016:41). 
Rather his intention was to highlight the tonality of his teaching, which he elsewhere 
styled a form of ‘gay sçavoir’ (Lacan, 2001a:526) – a word-play which combines 
Nietzsche’s notion of a gay science or joyful wisdom (Nietzsche, 1887a) with savoir 
(knowledge) and ça the French translation of Freud’s id (Nobus, 2016:53). The 
paradox of Lacan’s teaching is that the subject-matter is bleak – the asymmetries of 
human desire - but the texts are exhilarating. As this is also the paradox of much art 
- the subject matter of, say King Lear (Shakespeare, c1606, reprinted 1963) and Éloge 
de l’amour is equally bleak and the works are similarly exhilarating – the tenor of 
Lacan’s style throws certain art practices into relief. 
At the same time, the joy in art makes the case for the second proposition 
advanced by this thesis - namely that, if psychoanalysis is to be of continuing value, 
it needs to learn from Deleuze - for the joy to be found in art is, to say the least, 
under-theorised in the psychoanalytic tradition. Freud’s explanation in terms of 
sublimation, as Laplanche and Pontalis note, remained ‘somewhat undeveloped’ 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1967:432). Although others, most notably, Lacan (S.VVII), 
Zupančič (Zupančič, 2008), and Darian Leader (Leader, 2002) have significantly 
advanced beyond the ‘primitive state,’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1967:433) in which 
Freud bequeathed the concept, I contend that no theory has proved worthy of the 
event of art. It appears that a vocabulary developed in the clinic to conceive what 
does not work – symptoms - is unequal to the task of thinking what can - art. Recently 
Dany Nobus has persuasively suggested that to escape ‘the formalistic rigidity of 
institutionalized psychoanalytic knowledge,’ psychoanalysts must ‘re-engage with 
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the “dancing” thought of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra’ (Nobus, 2016:39).  In a similar vein, 
this thesis argues that if psychoanalytic approaches to cinema are to be worthy of 
the event, they must similarly engage with Nietzsche and his most important 
twentieth century exponent: Gilles Deleuze. Lacan reportedly once told Deleuze, 
‘What I need is someone like you’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Smith, 2012a:312). This 
thesis concurs: psychoanalysis needs Deleuze and not least in its thinking about art. 
 
Rationale 
 
The purpose of this section is to explain the raison d’ être of the thesis, by situating 
the argument in relation to a number of current debates both within and beyond the 
academy. Most immediately, it contributes to the debates around the future of 
psychoanalytically-inspired approaches to cinema. Following the contention of A. J. 
Bartlett, Justin Clemens and Jon Roffe in regard to Lacan, Deleuze and Badiou – ‘that 
no one is yet finished with these thinkers,’ it argues for the continuing pertinence of 
Lacan’s teaching (Bartlett, et al., 2014:7). While recognising that, as Robert 
Sinnerbrink noted, psychoanalysis, ‘which once ruled the film theory scene,’ has 
come to be treated ‘as a superseded or even perverse doctrine,’ the thesis, following 
Sinnerbrink, challenges this estimate (Sinnerbrink, 2011:30). In opposition to the 
claim of those who, like Teresa Rizzo (Rizzo, 2012:5), believe ‘psychoanalytic 
approaches have exhausted themselves,’ the thesis maintains that, in certain 
respects, psychoanalysis is of continuing value in thinking of how cinema can 
function. At the same time, it acknowledges the limitations of existing forms of 
psychoanalysis by arguing that, while forms of psychoanalysis still have interesting 
things to say about the cinema whose mainspring is fantasmatic make-believe, it can 
only be worthy of the event of cinemas, which eschew fantasy such as those of 
Godard and Duras, if it draws on the work of Deleuze.  
Consequently, the thesis also intervenes in the burgeoning discussion about 
the relationship of Lacan and Deleuze. While considering the claim of Bartlett, 
Clemens and Roffe that ‘Lacan provides a decisive impetus’ to Deleuze’s philosophy 
an overstatement, it agrees that their relationship is less antipodean than initially 
appears (Bartlett et al., 2014:4). Following the orientation of the recent landmark 
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collection (Nedoh and Zevnik, 2017), it argues that a disjunctive synthesis1 of Lacan 
and Deleuze can be exceptionally productive. In the directions taken to explore the 
possibilities created, however, this thesis differs on at least one count with many of 
the other principal participants in the debate. There is space to mention only three 
examples. As will become apparent in the subsequent section, this thesis draws upon 
Aaron Schuster’s brilliant book (Schuster, 2016) but ultimately takes a diametrically 
opposed view. Schuster cites what he terms a ‘quip’ of Bergson - along with Spinoza 
and Nietzsche one of the three principal influences on Deleuze - in which Bergson 
remarked that ‘whatever one may say about the pain and horror and stupidity of 
existence, “humanity holds fast to life, which proves that it is good”’ (Henri Bergson 
cited in Schuster, 2016:7). Where Schuster deplores this view, the thesis upholds it, 
arguing that otherwise the affirmative nature of art becomes inexplicable. With 
regard to Peter Hallward, the thesis agrees that Lacan and Deleuze cannot be 
conflated. Crucially the thesis accepts, that in respect of the key questions of 
subjectivity and desire, as Peter Hallward puts it ‘you can’t have it both ways’ 
(Hallward, 2010:33).  In chapters four and five, it is argued that, in these areas, 
choices have to be made. Further the thesis agrees with Hallward’s reading of ‘the 
heart of Deleuze’s philosophy’ (Hallward, 2006:1) as an attempt ‘after Bergson and 
Spinoza to develop ways of thinking and acting,’ (Hallward, 2010:35) which liberate 
‘man from the plane or the level that is proper to him, in order to make him a creator, 
adequate to the whole movement of creation’ (B:111). ‘Liberation from the human’ 
is Deleuze’s goal (Hallward, 2006:139). However, it disagrees with his dismissal of this 
line of thought as a form of ‘mysticism’ (Hallward, 2010:36). On the contrary, this 
                                                          
1 In contrast to Kantian synthesis, a ‘disjunctive synthesis’ does not unify the manifold 
and identify items within it (LS:55). As Anne Sauvagnargues puts it ‘synthesis, for 
Deleuze, is not a return to the one, but a disjunctive differentiation which proceeds 
by bifurcations and transformations, not by fusion and identity of the same’ 
(Sauvagnargues, 2005:17). It has a paradoxical quality for, as Jean-Jacques Lecercle 
observes, ‘it seeks to connect and separate at the same time, to keep together what 
must remain apart’ (Lecercle, 2010:17). The disjunctive synthesis of Lacan and 
Deleuze does not conflate but rather promotes a productive interaction. 
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thesis argues that Deleuze’s philosophy provides a vocabulary for our ‘becoming-
other’ with certain art-works, for example the possibility with such works of 
departing egoic forms of neurotic subjectivity.  
Finally, the thesis draws heavily upon Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Lacan and 
agrees with his contention that there is a proximity between Lacan and Deleuze – 
particularly the Deleuze of The Logic of Sense most notably in their agreement that 
there is always a ‘minimal difference between a structural place and the element that 
occupies (fills out) this place’ (Žižek, 2006:122). A notion, which will be explicated, 
shortly in the Theoretical Preliminary and further explored throughout the thesis. At 
the same time, this thesis takes its distance from Žižek in respect of his readings of 
both Lacan and Deleuze. Notwithstanding his extraordinary insights into Lacan’s 
teaching, Žižek’s reading of Lacan misses what, for the purposes of this thesis, is the 
crucial dimension of Lacan’s teaching. Žižek, as Bartlett, Clemens and Roffe observe, 
runs Lacanian ‘psychoanalysis together with philosophy’ and ignores the extent to 
which ‘it injects literary elements into scientific ones’ (Bartlett et al., 2014:54 
footnote). Against that approach, this thesis subscribes to Lacan’s insistence that his 
work rebels against philosophy - ‘Je m’insurge contre la philosophie’ (Jacques Lacan 
cited in Žižek, 1993:3). His teaching is, as Justin Clemens perceives, an 
‘antiphilosophy’ (Clemens, 2013). Although theoretical propositions can (often 
usefully) be abstracted from Lacan’s seminars and writings, his teaching is more 
fruitfully viewed as predominantly a series of experiments exploring what language 
– in both its lexical and mathematical forms - can accomplish. This explains the 
importance of his work for developing psychoanalytic approaches worthy of the 
event of art for it demonstrates that words and mathemes can have effects which 
theoretical discourses can neither explain nor engender. Like art, his work comprises 
a form of thought irreducible to any other, which is why it is still useful in thinking 
the thinking which occurs in art.  
Coming to Deleuze, this thesis differs from Žižek’s reading on several counts. 
Most of these, virtuality, desire and the body without organs can more usefully be 
discussed after the theoretical background has been outlined in the latter part of this 
thesis. For the moment let’s consider an issue already (implicitly) in focus: vitalism. 
Žižek is scathing: he dismisses ‘vitalism’ as ‘the formula of the superego’ (Žižek, 
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2016:330). Contra Žižek, this thesis upholds Deleuze’s vitalism. If ultimately ethics, 
for Deleuze, is being worthy of the event, ‘its temporary goal’ as Miguel de Beistegui 
observes, ‘is to know how to experience a maximum of joyful passions’ (de Beistegui, 
2010:114). Vitalism is not an arduous superegoic injunction but the question: ‘What 
must we do in order to be affected by a maximum of joyful passions?’ (Deleuze, 
1968a:273) It is the contention of this thesis that artworks in the mode of bien-dire 
can be ways of answering that question in forms which argue against Žižek’s dismal 
claim that ‘to live is not a natural and spontaneous Energeia but a duty, a superego 
imperative’ (Žižek, 2016:330). Few have taken to the dance floor, when listening to 
say Tamla Motown or The Stone Roses out of a sense of duty. And dance occurs in 
other art forms. Recall the wonderful sequence in the film Frances Ha (Baumbach, 
USA 2013) when the eponymous protagonist, runs, skips and dances through the 
streets of New York to a soundtrack of Bowie’s Modern Love (Bowie, 1983). A 
psychoanalytically-inspired thinking about art which begins, like Žižek’s, from the 
clinic will never, in contrast to Deleuze’s philosophy, be worthy of the joy in such art 
encounters. 
More important than any points of dispute between this thesis and other 
commentators on the relationship of Lacan and Deleuze is the new angle from which 
the thesis approaches that relationship. In part two Deleuze’s philosophy will be 
explored in relation to five foci: process, difference, relationality, composition, the 
sub-representative, and open-ended systems. These points of emphasis will then be 
used to at once establish a proximity between Lacan and Deleuze and to cast 
psychoanalysis in a new light. As Jacques-Alain Miller, Lacan’s executor, emphasizes, 
there is ‘more than one Lacan’ (Miller, J-A, 1997:9). Using the foci listed above, this 
thesis will create another and, in so doing, will propose psychoanalytically-inspired 
approaches to cinema and art worthier of the event of art. 
 
A note on methodology 
 
The purpose of this section is to explain the choice of textual examples. Although this 
thesis is primarily dedicated to cinema, I have included several non-filmic examples, 
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like the reference to dance in the previous section, for I concur with Deleuze when 
he maintains that writing on cinema ‘is at its worst when it limits itself to cinema as 
though it were a ghetto’ (TRM:284). If there are conjunctures, when it is useful to 
discuss film as a ‘specific signifying practice,’ there are others when non-cinematic 
examples can be useful in pointing up aspects of some films which are often occluded 
(Heath, 1975:8).  As a further example, consider lines of Rimbaud which will be a 
frequent reference point: 
Ô saisons, Ô châteaux, 
Quelle âme est sans défauts ? 
As Badiou astutely asks: ‘what mimetic hallmark might we possibly perceive’ in these 
lines (Badiou, 2014:32)? Thinking here assumes a form, which throws into relief the 
achievements of montage in cinemas such as those of Godard where ‘traditional 
cinematic story-telling’ is abandoned ‘in favour of the juxtaposition of disparate 
images,’ in a process creative of a sense beyond representation (McGowan, 
2012:111). 
For the most part, the filmic and non-filmic examples are modernist. For two 
reasons. The first, in support of my argument that Lacan’s teaching is of continuing 
interest, is that many modernist texts can usefully be read as responses to what 
Lacan terms the ‘lack in the Other’ (E:693). This concept will be explicated at length 
shortly, for now we can limit ourselves to the aspect alluded to above: the absence 
of the place. To be a social subject is to be assigned a place, a role and an identity in 
institutions like the family, school, peer group and workplace. Lacan’s contention is 
that the subject never fully coincides with any of these: the real is the impossibility 
of the subject being at one with the place assigned. Modernism thought this problem 
in innumerable forms, but frequently, by making something different of the issue. 
This is the second reason for choosing modernism: the thinking in many modernist 
works revalues. Two examples. As the discussions of The Exile of James Joyce make 
clear, Joyce’s work often thinks what it is to be out of place (Cixous, 1972:76). One 
response, most notably in Finnegans Wake, is to make something new of the 
language of the Other, the language which, as Lacan notes, is always the command 
‘Places everyone!’ (SXX:33) Joyce refuses this command by transmuting the language 
of the Other.  Ariel’s ‘Where the bee sucks there suck I’ (Shakespeare, The Tempest, act 
  20 
5, scene 1, line no 88) becomes ‘where the bus stops there shop I’ (Joyce, 1939:15-16). 
The novel revalues what the Other has made of issues. Similarly, Histoire(s) du 
Cinéma (Jean-Luc Godard, France/Switzerland 1988-98) implicitly asks: what has 
cinema made of the twentieth century? Has film always been worthy of the event(s)? 
Plainly not. As Scott Durham observes Histoire(s) foregrounds ‘cinema’s inadequate 
response to fascism and the catastrophes of war’ (Durham, 2014:448). However, 
Histoire(s) is not solely an indictment of the Hollywood dream factory. As in Joyce, 
clichéd usages are reworked and made new. ‘The paths not taken,’ by cinema are 
indicated but, more importantly, new paths are opened (Durham, 2014:441). Not 
least by a making something different of the cinematic language of the Other. 
Godard’s citations of say Hitchcock, like Joyce’s citations of Shakespeare make 
something new in which, as Deleuze observes, he doesn’t just ‘have thoughts on 
cinema; he starts cinema thinking’ (DI:141). 
To be clear, the argument is not that such thinking/making is the preserve of 
modernism for it can also be found in more popular works – think, for example, of 
The Sex Pistols’ God Save the Queen - but that it is particularly salient in modernist 
works. In these works, the problem with which it begins matters – it interests us 
because it deals with an issue which concerns us – but what matters more is where 
the work then goes (The Sex Pistols, 1977). Unless an artwork engages with a concern 
it is, to borrow a phrase from John McDowell, ‘a frictionless spinning in a void,’ but 
its achievement is what it then makes of this issue (McDowell, 1996:11). The claim of 
the thesis is that, if psychoanalytic criticism is to be worthy of the thinking in art, it 
must focus on the thought’s achievement not only its initiating impulse. Modernist 
examples preponderate because, insofar as they acted upon Ezra Pound’s injunction 
to ‘MAKE IT NEW,’ their thinking not only represents, but transforms, creates and 
revalues (Pound, 1964:275). 
As indicated above, two modernist texts will serve as reference points 
throughout. India Song and Éloge de l’amour, have been selected because both 
engage in uniquely cinematic forms of thinking, revaluation and creation. India Song 
has been chosen not just because Duras intrigued both Lacan and Deleuze – each 
wrote about her work – but because the multi-stranded narratives and the 
separation of the sound track from the image track constitutes a form of thinking 
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which could occur nowhere else (Lacan, 1965 and C2). Most importantly for our 
purposes, the actions of enigmatic characters irreducible to psychological categories, 
establish ‘the primacy of the event’ foregrounding ‘the way it transcends all motive, 
all explanation’ (Josipovici, 2010:112). The narrative concerns a figure and the 
aftermath of an episode that are the focal points of much of Duras’ work. The figure 
is Anne-Marie Stretter, a character in part inspired by the wife of a colonial 
administrator in French Indochina, Elizabeth Striedter (Gunther, 2002:4) who 
fascinated the young Duras not only because of her wealth, ‘beauty and elegance’ 
but because of a rumour that a young suitor had ‘committed suicide out of love for 
her’ (Gunther, 2002:5). The episode is the ball at which Stretter, the French 
ambassador’s wife, and Michael Richardson fall passionately in love. As a result, 
Richardson’s fiancée, Lola Valerie Stein, is abandoned. This is alluded to in the film - 
Richardson is present at the embassy reception which occupies the greater part of 
the narrative and the off-screen voices discuss it – ‘What love! What desire!’ – but it 
assumes a different significance for we learn that Stretter, far from being fulfilled by 
this intense liaison, has become a suicide. In counterpoint, there are two other 
narratives: that of a beggar woman and the vice-consul. The beggar-woman as a 
pregnant seventeen-year-old has been thrown out by her mother and in the course 
of walking from Savannakhet in Laos to Calcutta has lost both her mind and the 
children born from an existence dependent on prostitution. As for the vice-consul, 
he has caused a scandal by inexplicably firing at lepers from his balcony at Lahore 
and, in consequence, has been ordered, in disgrace, to Calcutta. Both feature at the 
embassy reception. The beggar-woman can be heard laughing or howling 
somewhere in the night and the vice-consul, after being rebuffed by Stretter, 
similarly shouts his impossible desires from the darkness.  
The second choice, Éloge de l’amour concerns Edgar whose project, which 
may take the form of a novel, a play, a film, or perhaps an opera, is a work about 
what he believes to be the four stages of love: meeting, sexual passion, separation 
and reconciliation. These moments are to be played out by three couples who will be 
representative of the experience of the young, of adults and those in later life. To this 
end, he holds auditions but the young woman whom he particularly wants to involve, 
Berthe, refuses to participate. To support herself and her three-year-old she holds 
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down several jobs including that of a night-cleaner at a rail depot, so she has more 
immediate concerns. The film is in two parts. The second is a flashback recounting 
Edgar’s trip to Brittany during which he first met Berthe. As part of his researches 
preparatory to writing a cantata about the Catholic philosopher, Simone Weil, he 
interviews a couple who had fought together in the resistance. The couple are 
Berthe’s grandparents whom she is trying to dissuade from selling their story to 
Hollywood producers belonging to Spielberg Associates. Nothing immediately comes 
of the encounter and later, although he often thinks of her, he decides she is not 
suitable to participate in his new project. At the hinge of the film Edgar meets 
Berthe’s grandfather and learns she has committed suicide. Pressed to explain what 
happened, Edgar says, ‘Her tone of voice interested me. It often brought ideas to life, 
but otherwise she was a let-down.’ To which the grandfather rejoins: ‘You are the 
let-down.’  It is of interest as it is a film about a man who is unworthy of what happens 
to him, but which is itself not unworthy of a society where one might ask:  Quelle 
âme est sans défaut? 
 
Theoretical Preliminaries 
 
Before considering the relevant aspects of the work of Freud and Lacan, I want to 
make four points which will be crucial for the argument of this thesis. The first two 
are ground-clearing exercises. I want to begin by clarifying the status of 
psychoanalysis by emphasising that Lacan’s teaching is not a finished body of 
doctrine. Secondly, I want to underscore the Lacanian emphasis on singularity: just 
as every patient and every session is unique so is every encounter with an artwork. 
Hence generalisations about textual functioning must be eschewed. Thirdly, as it is 
the pivot for much of the psychoanalytic theorising in this thesis, I want to point up 
certain aspects of what Slavoj Žižek terms ‘Lacan’s key motif’ (Žižek, 2012:477): the 
‘lack in the Other.’ As reference to this notion will be made throughout this and the 
subsequent chapter, it is important to establish something of its contours and 
implications from the start. Finally, as a prelude to the extensive discussion of 
Deleuze and Lacan in part two of this thesis I want to introduce some Deleuzean 
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concepts to demonstrate how they can contribute to forms of psychoanalytic 
criticism worthier of the event.   
 
1. The status of psychoanalysis  
 
‘Should someone get ahead of my discourse to the point of making it 
outdated, I will finally know that it has not been useless.’  
Jacques Lacan (cited in Marini, 1986:28-9) 
 
Why psychoanalysis? Because existence and its world(s) matter to us and how they 
matter is a function of how we desire. It is desire with its interests, evaluations and 
orientations which imparts significance to reality. The claim of psychoanalysis upon 
our attention is that it offers arguably the most complex theoretical framework(s) for 
thinking the workings of desire. This is not to suggest that psychoanalysis has all the 
answers. On the contrary, the argument of this thesis is that, if psychoanalysis is to 
remain pertinent it must constantly renew itself. At its best psychoanalysis is alive to 
the necessity to innovate. This is the purport of Freud’s claim that one is not doing 
psychoanalysis if one does not learn from every patient (Lafont, 2004:8, Lacan, 
1995:6), and Lacan’s insistence that each patient is ‘a singularity’ rather than a 
particular (T:29). Every patient is unique rather than an instance explicable by a 
general theory (Harari, 1996:30) and, in consequence, ‘analytic science must be 
called into question in the analysis of each case’ (E:296-7). Lacan’s awareness of the 
exigency to invent can usefully be illustrated by an episode, which, thanks to 
YouTube, has become one of the most celebrated moments of his practice and which 
will be a point of reference throughout this thesis.  In Gérard Miller’s film, Rendez-
vous chez Lacan an analysand, Suzanne Hommel recounts how, in 1974, after telling 
Lacan of a dream, she informed him that she woke at five every morning before 
adding ‘It’s at five o’clock that the Gestapo came to get the Jews in their houses.’ At 
this, Lacan jumped from his armchair, and, without speaking, lightly caressed her 
cheek. She understood what she termed this ‘extraordinarily tender gesture’ as 
‘geste a peau’ – a touching of the skin – instead of ‘Gestapo.’ The ‘surprise,’ she 
continues, ‘didn’t diminish the pain but it made it something else.’ Below it will be 
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argued that art can similarly, without taking refuge in fantasy, at least on occasion, 
make something else of suffering (Miller, Gérard, 2011).  
For the moment, the key argument is that this thesis takes it as axiomatic that 
psychoanalysis is, in the phrase of Blanchot made famous by Derrida, always ‘to 
come’ (Derrida, 1993:64). Although Derrida originally employed this formulation in 
relation to democracy, as Gabriele Schwab has emphasized, it applies equally to 
psychoanalysis which is also irrevocably open to an unanticipable future (Schwab, 
2007:30). A psychoanalysis worthy of the event can never be a finished body of 
doctrine. As Lacan puts it, ‘there is nothing doctrinal about our office,’ before 
continuing: ‘we are answerable to no ultimate truth’ (Jacque Lacan cited in Julien, 
1990a: pp 115-6). So, no defence of an orthodoxy will be mounted here for, at least 
in principle, there is no orthodoxy.  The concept of a lack in the Other which will 
feature at length is not the ‘ultimate truth’. Like all of Lacan’s pronouncements, it is 
a hypothesis with no warrant other than the interest of what its exploration and 
application produce. Far from taking psychoanalysis as unassailable doctrine, this 
thesis argues that to remedy its deficiencies psychoanalysis must learn from 
Deleuze and Guattari. Two of those deficiencies are relevant here. First the gender 
politics. I shall return to this at greater length in chapter one. For the moment what 
matters is that in too many cases the gender politics are suspect. For that reason, 
no gender-specific concepts are deployed in the alternative psychoanalytic 
approaches proposed. My second claim is that, in many art encounters, existence 
comes to matter differently to us and that psychoanalysis regarding at least some 
of these encounters has no very persuasive account of that difference. While 
psychoanalysis may be enlightening as to artworks which are mere wish-fulfilment 
– the bulk of Hollywood - it has less to say about works eschewing such evasions of 
the real. It is as interesting on the pathology of, for example, Hölderlin (Laplanche, 
1961) and Joyce (S.XXIII) as it is unconvincing in its accounts of the joy to be taken in 
their works. 
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2. Textual Functioning  
 
Here I wish to clarify the status of the textual readings and analyses of texts in this 
thesis by emphasising that every encounter with an artwork is singular and that the 
results are often unpredictable and unanticipable. Consequently, just as 
psychoanalysis is always to come, so is psychoanalytic criticism. That said I want to 
underline the materiality and hence the efficacy of the text. In conjunction with – in 
Deleuzean terms in an assemblage with (TP:4) – a text we can be transformed in 
otherwise inaccessible ways. However, such transformation cannot be effected by 
the text unilaterally – as the 70s psychoanalytic film theory to be discussed in chapter 
one briefly came close to claiming. Transformation is not in the gift of the text alone. 
The point can be made through an analogy with that strand of Catholic theology 
which holds that the gift of grace is not at our command but can only arrive if we are 
appropriately disposed: as the Catechism has it: ‘God’s free initiative demands man’s 
free response’ (Catechism, 1994:485). Similarly, the work of the text makes available 
otherwise unavailable modes of existence, but only if the reader or spectator is 
disposed to cooperate in the encounter. Exchanging the theological for the biological, 
the point could be made as follows: just as changes in milieu can give a living being 
more options but only if it is disposed to take them up, so a text can afford new 
potentialities but only if the reader or spectator is inclined to explore them. Lacan 
holds a similar view. After, in structuralist vein, suggesting that ‘language determines 
the subject’ he immediately qualifies this proposal by adding that the process will not 
occur without the subject ‘contributing something of his own to it’ (E:31). A text 
achieves what Colette Soler terms ‘a subjective conversion’ only if the subject 
willingly contributes (Soler, 2009:6).  Hence the nature of textual encounters is often 
unforeseeable – so the suggestions in this thesis as to how a text might function are 
precisely suggestions.  
For example, it is a commonplace that much mainstream film is given over to 
fantasy. Now, while on many occasions, such films may function as diverting, 
entertaining amusements, on others they may be altogether more pernicious. If a 
spectator takes refuge from the vicissitudes and ‘pain of existing’ in identification 
with idealised characters endowed with superhuman powers and fantasies where 
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people live in blissful accord, it may ultimately give his own life an even more 
distressing aspect (Lacan, 1958-9: Session of 8/4/59 p. 9). The fantasies supposed to 
relieve his condition may start to weigh upon him. He and his life may suffer 
depressingly by comparison. As Lacan notes many subjects tend to absurdly imagine 
there is ‘someone who is altogether “happier”’ who ‘lives harmoniously,’ who 
‘doesn’t ask any questions…sleeps soundly in his bed and enjoys ‘superabundant 
vitality.’ Art propagating this burdensome ‘mirage,’ can have serious political 
consequences for, if subjects subscribe to unrealisable ideals, they are then prone to 
making unrealisable demands on self and others (S.VII:237). Hence the argument in 
this thesis for art – and critical approaches to art - which are worthy of what happens 
to us, that is art which has no truck with fantasy or idealisation. We will come back 
to this. For the moment, the key point is that it is impossible to foretell with certainty 
what will occur in an art-encounter. ‘In psychoanalysis there is no predictability’ 
(Harari, 1996:121). 
3. An essential theoretical preliminary: The Lack in the Other 
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This section of the theoretical preliminary sets out a key conceptual point of 
reference, the lack in the Other, and introduces a model of textual functioning which 
will inform much of the rest of the thesis. For Lacan, ‘the most primordial relationship 
of the subject is the relationship to the Other’ and the Other is lacking (Lacan, 
2013a:439). Like all of Lacan’s principal concepts, this notion has different meanings 
at different times. For present purposes, four are particularly important. First 
language is the language of the Other. We are more the inheritors than the authors 
of language and we discover that, in the language of the Other, ‘saying it all is literally 
impossible: words fail’ (T:3). Any saying can only be a ‘half-saying’ (S.XVII:110). When 
trying to express the truth of self or desire ‘one only half-tells (mi-dire) it’ (S.XX:92). 
However, as social beings we are compelled to speak even of what cannot be put into 
words. ‘Whereof we cannot speak thereof one cannot stay silent’ (Davoine and 
Gaudillière, 2004). Although, if there is a lack in the Other, not all can be made clear 
between us, ‘saying is necessary’ – ‘il faut le dire’ (Lacan, 2001a:472). In doing so, 
while we cannot say it all, we can aspire to speak well. This is the ethics of what Lacan 
calls ‘bien-dire,’ and it gives us a first way of thinking about what art can accomplish 
(Lacan, 2001:541). Following Badiou’s suggestion that some poetry can be thought 
of as ‘bien-dire’, this thesis makes a similar claim for other artworks, and in particular 
films like Éloge de l’amour (Badiou, 2004:235). Here, as elsewhere: ‘ethics and 
aesthetics are one and the same’ (Wittgenstein, 1921:71 – 6.421). If, as Deleuze 
observes, every film entails a ‘choice of existence,’ bien-dire is the choice of a mode 
worthy of the event (TRM:283). To clarify with a literary example:  Proust’s novel is 
as close to being an instance of bien-dire as the narrator’s obsessive, jealous brooding 
over his love, Albertine – ‘captive’ in his apartment - is distant (Proust, 1913-27).  
The specifically Lacanian point here is that in speaking well the speaker is 
transformed – the process of enunciation creates the speaker – there is a becoming. 
As Christian Fierens notes, for Lacan speech can be ‘the act in which the subject 
comes into being’ (l’acte dans lequel le sujet advient) (Fierens, 2012a:97). On this 
account film can, like other art forms, be a way of speaking in which the making 
something new of an issue is the making something other of the subject. The 
correlation is crucial. As Kierkegaard observed, how one is can alter the significance 
of what is – as he puts it: when the ‘How is scrupulously rendered the What is also 
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given’ (Kierkegaard, 1967:351). With a change in the subject, for example, through 
the surpassing of egoic modes, the real can come to matter differently. 
The answer to the unanswerable questions posed by the lack in the Other, is not 
a formulation but an existential change in the subject. It is the contention of this 
thesis that artworks can enable such existential transformations. This point has been 
articulated in lines of thought as diverse as those of Christianity, Sartre and 
Nietzsche. In its most interesting Christian form the point is made by the notion that 
a prayer in the appropriate form can be its own answer. The act of praying can 
produce an existential change in the believer which gives him or her a new outlook 
that is as close as he or she can get to a solution to the inescapable vicissitudes of 
life. To anticipate: it will be argued below that certain artworks can similarly be their 
own answer. This argument was adumbrated by Sartre in his discussion of the 
marvellous lines of Rimbaud cited above: 
Ô saisons, Ô châteaux, 
Quelle âme est sans défauts ? 
The question, in the second line, Sartre claims ‘involves no answer.’ Rather, he goes 
on: ‘it is its own answer’ (Sartre, 1948:9). Taking Sartre’s line of thought in a different 
direction, my argument is that, insofar as there is an answer to the unanswerable 
problems of existence, it resides in an existential change in the questioner. It is this 
point which Nietzsche articulated so powerfully when he claimed that ‘The superman 
is the meaning of the earth,’ and continued: ‘Let your will say: The Superman shall be 
the meaning of the earth!’ (Nietzsche, 1891:42) In other words, the best response to 
our predicament is a self-overcoming such that problems take on another hue and 
matters another aspect. While the meaning is not disclosed, others become 
accessible. The terms of existential questions as to the meaning of life interdepend 
with modes of subjectivity. If the subjective mode changes so can the terms of the 
question – indeed the question may even disappear. The consonance of this with 
psychoanalysis should be immediately apparent since the psychoanalytic cure does 
not consist in the excavation of (supposedly hidden or buried) truths but in processes 
enabling the emergence of a new subject. In analysis ‘what must and can change, is 
the subject’ for, as a result of that transformation, the real can come to matter 
differently (Silvestre, 1987:306). Equally apparent should be the pertinence of this 
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notion of becoming for our thinking about art. If signifiers have the capacity to 
transform the subject in the treatment, it is plausible to argue they possess a similar 
efficacy in art. The style of the work can alter the style of the subject.  
This brings us to the second aspect of the lack in the Other: the difference 
between the half-saying and the subject’s wishes is the index of the difference from 
which all else derives. Born prematurely, as the Lacanian, Philippe Julien notes, a 
human infant unlike ‘the majority of baby animals, whose mobility and capacity to 
feed themselves allow them to survive on their own’ (Julien, 1990a:30) ‘is delivered 
over, from the start, to the other’s goodwill.’ Hence, every child is ‘condemned to 
sociality or death’ (Julien, 1990b:46).  The problem with this ineluctable sociality is 
that it entails assuming the place assigned by the Other – initially the caregiver(s) – 
but, as alluded to above, the place is absent. Since there is never an exact fit between 
occupant and place, Lacan writes the subject as barred: S/ . To take up a position in 
the languages and institutions of the Other is to know difference and disparity: the 
structural impossibility of being at one with a socially assigned place. As Žižek puts it, 
‘the original human condition is of being out of joint’ (Žižek, 1999:16). So, in the 
beginning there is difference. ‘The subject begins with the cut’ insofar as it cut off 
from the place but there is no subject prior to the cut (Lacan, 1966-67: Session of 
16/11/66 p. 5). The subject is not initially a unity and then divided; it is born split: at 
once included in and excluded from the Other; at the same time, dependent on the 
language of the Other for its existence and incommensurable with the signifier. 
Difference is constitutive of the subject. While the body and language are irreducibly 
heterogeneous, they ceaselessly interact. The subject is ‘defined as a cut’ (Lacan, 
1965-66: Session of 8/12/65 p. 11) because language, by summoning us to identities, 
roles and places, ‘cuts up the body’’ and because the subject’s body, in its turn, cuts 
when it seeks to tailor the world to its wishes (Wright, 1999:77). 
Any assumption of an assigned identity comes at a cost: a ‘pound of flesh’ has to 
be paid (Lacan, 1977:28). Consequently, the individual feels that in becoming a social 
subject something of life and being has been lost. To be a subject is, therefore, to 
lack and to desire what is lacking, namely what Lacan terms the object ‘a’ (E:4). The 
subject is a cut in that the condition of possibility of the subject is separation from 
the object – one reason why it is termed the object a is that, as Fierens, following 
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Pierre Bruno notes, it is a priori: it is the condition not only of the subject’s existence 
but ‘preliminary to the appearance of every object; no object appears except on the 
basis of this object a’ (Fierens, 2010a:12). Further, it is at once, in the real of its 
absence, the cause of desire and in its imaginary forms the object of desire. Since it 
is irretrievably lost, desire is unassuageable.  
This introduces a further aspect of the lack in the Other for, when a subject seeks 
to remedy this lack by making demands upon another subject or when another 
makes a comparable demand upon him or her, the demand is never met in full. As 
Bob Dylan has it, the man ‘wants eleven-dollar bills, you only got ten’ (Dylan, 1965). 
Since every singular subject is in pursuit of a different object a, desires are 
incongruent and asymmetrical. This is particularly evident, Lacan claims, in the 
absence of reciprocity within sexual relationships. This is the third aspect of the lack 
in the Other relevant for this thesis and one meaning of Lacan’s claim that ‘there’s 
no such thing as a sexual relation’ (S.XX:34). Not only is there no ‘formula’ (Bruce 
Fink, translator’s footnote 26 in S.XX:7) or recipe for a sexual relationship – the Other 
of language is lacking – and hence an exigency to experiment, there is no 
complementarity – outside of fantasy subjects cannot make each other whole 
(E:524). The Other who would complete us does not exist hence for heterosexual 
males the woman, - that is, the woman supposedly incarnating the irremediably lost 
object - whom Lacan terms ‘La Femme,’ does not exist (S.XX:73). Compounding the 
difficulties associated with the incongruity of desires is the further impossibility, 
mentioned above, of making desire clear: the ‘mystery’ of ‘the nature of… desire’ is 
‘never entirely resolved’ (S.VII:237). If there is a lack in the Other (of language), others 
are as much an enigma to the subject as he or she is to him or herself. The other is 
no more transparent to the subject than the subject is to himself. ‘Subjective opacity’ 
is ineradicable from intersubjectivity (E:689). 
This matters in the present context because the overwhelming majority of 
narratives in literature and film concern the problematic world of conflicting 
demands and asymmetrical desires. Both of our principal textual examples, Éloge de 
l’amour and India Song address this issue. In the former the unmet demands of the 
vice-consul and the beggar-woman are hurled into the night while the 
disappointment of Stretter’s unspoken desires precipitates her suicide. As for 
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Godard, if, as he has remarked, he has ‘made love stories and stories of couples, 
those stories have rarely been happy (Jean-Luc Godard cited in Sterritt, 2014:386). 
Relationships disintegrate in À bout de souffle (Godard, France 1960),  Le Mépris 
(Godard, France 1963), Pierrot le fou (Godard, France1965), Masculin Féminin 
(Godard, France 1966), Sauve qui Peut (Godard, France 1980) , and Prénom Carmen 
(Godard, France 1983). In Éloge de l’amour, while Edgar may not be directly 
responsible for Berthe’s suicide, his unfeeling, dismissive behaviour could well have 
contributed. The claim of this thesis is that Lacan is of continuing interest because his 
teaching can illuminate something of what is at stake in such narratives, but that 
psychoanalysis has not always taken full account of what art can make of the issue. 
Finally, the lack in the Other is Lacan’s variant on Nietzsche’s claim that God is 
dead: to say the Other is lacking is to say that the Other ‘doesn’t exist’ (E:695). There 
is no god-like Other who can act as guarantor – no ‘Other of the Other’ (Lacan, 
2013a:441). Therefore, as noted above: ‘the way does not exist’ (Nietzsche, 
1891:213). Consequently, we are ineluctably condemned to experiment. Now, as 
psychoanalysis attests, the experiment is often botched. As an example, consider one 
of Freud’s most notorious case studies, that of Little Hans - a case which is selected 
here because it will prove useful in later chapters (Freud, 1905a). Hans, the four-year-
old son of a friend of Freud had problems. As always in psychoanalysis, the nature of 
these is disputed but they seem to have included, an over-anxious mother, an 
ineffectual father, an awakening sexuality (he had erections) and, finally, the arrival 
of a sibling rival in the form of a baby sister of whom he was initially very jealous – 
he was overheard to say ‘But I don’t want a baby sister!’ Hans responded to these 
problems by developing a phobic fear of going out in the street, where he believed a 
horse would bite him (Freud, 1905a:174). We shall return to Little Hans below when 
discussing Deleuze’s critique of Freud, because Deleuze, as we shall see, is withering 
in his assessment of Freud’s handling of the case (D:80). For the moment, the only 
point being made is that, as a solution to his situation, Hans’s phobia brought as many 
problems as it solved.  
In contrast to the distressed little boy’s botched experiment are those which 
succeed in finding a more vital way of responding to the problems posed by the real. 
My claim is that art in the mode of bien-dire can take the form of an experiment 
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which is altogether happier than the responses marked by, say, self-indulgence, 
despair, self-pity, neurosis, phobia or depression or indeed the everyday, petty, 
small-minded, mean-spirited, peevish, irritable responses to setbacks and 
disappointments. To be clear, the argument here is not – absurdly – that art is the 
response – innumerable people, who have little or no commerce with art, have found 
their own equally satisfying solutions. It is just to claim that art can be a response and 
that one answer to the question of what art does is that it can afford a more vital 
way of answering the real as impossible than many alternatives.  
Godard’s practice is exemplary here. No film-maker is more aware of the fact that 
it is as impossible to stay silent as it is to say it all. Every film shouts his pain but rather 
than mere expressions of suffering they constitute paradigmatic instances of bien-
dire. In response to the thwarting and frustrating of his projects he produces 
indictments of corporate capitalism and American cultural imperialism. Out of the 
wrongs which can no longer be righted – the horrors of the twentieth century - he 
creates work denying audiences any comfort. In respect of the wrongs which can be 
righted – for example, in Éloge de l’amour, homelessness, the drudgery of low-paid 
servitude and anti-Semitism – he contributes campaign material. And from his 
central theme, the asymmetries of desire, he conjures poetry. His films do not merely 
acknowledge the non-existence of the Other, they respond to the exigencies and 
opportunities which the absence of the way constitutes by opening ways that enable 
the real to be thought differently. Just as, on occasion, physical and psychical health 
can be restored in NHS institutions enabling those treated to be more alive, so, on 
occasion, encounters with the institutions of art (in the modes of bien-dire) can 
enable subjects to enjoy a more vital existence. The theatre director Peter Brook’s 
contention that ‘every form of theatre has something in common with a visit to the 
doctor. On the way out, one should always feel better than on the way in,’ should 
hold for every encounter with art in the mode of bien-dire (Peter Brook cited in 
Billington, 2017:15). 
To conclude: the argument of this section is that psychoanalysis, and more 
specifically experimentation with the hypothesis of the lack in the Other, is of 
continuing value in thinking the event of art. Consider the graph situated at the 
beginning of this section and to which reference will be made at later junctures 
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(E:692). It is of interest as an early attempt by Lacan to diagram some of the effects 
of the lack in the Other. As not all of these effects are important for our immediate 
purposes, I will confine the exposition to the immediately relevant. In broad outline, 
it is a diagram of the act of speaking. The lower vector is that of the signifying chain 
and the upper that of the drives. On the right-hand side, both encounter the lack in 
the Other: at the lower level the impossibility, in the absence of the key signifiers, of 
saying it all: S(O); on the upper level the impossibility of demands being met either 
by the subject or its others: S/◊D.  On the left-hand side, there is what is made of these 
encounters by ‘the barred subject’ produced by the act of speaking (E:696). In a 
retrograde movement from right to left the subject tends to respond to the lack in 
the Other of language, to the discovery the Other is barred (Lacan, 2013a:441), that 
is marked by ‘inconsistency’ and ‘incompleteness’ (Ø) (Miller, 1995a:36), with an 
imaginary image of wholeness – the image is designated i(a) and the ego constituted 
by it: e.2 To make good the lack in the Other which occasions desire (d) it tends to 
respond with a fantasy: S/ ◇ a. In other words, the tendency is to short circuit the 
effects of the lack in the Other by taking refuge in idealized images or fantasies. 
Plainly this is the strategy which prevails in mainstream contracted cinema 
and of which psychoanalysis provides a persuasive account. The argument of this 
thesis is that psychoanalysis can be equally useful in our thinking the event of bien-
                                                          
2 Henceforth the designation of the barred Other will be left untranslated: Ⱥ. This is 
to avoid the confusion that might arise from usage of the English equivalent Ø. That 
symbol, which customarily denotes the contents of the empty set, is employed by 
Lacan to relate the barred subject to the number zero. For Frege, as Anthony Kenny 
usefully points out, ‘[s]ince each thing is identical with itself, nothing falls under the 
concept not identical with itself (Kenny, 1995:92)..  Hence, in the number order, Frege 
considers zero – that is nothing – is best thought of as the number belonging to the 
concept ‘not identical with itself’ (Gottlob Frege cited in Kenny, 1995:92). In an echo 
of Sartre’s claim that the for-itself – the most important philosophical precursor of 
the Lacanian subject - is ‘the being which is what it is not and is not what it is’ (Sartre, 
1943:57-8), Lacan claims that, if the Other is barred (Ⱥ) the subject is not self-identical 
and is therefore also barred: (S/). (S.XI:226, Miller, 1977-78:32).  
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dire. The graph supports my contention that it can because it emphasizes that 
subjectivity is a matter of vectors and trajectories. In Deleuzean terms: lines (TP:8-9). 
Lacan described his style as ‘a thought in motion’ (SI:1), and this is equally apt as a 
description of art in the manner of bien-dire which proceeds in the knowledge that 
‘where there is no path’ – where the path does not exist – ‘there is only the 
travelling’3. Art can be a mode of that travelling. ‘What,’ Jacques-Alain Miller asks ‘is 
[the] graph?’ and answers: ‘it is a set of pathways’ (Miller, J-A., 1998:21). The claim 
of this thesis is that many artworks can similarly be usefully thought of as a set of 
pathways. The merit of the graph is to bring out something of the nature of those 
pathways: they can be multi-stranded, multi-levelled and multi-directional. Further 
the movement forward is accompanied by a retrograde movement and the 
perpetually renewed movement is punctuated by moments of stability. Thinking is a 
way-making which assumes forms far from common-sense notions of a unitary, 
linear progress. It responds to the cut that is the lack in the Other with a play of lines, 
cuts, points and, as we shall see, knots. It makes of the problems posed by the barred 
Other (Ⱥ) not an imaginary whole but pathways. My claim is that the thinking in the 
event of art in the mode of bien-dire is a proceeding on these pathways.  
Psychoanalysis is of continuing value for, as Lacan adamantly insisted, it is not 
a psychology (E:673, 681, S.XX:83). As the graph insists, the subject is not a unitary 
being. It is a relationship; more precisely it is shifting relationships. Stephen Heath, 
at his most astute, discerned this when he fastened on Lacan’s earlier description of 
the subject as ‘pulled to the four corners’ (Heath, 1976-77:51) of schema L: 
 
                                                          
3 This phrase, the title of the thesis derives from the epigraph to Luigi Nono’s No hay 
caminos, hay que caminar which was taken from an inscription on the wall of a 
thirteenth century cloister in Toledo: ‘Pilgrim, there is no pathway only travelling 
itself.’ 
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Lacan explains: the S designates the subject’s ‘ineffable and stupid existence,’ that is, 
the Freudian id (in German Es). The a designates ‘his objects’ – the world of objects 
organised around and centred on a’ ‘his ego,’ that is, his narcissistically invested 
image (as given in the mirror). Hence Lacan’s claim that the ‘form’ of his identification 
is ‘reflected in his objects’ (E:459). Finally, A as ‘the locus from which the question of 
his existence may arise for him’ is at once the language of the Other, where he is 
summoned to an assigned place from which, as there is no exact fit, he is perpetually 
displaced and the unconscious – the discourse of the Other – which calls in question 
his narcissistic self-image (E:459). In light of this Heath emphasises that the 
psychoanalytic subject ‘is not any thing, is defined topologically and not punctually, 
is the action of a structure’ (Heath, 1976-77:50). On this account, the subject is in 
movement and to use a Deleuzean term which will recur in this thesis ‘between’ 
(TP:25), in this case, ‘the four corners’ (E:459). If, as the later Lacan held, the Other is 
barred, the subject is between the real of its being, (while dependent on signifiers it 
is never at one with them), and its symbolic identity (which assigns a place which is 
never the place). The ‘function of the subject is in the between-the-two’ (Jacques 
Lacan cited in Pluth, 2007:15). 
Analysis ends not with the analysand obtaining ‘the complete picture’ but with 
an alteration of relationships such that the real matters differently. In support of my 
contention that psychoanalysis is of continuing interest, I argue that this gives a 
useful way of considering the thinking which occurs in those artworks where the 
priority is not the representation or critique of a reality with an existing currency but 
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an alteration of the relationships constitutive of the subject such that the real 
assumes another aspect. Where for the neurotic, the Ⱥ is the occasion for despair, 
for the artist it is the opportunity for path-breaking. Just as some believers find a 
prayer is its own answer, so artists in the register of bien-dire find that creation is its 
own justification for the thinking which then occurs – in contrast to burdensome 
neurotic brooding – unburdens.  
 
a. Cinema as bien-dire 
 
As an example of the cinema of bien-dire let’s consider L’Amour Fou (Rivette, France 
1969) a film about the disintegration of the marriage of an actor (Claire) and a theatre 
director (Sebastien). He is directing her in the role of Hermione in Andromaque when, 
in rehearsal, she objects to his manner, complains she cannot work in the 
circumstances – (a film-maker has been invited to make a ‘fly-on-the-wall’ 
documentary of the production) – and walks out. The remainder of the film – some 
four hours – charts the ensuing collapse of their marriage, a crisis in the theatrical 
production and the mental breakdown of first Claire and then Sebastien. If, as Rivette 
has acknowledged, it has ‘some autobiographic aspects’ – claiming he chose Jean-
Pierre Kalfon to play the director ‘because he didn’t resemble me at all’ - it is a good 
example of bien-dire as a being worthy of the event (Jacques Rivette cited in Wiles, 
2012:140). The unremarkable content underlines the extent to which what counts is 
less what is represented than the way in which it is enunciated. Bien-dire in this 
instance resides in the clarity and freedom of a style which bespeaks a choice of 
existence, and which, in making something new of the issue, enables Rivette to 
become other. 
 
b. Textual functioning and the lack in the other 
 
   ‘Poetry is not the thing said, but a way of saying it.’ 
A.E. Housman (A. E. Housman cited in Hamburger, 1972:24) 
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Housman’s remark suggests an approach to thinking forms of textual functioning not 
only for poetry but for certain forms of cinema. On this model, an artwork is a 
response to the real as impossible where the real is the impossibility of, for example, 
finding the way. Rather than an illustration or representation of this lack – what 
purpose would that serve? - it is a way of proceeding.  If there is a lack in the Other, 
‘the subject’s primary position’ is, as Colette Soler remarks, ‘a problem’ (Soler, 
1996:254).  More precisely, we confront problems without solutions for the subject 
is, as Aaron Schuster puts it, ‘a question without an answer’ (Schuster, 2016:165). 
Adopting a phrase of the English philosopher, R. G. Collingwood, Guy le Gaufey 
argues we should view Lacan’s teaching in terms of ‘“question-answer-complexes”’ 
(le Gaufey, 2016:36). This thesis argues that a psychoanalysis to come should 
consider certain artworks in a similar perspective, that is, as ways of responding to 
problems without answer which yet answer in forms worthy of what happens to us. 
 On this account, art begins with a problem which, more often than not, exists 
prior to the work.  It is this problem which gives the work its initial interest and 
explains why it matters to its audience, why we care. Problems assume countless 
forms. Some admit of an immediate solution: for example, the injustices of the 
current benefit system, as portrayed in I Daniel Blake, could be removed at a stroke 
by legislation and better provision. Others like the problems between Claire and 
Sebastian appear more intractable. In the present conjuncture it seems the only 
answer to problems in the latter category is at the level of style. This then gives us a 
means of distinguishing between different modes of cinematic bien-dire. All involve 
both – to adopt Housman’s and, as we shall see, Lacan’s terms - a saying and a said, 
that is a style bespeaking an attitude and an abstractable representational content 
which can be extracted from the work and taken up in extra-cinematic discussion as 
has happened with I, Daniel Blake (Question Time, BBC 1, 2016). However, there is a 
difference in emphasis. In the latter, the work is largely at the level of what is 
represented while in the former the style must undertake more of the work. 
Psychoanalysis is of continuing interest as it can contribute to consideration of both 
forms of cinematic thinking for libidinal investments are always in play. The 
ideological burden of films at the pole of content/representation is subtended by the 
workings of desire. If we are moved and outraged when Daniel Blake’s friend Katie is 
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driven by hunger to steal at the food bank, it is because we care. However, since the 
importance of libidinal investments has been convincingly established - not least, as 
we shall see, by Žižek - the focus of this thesis will be on the second pole, that is, 
works whose style of bien-dire alters the subject and thereby how the real matters.  
The achievement of such films is thrown into relief by contrasting them with 
films which peddle easy solutions. If there is a lack in the Other, the terms in which 
the problem is posed are not given: there is latitude as to the mode of figuration. If, 
for example, the problem is structural, say the impossibility of being at one or the 
impossibility of finding the place, the real as impossible does not dictate how it will 
be figured. Decisions must be made. These choices in respect of figuration at the 
inception of the work are decisive for its future because they determine the 
‘solutions’ which will be available. At its starkest, there are works where the real is 
no problem at all, for the hero or superhero is more than equal to whatever 
challenges he or she confronts – whatever the odds, he or she prevails. Mission 
Impossible (De Palma, USA 1996) is mission all too possible if Ethan Hunt – the clichéd 
action hero played by Tom Cruise - is on the case. Similarly, there might appear to be 
a serious problem if a U.S. naval vessel with nuclear weapons is seized by deranged 
terrorists, but the solution is child’s play if the ship’s cook has a background in Special 
Forces (Under Siege, Davis, USA 1992). On the other hand, there are works which 
eschew fantasmatic solutions. Thus, two poles could be distinguished in cinema. At 
one pole would be texts which set up a problem in terms susceptible of easy solutions 
where, for example, Wayne has only to swing his fist or Eastwood to gun down a 
battalion of villains for all to come right. The raison d’être of such films is the 
simplification of our situation in terms which permit the rehearsal of the usual erotic 
and sadistic fantasies.   Django Unchained (Tarantino, USA 2012) can serve as an 
example. Django, a slave, is separated from his wife Broomhilda and suffers 
appallingly. The solution is plain: freedom from the abomination of slavery and 
reunion with the beloved Broomhilda. As Django becomes peerless in both gunplay 
and the setting of explosives, this proves to be well within his compass and the film 
becomes just another opportunity for audiences to feast upon the sadistic pleasures 
of watching Django take his revenge upon the cruel slave-owners and their vicious 
cohorts. At the other pole are artworks and films which set up a problem in terms 
  39 
which debar any final resolution and where, in consequence, the best that can be 
achieved is an answering in the mode of bien-dire.  Obvious literary examples include 
Hamlet (Shakespeare, c1600, reprinted 2016a) where the son is called upon to 
perform the impossible task of putting right what has gone wrong in his parents’ 
generation, Ulysses (Joyce, 1922), which addresses - among many other issues - the 
impossibility of any son being the son or any father the father, and The Trial (Kafka, 
1925) which is a response to the impossibility – outside delusion – of achieving accord 
in judgments informed by desire. Comparable examples in cinema are those at the 
centre of this thesis: the films of Godard as responses to the impossibility (at least in 
capitalist modernity) of intimate relationships being free of non-reciprocity and those 
of Duras where it is impossible to overcome or circumvent the opacity of the Other.  
I shall term films close to the first pole: contracted cinema. They begin by 
responding to the real as impossible. How could they not? While we may prefer to 
forget the real as impossible, it will not forget us. However, they replace questions 
without answer with resolvable problems. The strategy is to contract irresolvable 
issues to problems susceptible of easy resolution. Works of contracted cinema have 
a specified goal – the telos of the narrative – and typically a paragon, whose 
proficiency and moral superiority guarantee its attainment. Any questions which 
arise – for example, who committed the crime? will the hero save the day? can the 
villain be brought to book? -  have ready-made answers. The only question becomes 
when and how the narrative goal will be attained. Everything contracts to a single 
question: what will happen next? And the answer is at hand. 
In contrast, films around the second pole which I term – with apologies to 
Gene Youngblood who coined the term for very different purposes (Youngblood, 
1970) – expanded cinema, that is films which, unflinchingly accept that, if the Other 
is marked by incompleteness and inconsistency, there can be neither final 
significations in relation to such concerns as identity, desire and death nor a defined 
and ordained telos. Instead there are only modes of bien-dire, ways of being and 
becoming in relation to the exigencies of the real. Eschewing idealization and fantasy, 
this cinema expands our sense of what of life and joy are possible. This is not to argue 
that contracted cinema can never be an instance of bien-dire. The Tree of Wooden 
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Clogs (Olmi, Italy 1978) is exemplary in this regard. The ‘minimal narrative’ concerns 
Batisti, a peasant farmer in nineteenth century Lombardy, whose priest persuades 
him that his gifted son should be educated (Landy, 2000:161-2). On his long daily 
journey to school the boy breaks one of his clogs so Batisti, who is too impoverished 
to have any other resource, fells one of the landowner’s trees to manufacture a 
replacement. When the landowner discovers this ‘crime’, he evicts Batisti. In the final 
scene, the other subjugated peasants watch silently as the family load their cart and 
set off into a future of ‘starvation and squalor’ (Landy, 2000:164). Olmi’s film is an 
instance of contracted cinema for it has a telos, namely the indictment of the ‘base 
cruelty’ of exploitative landowners but, as one of the most powerful arguments for 
socialism in the history of cinema, it is also a paradigmatic instance of bien-dire 
(Bondanella, 2009:257). Nor is it to argue that a particular text necessarily belongs in 
its entirety to a single category. Many films straddle both. India Song is close to the 
pole of contracted cinema when addressing the evils of colonialism and closer to 
expanded cinema when dealing with the opacities associated with desire and 
identity. Similarly, Éloge de l’amour is in the mode of contracted cinema when 
indicting society’s treatment of the homeless but switches to more expanded forms 
when speaking of what is wanting in Edgar. 
 The argument is only that if psychoanalytic approaches are to be of 
continuing interest they must go beyond the critique of fantasy-ridden forms of 
contracted cinema and become worthy of the event of expanded cinema. And 
further that psychoanalysis has the capacity to develop in this direction insofar as it 
is similarly committed to effecting a change in the spectator such that the real comes 
to matter differently.  
 
a. Two objections 
 
Two charges might be laid against this approach. First that, in its concern with a real 
which resists representation, it fails to recognise the overriding importance of the 
politics of representation. Second, that the thesis is no more than a hymn to 
aestheticisation. Both misconceive the purport of my argument. Let’s consider the 
objections in turn.  
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The Politics of Representation 
 
The first objection is rebutted by the tribute paid to The Tree of Wooden Clogs, but 
two points are worth adding to clarify my argument. First, a consideration of cinema 
as a response to the real as impossible is to the exclusion of neither history nor 
politics. There is no reason to hold forms of the real as impossible to be ahistorical 
invariants. Although, at present, the (Lacanian) hypothesis that, in certain areas of 
human existence, the place does not exist seems persuasive, this does not prove that 
such modes of the real as impossible will always obtain. On what grounds could that 
be established? Nor does the hazarded hypothesis deny the possibility of 
amelioration. Psychoanalysis, like progressive politics, is engaged in the construction 
of happier, more hospitable and more enabling places. And contracted cinema with 
a determinate, realisable telos, like Olmi’s film, can play a role in promoting just such 
changes in the larger social sphere and thereby be worthy of the event. This is the 
achievement of two recent examples: A Touch of Sin (Jia Zhangke, China 2013) and 
Leviathan (Zvyagintsev, Russia 2014). The former, as Mark Kermode notes, is a ‘state 
of the nation document’ whose representation of the ‘purgatorial pain’ of life in 
contemporary China as provoking insurrectional acts of violence against the venal 
and brutal power structure, by social isolates and outsiders prompted the party to 
delay its release (Kermode, 2014:27). Leviathan is a similarly scathing indictment of 
the self-interested, corrupt and oppressive nature of local government in Putin’s 
Russia.  If bien-dire is being worthy of what happens to us, then, in many 
circumstances bien-dire will take the form of such films and progressive interventions 
in the debates around their veracity and ideological effectivity. 
My argument – the second point - is only, while not denying the legitimacy, 
exigency and urgency of the political struggles around representation, that certain 
works are more than the sum of their representations. Here Lacan and Deleuze are 
agreed. ‘Of course,’ Lacan acknowledges, ‘works of art imitate the objects they 
represent, but,’ he continues, ‘their end is certainly not to represent them,’ for ‘in 
offering the imitation of an object, they make something different out of that object’ 
(S.VII:141). More pithily, Deleuze insists, ‘no art is imitative’ (TP:304). Ulysses and 
India Song represent the effects of colonial oppression and exploitation but the work 
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of the work in both cases also achieves something else, which, on occasion, may be 
of moment. But before exploring the nature of that ‘something else’ let’s consider 
the second objection. 
 
I. Aestheticisation 
 
A further charge could be that psychoanalysis has no future if, rather than being 
worthy of the event, it becomes complicit with and an apologia for the evasions 
which are the supposed hallmark of ‘aestheticisation’. However, this charge is wide 
of the mark on two counts. First, this thesis is concerned not with aesthetics but 
health. It extends Deleuze’s claim that literature is ‘an enterprise of health’ to all 
artforms (ECC:3). In this perspective, art is viewed as a vital form of thought which 
contrasts with more baleful modes. We are in the middle of a mental health crisis. 
According to the charity Mind ‘approximately 1 in 4 people in the UK will experience 
a mental health problem each year’ and during these episodes patients are afflicted 
by incapacitating, tormenting and painful forms of thought (Mind, 2017). It is against 
this background that the thinking which occurs in art should be viewed. That thinking 
should be measured not against some ideal of say heroic, stoical, steadfastness but 
against (often unhappy) actually existing modes. This is not to claim – ridiculously 
and offensively - that art is the answer. If the Other is barred (Ⱥ), the answer does 
not exist. It is only to argue that art can be one of the sites – there are innumerable 
others – where life-enhancing as opposed to life-sapping forms of thought may occur.  
India Song can again serve as an example.  Duras described the photograph 
of the dead Stretter, surrounded by roses situated on the piano in the reception 
scene, as ‘the altar of pain – of my pain,’ before adding, ‘the source of the film lay 
there’ (Duras, 1980:46).  My argument is that, if suffering was Duras’s point of 
departure it was no more than that. The work of the film is not reducible to the 
expression of pre-existing affects. On the contrary, by making something new and 
creating another response to the problem(s) which occasioned such anguish, it leaves 
pain in its wake. As even Allen Ginsberg would surely have allowed, a poem is not a 
howl. No more is India Song. 
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The second reason this thesis is not open to a charge of aestheticism is that it is 
located in the post-aesthetic era inaugurated by Heidegger’s ‘The Origin of the Work 
of Art’ (Heidegger, 2002) in which, as Miguel de Beistegui notes, Heidegger seeks ‘to 
begin to think of art outside aesthetics’ (de Beistegui, 2005:130). In Heideggerian 
vein, artworks, like Éloge de l’amour, will be thought of as events rather than as 
objects of disinterested aesthetic contemplation and as ‘the happening of truth’ 
rather than as vehicles for pre-existing ideologies (Heidegger, 2002:33). As in 
Heidegger, the emphasis will be on the ‘work-being’ of the works not their ‘object-
being’ (Heidegger, 2002:20). This is not to say that this thesis is Heideggerian for the 
Lacanian components turn on the notion of the subject which Heidegger eschewed 
as metaphysical (Heidegger, 2002:49). More generally, Heidegger’s ontology is too 
unpeopled to be of much use in our thinking of cinematic narratives whether Avatar 
or India Song. Where Heidegger claimed art to be born of the strife (Heidegger, 
2002:26) between world - roughly, the horizon of intelligibility - and earth – roughly 
the materiality which resists signification (Heidegger, 2002:27) – this thesis will 
present art as, more frequently, better conceived as a form of thought occasioned by 
the strife between the symbolic (roughly societal imperatives) and the real – here, 
the ‘vital immanence’ of the body and its impulses (Lacan, 1961-62: Session of 
20/12/61 p. 2). So, although Heideggerian claims such as ‘the truth that opens itself 
in the work can never be verified or derived from what went before’ (Heidegger, 
2002:47) and that ‘as a work, the work holds open the open of a world’ (Heidegger, 
2002:23), will find an echo in this thesis, the terms of the post-aesthetic here will be 
predominantly Lacanian (in part one) and Deleuzean (in part two). 
To conclude - if the barred Other (Ⱥ) is functioning, the real has to be thought by 
a thinking without resting place. We are, of necessity, always already under way. 
Famously Diane Vreeland remarked ‘the eye must travel’ and so must thought 
(Vreeland, 2011). As Beckett’s Unnamable insists we ‘must go on’ (Beckett, 
1959:418). Art as bien-dire can be a less troublesome and more vital way of doing so. 
If ‘the poem’, as Paul Celan wrote is ‘underway’ so are films like Éloge de l’amour and 
that is their chance of creating new senses and values (Paul Celan cited in Lacoue-
Labarthe, 1986:32).  
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4. Lessons from Deleuze 
 
In the interests of clarity, extended discussion of Deleuze is postponed until part two. 
However, to relegate his philosophy entirely to the latter stages of this thesis would 
be to miss too many opportunities in the first part to demonstrate how a 
psychoanalysis which aspires to be worthy of the event of art could call his thought 
in aid. For that reason, I want to set out five concepts which will be taken up to the 
advantage of psychoanalysis in every chapter. Let’s begin with Deleuze’s claim at the 
beginning of Nietzsche and Philosophy that ‘Nietzsche’s most general project is the 
introduction of the concepts of sense and value into philosophy’ (NP:1). ‘Living,’ 
Nietzsche wrote, ‘mean[s] evaluating’ (Nietzsche, 1886:8). ‘No people could live 
without evaluating’ (Nietzsche, 1891:84). This is the import of the episode with my 
elder grand-daughter: her thinking, on the occasion described, was less 
representation and determination than, in Deleuze’s Nietzschean phrase, a 
‘transmutation of values’ (NP:180). Developing this line of thought, it will be argued 
that psychoanalytic theory could, on occasion, think of artworks less as the 
expression of pre-given meanings and the representation of realities with an existing 
currency than as (r)evaluation. A further Nietzschean point will prove useful in 
explaining how this can be achieved. Deleuze writes:  
‘It is not certain that the question what is this? is a good question, for 
discovering the essence or the Idea. It may be that questions such as who? 
how much? how? where? when? are better’ (DI:94).  
Translating this notion into our thinking of what can happen in the event of art, this 
thesis will argue that art’s construction of spaces, times and styles of existence can 
be more important than representational content when addressing the real as 
impossible. Where, when and how the spectator is can alter who he or she is such 
that new senses and values come into existence. In consequence, although the 
spectator cannot find the answer he or she can find a happier way of answering.  
There is a further reason why the question ‘what is this?’ is not always useful, 
namely that identities are provisional rather than fixed once and for all, because what 
something is depends on the relationships in which it is involved. On this account, we 
should think not in terms of immutable essences but in terms of capacities to affect 
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and be affected. Hence, on many occasions, it is useful to focus not on identities but 
on relations of conjunction and disjunction. Hence the importance, in many contexts 
of Deleuze’s injunction to think in terms of the conjunction ‘AND’ rather than the 
copula ‘IS’ (D:57). 
 It will be argued below that this is a characteristic of modes of thinking 
unique to certain artworks which, rather than claiming this is the case, this is the 
essence of the situation, articulate heterogeneous elements and processes. Thus, 
throughout Duras’ and Godard’s work there are conjunctions of images, words and 
music which are irreducible to each other and which are never subsumed in a single 
proposition. Just as in Beethoven’s late piano sonatas, where there is a perpetual 
oscillation between violence and lyricism, and where the sense is in the interplay, not 
in some supposed essence to be located in either of the components, so in Duras and 
Godard the sense is not in a determinate content but in the play. What matters are 
less things than compositions but - and this brings us to the fourth Deleuzean concept 
namely agencements:4 assemblages or compositions which are not static 
arrangements but dynamic processes. To adopt an earlier Deleuzean formulation, 
each agencement is ‘a “conditioning-conditioned” structure,’ for its elements 
interact in a process of reciprocal transformation - while also relating to the outside 
(LS:266).  
This brings us to the final nexus of concepts: 
territorialisation/deterritorialisation/reterritorialisation. As a first approach to these 
concepts, let’s consider what Ronald Bogue proposes as ‘a paradigmatic instance’ of 
this ‘process of becoming-other,’ namely Olivier Messiaen’s use of birdsong (Bogue, 
2007:36). On Deleuze’s account, ‘Messiaen’s musical rendering of the bird’s refrain,’ 
as Bogue succinctly puts it, ‘deterritorialises that refrain, extracts it from its territorial 
function, and then incorporates it within a musical composition that unfolds along its 
own lines of development’ (Bogue, 2007:36). Following this, I argue that 
                                                          
4 ‘Agencement’ as Martin Joughin notes, is customarily translated as ‘assemblage’, 
‘structure’ or ‘arrangement’ but, following Nick Nesbitt, I will leave it untranslated 
‘to preserve the sense of an ongoing active construction that is lost in the more 
passive English “assemblage.”’ (Nesbitt, 2010:161 footnote 9). 
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psychoanalytic criticism should be more aware of how artworks  through figuration 
and articulation can deterritorialise the words and images in existing representations 
and imaginaries and then reterritorialize them in a new composition –  Godard’s 
citations of Chateaubriand, Simone Weil and Georges Bataille in Éloge de l’amour and 
Duras’s deterritorialisation of the fourteenth of Beethoven’s Diabelli Variations and 
reterritorialisation of it in India Song are powerful examples. In both cases the effect 
is to create new values and senses not least because the territorialisation of these 
elements within the text ‘is inseparable from vectors of deterritorialisation working 
[the text] from within’ (TP:509). In other words, the reterritorialisation of the 
deterritorialised elements in the text has the effect of opening the text to a beyond. 
Paradoxically capture gives rise to the liberation of what Deleuze calls a ‘line of flight’ 
(TP:509). Such lines of flight are not to be conceived as an escapist retreat. As Deleuze 
puts it: ‘to flee is not to renounce action: nothing is more active than a flight’ for here 
to flee is also ‘to put a system to flight’ (D:36). This thesis will argue that a model of 
textual functioning as territorialisation/deterritorialisation, capture/liberation is 
implicit in psychoanalysis and if rendered explicit would enable psychoanalysis to 
become worthier of the event of art. However, before that let’s, in the first chapter, 
survey existing psychoanalytic approaches to cinema. 
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PART ONE 
 
The central argument of this part of the thesis is that psychoanalysis has not always 
been worthy of the event of art but can be. In chapter one I assess what is of 
continuing value in existing approaches. In chapter two I explore different pathways. 
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CHAPTER ONE: PSYCHOANALYTIC FILM THEORY 
 
Introduction 
 
Confessing his ‘embarrassment where art – an element in which Freud did not bathe 
without mishap - is concerned,’ Lacan famously cautioned against the use of 
psychoanalysis when considering matters relating to art (S.XI:ix). This chapter 
constitutes a survey of the most important writers who, disregarding Lacan’s advice, 
adopted psychoanalytic approaches to explore what happens in cinema. It is argued 
that, in many instances, these approaches were unworthy of the event of art insofar 
as they missed, or were unconcerned with, much of what can happen in encounters 
with at least some filmic texts. However, it is far from being an outright 
condemnation. For two reasons. Firstly, if psychoanalytic criticism was unworthy of 
those aspects of the event of art, which are the focus of this thesis, it was because it 
was striving to be worthy of immediate, urgent, and altogether more important 
political events: most obviously post -‘68 radicalism and more particularly second 
wave feminism and the other social movements of the time. As an example, consider 
the work of the most influential theorist, Laura Mulvey (Mulvey, 1975). An artist 
herself, Mulvey is alive to what art can achieve but she recognised that, at certain 
junctures, there were more pressing political tasks to be undertaken. Hence her 
powerful critique of the modes of visual pleasure in narrative cinema. This chapter 
has no criticisms to make of such interventions. Its argument is simply that the focus 
lent by particular political concerns occluded what certain forms of art and cinema 
can achieve. This brings me to the second reason why this chapter is far from being 
outright critique, namely that much of the work done is less reductionist than might 
initially appear. Amidst the ideas which now seem superannuated, there are 
concepts of continuing value so it is worth sifting material which in many respects 
now appears démodé and discredited.  
The chapter falls into three principal sections. First, an examination and 
discussion of the two principal modes of psychoanalytic criticism, namely those 
based on content analyses and those whose focus was rather textual structures and 
mechanisms.  Second, a consideration of feminist interventions in psychoanalytic 
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criticism, which at once demonstrates the efficacy of certain forms of psychoanalytic 
criticism in emancipatory politics and the overall limitations of existing forms of 
psychoanalysis. Third, a consideration of Slavoj Žižek, whose work, while inspiring 
many of the lines of thought below, this thesis, as indicated above, will seek to take 
in a different direction.  
 
Section 1: Content Analyses  
 
The argument of this section is that, when engaged in psychobiography and content 
analyses, psychoanalysis has often been unworthy of the event of art. Rooted in the 
clinic, the tendency in psychoanalytic approaches has been to diagnose and the result 
merely, ‘the tedious listing of unconscious themes in a work’ (Laplanche, 1961:4). 
While such an approach can be useful in determining the issues, it tends to 
undervalue what Gerald L. Bruns termed ‘the work of the work of art’: the thinking 
which can occur in the event of art (Bruns, 1997:13). 
 
Psychobiography  
 
‘I am one thing; my writings are another matter.’ 
Friedrich Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1908:259) 
 
Psychobiographical approaches to art, inspired by Freud’s study of Leonardo, analyse 
texts as the expression of the author’s desires and libidinal disposition (Freud, 1910). 
The argument of this section is that the poverty of such approaches is instructive, 
insofar as it suggests the need to explore other ways of conceiving the thinking which 
occurs in art. Bruce Springsteen can serve as an example. Reportedly, he once said 
that, like every artist, he had been told by someone he was ‘not worth dirt’ – in his 
case, his father - and been viewed by someone else - in his case, his mother - as ‘the 
second coming of the baby Jesus’ (Desert Island Discs, 2016).  In a more recent 
interview, he elaborated on his relationship with his father ‘When my dad looked at 
me, he didn’t see what he needed to see,’ and continued ‘He loved me but he 
couldn’t stand me’ (Desert Island Discs, 2016). Now, while it could be argued that 
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these Oedipal concerns mark songs like Born to Run, they explain neither its 
achievement nor the joy to be found in it (Springsteen, 1975). This is instructive, for 
it suggests that psychoanalysis can miss the extent to which the subject, with art in 
the mode of bien-dire, can become other.  
Returning to cinema, the same argument holds for the work of Bernardo 
Bertolucci, who is open about the Oedipal rivalry he felt for his father, owning that 
the son killing the father is the story of most of his films (Tonetti, 1995:193). Certainly, 
The Conformist (Bertolucci, Italy 1970) can be read in this light. The protagonist, 
Marcello Clerici, is driven ‘to achieve “normality”’ by conforming to the existing 
socio-political in order to overcome his crushing sense of being unacceptably 
different (Restivo, 2010:166). He has good reason to feel an outsider. His deranged 
father is in a lunatic asylum, his morphine-addicted mother is keeping her chauffeur 
as a lover and Marcello has ‘undergone a traumatic homosexual experience’ with 
another chauffeur, Lino (Vighi, 2006:97). Imprisoned in Lino’s room, Marcello resists 
Lino’s sexual advances by picking up and firing the chauffeur’s pistol. Believing 
wrongly that Lino has been killed by a ricocheting bullet, and that he is a murderer, 
Marcello escapes the room but not the sense that he is abnormal. To overcome his 
sense of difference, Marcello becomes intent upon integrating and becoming as 
normal as he imagines others to be. Conformity requires first, a bourgeois marriage 
to a woman, Giulia, who – as he puts it - thinks only of ‘kitchen and bed’ and – as he 
is troubled to the point of delusion – enlistment in a state-sponsored secret 
organisation which carries the war to Mussolini’s enemies. His first mission is, using 
his honeymoon in Paris as a cover, to make contact with his former philosophy tutor, 
Professor Quadri, win his trust and obtain information about the activities of 
Mussolini’s exiled opponents. En route to Paris, Clerici is instructed to break off his 
journey and go to a brothel in Ventimiglia to receive new orders and is instructed to 
assassinate Quadri. The Oedipal motifs are now foregrounded for Marcello falls in 
love with the wife of this father-figure whom he then assassinates. And they are 
further underscored by the script ascribing to Quadri the telephone number of 
Godard, Bertolucci’s erstwhile mentor, the cinematic father against whom he had 
come to politically and stylistically rebel (Wood, 1980:126). 
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Now, the problem for a psychoanalysis, which seeks to be worthy of the event 
of art, is that such analyses, while not without interest, always ultimately appear 
threadbare. To focus on diagnosis is to run the danger of missing the work of the 
work: the forms of thinking which are unique to the event of art. As an example, 
consider the Ventimiglia sequence. At the brothel he finds Manganiello – the fascist 
thug accompanying him on his mission – with a prostitute. As he enters, she rises to 
her feet and announces with a bewildered sadness ‘I’m crazy’. With romantic music 
surging on the soundtrack, he ardently takes her in his arms, but the embrace is 
almost immediately interrupted by a summons to the office of his superior, Raoul. 
The latter informs him that the mission has changed; he is given a gun and instructed 
to ‘eliminate’ his former professor. Taking up the proffered gun, Marcello responds 
to the injunction that he be ‘swift and decisive’ by – rather ridiculously - striking the 
postures of a killer, before putting the gun to his own head and then breaking off in 
perplexity to exclaim, ‘My hat. I’ve lost my hat. Where is it?’ In the sequence Marcello 
has successively been the lover of a woman as mad and lost as himself, a murderer, 
a suicide and a wretched bourgeois consumed by petty anxieties. As such there is a 
thinking of the costs of conforming to himself and others, and of the relations of 
madness to both order and desire. Such thinking takes the form not of propositions 
but of interlacing lines. In Trintignant’s singular characterisation of Marcello, there is 
at once a brittleness, a meekness and extreme violence.  Clerici is correct, uncertain, 
despairing and (to a degree, unconsciously) intent on devastation. Further it is a 
thinking of ambivalence: when Marcello embraces the prostitute, he is at once 
awkward – this is what he presumes a man is supposed to do in this situation (he 
himself may have homosexual desires) – and unburdened for, in her ‘madness’, she 
is what in Lacanian terminology is his semblable (that is, another misrecognized as 
the self) (SX:325). Finally, it is a thinking of issues recalcitrant to discursive 
understanding – ‘Raoul’s office is, absurdly, awash in walnuts – disorganised piles of 
walnuts on the desk, walnuts neatly line up along the mantle’ (Restivo, 2010:166).  
In other words, a thinking occurs in the work of the work which is not the 
mere expression of Bertolucci’s Oedipal impulses.  This thinking, rather than seeking 
to define, takes into account the ambiguities and contradictions of psychical 
functioning:  Marcello, in a world which defies comprehension – what is happening 
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with the walnuts? - is at once an anxiety-ridden conformist and an insane outsider, a 
murderer and a suicide. AND not IS. Like the ruminations of my grand-daughter, it 
seeks, albeit in a much more elaborately structured fashion, not to fix and arrest 
things but to make something new of what has happened. Expanded cinema at such 
moments, however, advances on my grand-daughter’s pre-discursive thinking for, 
rather than seeking a beyond, in Deleuzean terms, it is that beyond, a line of flight. 
When Freud, in Creative Writers and Daydreaming, claims writers temper 
fantasies, he is unworthy of the event of art which attains the status of bien-dire. For 
Freud the pleasure we take in literature derives from the satisfaction of desires in 
fantasies. Such fantasies, in the form of, say, daydreams, occasion shame if exposed 
to the gaze of others. ‘As a rule,’ an adult ‘would rather confess his misdeeds than 
tell anyone his phantasies’ (Freud, 1908:133). To render them acceptable, the writer 
‘softens’ their character ‘by altering and disguising’ them and by bribing us with a 
‘purely formal – that is, aesthetic – yield of pleasure which he offers us in the 
presentation of his phantasies’ (Freud, 1908:141). This ‘incentive bonus or fore-
pleasure’ enables both the writer and his or her audience to enjoy the fantasies 
‘without self-reproach or shame’ (Freud, 1908:141).  While this is undoubtedly true 
of works given over to fantasy (much of contracted cinema) it signally misses the 
achievement of other artworks and, more deplorably does less than justice to what 
Nietzsche terms the ‘fearlessness’5 of certain artists (Nietzsche, 1889:82). In bien-dire 
there is always a taking of courage for there is the refusal of the consolations and 
solace of fantasy and a rupturing of existing imaginaries. Instead of the – relatively – 
passive endurance of debilitating afflictions, there is the making something new of 
the issue of concern. Reading a biography of James Joyce, it is remarkable to discover 
the extent to which he drew on episodes from his life but even more remarkable is 
what he made of the material. While the issues he confronted, such as the sense of 
exile which impelled him to seek physical exile on the continent, give the work its 
interest, the achievement resides in what he made of it in a style of writing which 
was also - to borrow a phrase from Merleau-Ponty – ‘a certain style of being’ 
                                                          
5 I owe this reference and, as the acknowledgements make plain, much else to David 
Deamer. 
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(Merleau-Ponty, 1945:183). Similarly, as we saw above, Rivette’s L’amour fou does 
not merely chronicle an episode from his autobiography; it is bien-dire as the making 
something new of what happened and something new of the artist. 
Psychobiographical studies fall flat to the extent that they have missed this process 
of co-creation. The Joyce, who sponged so abominably from his brother Stanislaus, 
was not the Joyce who wrote Ulysses. If a Godard made the appalling anti-Semitic 
remark reported by Jean-Pierre Gorin, another Godard made Éloge de l’ amour 
(Brody, 2008:364). As argued above, in the event of art, there can be a ‘becoming-
other’ (C2:276).  At such moments of ‘the author’s becoming,’ new modes of 
existence can be achieved rendering new truths available (C2:275-6). But nothing is 
settled once and for all. Drawing on and adapting Paul Celan’s claim that ‘reality is 
not, but has to be sought and won’ (Paul Celan cited in Geuss, 2010:119) this thesis 
holds that there are modes of truths which must be similarly won and then won again 
in a new form, for here truth, as in Lacanian psychoanalysis, ‘is always new’ (E:157). 
 
Textual Analyses 
 
This brings us to the second form of content analyses: those which, while similarly 
committed to the excavation of the supposedly latent content of texts, make less 
overt reference to the psychobiography of the director. Like the psychobiographical 
approaches, these readings are instructive for, in their comparable poverty, they 
point to the existence in the event of art of forms of thought irreducible to such 
analyses. For example, many studies, taking as their point of departure Roland 
Barthes’ claim that every narrative leads back to Oedipus, have located Oedipal 
trajectories throughout mainstream cinema (Barthes, 1973:47). Most famously, 
Raymond Bellour in his canonical analysis of Hitchcock’s North by Northwest 
(Hitchcock, USA 1959) described the narrative as the movement of the hero Roger 
Thornhill from domination by his mother through a series of castration ordeals to 
discover a substitute love object: Eve Kendall who becomes the new ‘Mrs Thornhill’ 
(Bellour, 1975). Even today this approach has not wholly disappeared. As Žižek 
observes, ‘in a typical Hollywood product, everything from the fate of the knights of 
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the Round Table through the October Revolution up to asteroids hitting the Earth, is 
transposed into an Oedipal narrative’ (Žižek, 2008:52).  
This approach, is of continuing interest for two reasons. First it can be useful 
in determining the issue(s) at stake. With any artwork, which has a representational 
dimension, the question immediately arises: why is this of interest? To what concern 
does it speak? One of the lessons of the Hommel episode is that an intervention is 
effective only if it engages with an issue. Art as intervention works only if it engages 
with an issue which matters. Otherwise it is as inconsequential as a Wittgensteinian 
wheel which spins pointlessly, turning no other (Wittgenstein, 1953:95, 271). 
Content counts and psychoanalytic approaches can help determine the issue which 
is figured by the work.  
Psychoanalytic approaches can also explicate what many works make of the 
inaugural problem figured by the work. Since, in most instances, the problem has 
been figured in terms which will allow the rehearsal of the usual fantasies, this is 
often straightforward. For example, to return to Oedipus, Lacan has persuasively 
argued that Oedipal fantasies are designed to mask structural impossibilities as 
contingent. On Lacan’s reading of what he terms ‘Freud’s dream’ Oedipal scenarios 
are imaginarisations designed to disguise the fact that, if the Other is barred, the 
complete satisfaction of desire is structurally impossible (S.XVII:117). Rather than 
accept the impossibility of complete satisfaction, some male subjects take refuge in 
the fantasy that, but for a contingent barrier, desire could be fulfilled (Evans, 
1996:130). Oedipal fantasies are merely a variant of this form: they suggest that but 
for an obstacle – a figure or factor figuring the role of the father in the Freudian 
scenario – the subject could have the (mythical) woman who is the answer to their 
(neurotic) demands. From Casablanca (Curtiz, USA 1942) to Titanic (Cameron, USA 
1997), the fantasy that, but for a contingent obstacle, desire would have been 
fulfilled has been a commonplace of Hollywood cinema. 
Where such psychoanalytic approaches are not always worthy of the event of 
art is in relation to artworks where there are no pre-ordained fantasmatic solutions. 
The Conformist can again serve as an example. The purport of The Conformist is plain: 
the assumption of the identity assigned by a fascist symbolic order is catastrophic for 
both self and other. ‘Beware,’ wrote Deleuze (striking a Lacanian note), ‘of the 
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dreams of others, because if you are caught in their dream, you are done for’ 
(TRM:318). Anna is caught up in the Marcello’s dream of normalcy and barbarously 
murdered. However, beyond the uncontentious indictment of fascist regimes, there 
is a thinking of issues relating to identification and desire unconfined to the subjects 
of Mussolini. There is space for only one example. Dominique Sanda appears in three 
roles. She appears first in a scene where she is lying across the desk of a fascist bigwig. 
Later she appears as the apparently ‘crazy’ whore embraced by Marcello at 
Ventimiglia. Finally, she takes the role of Anna, the wife of Quadri. Now a Lacanian 
elucidation immediately proposes itself: Marcello desires a series of women insofar 
as they seem to embody the object a. First the veiled woman in a situation which has 
echoes of the primal scene, the coitus between the mother and the father. Then she 
is the prostitute misrecognised as his semblable. And, finally, Anna represents all of 
the life which he has repressed in acceding to a brutal symbolic, social order. Now 
this is of interest but it misses the work of the work. Instead of reducing the three 
appearances to illustrations of a Lacanian notion, they could be viewed as an instance 
of serial thought. Serial thought is a way of thinking what cannot be thought but 
which must be thought: here the problems associated with certain forms of desire. 
If the Other is barred, the way of thinking the issue does not exist. Serial thinking 
constitutes a series of approaches. Of course, if the Other is characterised by a 
‘fundamental incompleteness’, they cannot add up to an encompassing whole but 
this does not signify the failure of such thinking for its aim is not to establish a 
determinate essence but to engage with the issues such that they matter differently 
(Le Gaufey, 2016:41).  Although the three series resonate they are irreducible to each 
other. The three figures played by Sanda do not coincide. The veiled woman lying on 
the desk looks back at Marcello in an assured and collected fashion which is far from 
the ‘madness’ of the prostitute. Whereas the prostitute, is in a financial sense, 
available to him the veiled woman is not. Nor is Anna, for she desires Giulia more 
than her husband. In a scene bathed in the warmest colours to occur in a 
predominantly wintry film, she dances with Giulia with a vivacity and grace which 
prompts everybody in the hall, except Marcello and Manganiello –fascists don’t 
dance - to join in a communal celebration of life. These three lines of thought are 
then contextualised by two further series. The first relates to Giulia who is at once 
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the same as Marcello and Anna and on a very different path. Like Marcello she has 
suffered the advances of an older man while a child but unlike him does not herself 
turn into a predator using others. She is different from Anna in that she does not 
chafe at bourgeois conventionality, but the same in that she too is a victim of 
Marcello. Finally, there is the series beginning with the chauffeur Pasqualino in which 
Marcello begins as the prey and then becomes a predator intent on the satisfaction 
of his own desires without regard to others. Like Lino he may well have homosexual 
desires – like Anna he may seek same-sex relationships – but at the same time he is 
her cowardly killer and he tries to set the anti-fascist demonstrators on Lino as the 
man responsible for his own crimes (Restivo, 2010:178). Thinking occurs in the mode 
of AND not IS.  
As with psychobiography, the poverty of content analyses is instructive. It is 
the index of the existence in art of modes of truth other than those of common-
sensical correspondence theories where truths are measured in terms of their 
adequacy and correctness. Truths, claiming validation through the protocols of 
correspondence, do exist in art forms such as cinema. They ground debates around 
the veracity of the representations: is I, Daniel Blake an accurate depiction of what 
happens in job centres? However, other modes of truth can appear in art, truths 
which are singular, unrepeatable events in which the real comes to matter 
differently. As these truths are contingent upon times and places in films, it is 
impossible to assay them from some putative external position. They appear only to 
the subjects who are co-constitutive in the event of art and are indiscernible from a 
place apart.  Such truths are an argument for the continuing relevance of 
psychoanalysis for this is the status of the truths which occur in the treatment where, 
Lacan observes, it is impossible to tell the ‘truth about truth’ (E:737). As access to 
such truths is contingent upon where, when and how the subject happens, that is, 
who the subject becomes, ‘there is no metalanguage’ (E:688).  
 
Section 2: Apparatus theory 
 
This section considers the second principal mode of psychoanalytic criticism which, 
while not disregarding content, focused on the structurations effected by the 
  57 
cinematic apparatus and more particularly on how cinematic structures at once 
constituted subjectivity and masked the process of that constitution. It is significant 
for this thesis because, despite the extravagance of some of its claims, apparatus 
theory is of continuing interest insofar as it is an important precursor of some of the 
approaches under exploration – notably those concerned with the where, when and 
how of the spectator. 
Richard Rushton has aptly summarised the gist of the thesis as the claim that 
spectators are ‘hoodwinked, deceived and manipulated by the cinematic apparatus’ 
(Rushton, 2011:21). On the basis of a reading of Lacan’s path-breaking paper on the 
Mirror Stage, the apparatus theorists conceived the fulcrum of ideological operations 
to be misrecognition (E:75-81). According to Lacan, the ‘specific prematurity of birth’ 
in humans - prompts every child somewhere between six and eighteen months to 
seek security by identifying with the ideal that he or she presumes the parent or 
caregiver loves (E:78). Classically this occurs when the child identifies with the image 
of wholeness and mastery it perceives in a mirror. In the arms of a parent saying, 
‘That’s you’ the child identifies with the apparently ideal self in the mirror but the 
child’s, ‘That’s me!’ is a misrecognition for no human being can achieve the unity 
perceived in the specular image or incarnate the supposed ideal. The child imagines 
it has discovered its true self but the specular image with which it identifies is a fictive 
construction constituted by its narcissistic desire. 
Lacan’s conception arrived in film theory via Althusser’s theory of ideological 
functioning (Althusser, 1968:121-173). Drawing on Lacan, Althusser held that to be a 
social being is to be interpellated, that is, summoned to occupy an assigned role or 
place. A child, for example is assigned the role of good little boy or girl and later well-
behaved, diligent school pupil. To the extent that an individual accepts such an 
assignment, he or she engages in a misrecognition for there is always a measure of 
disparity between the individual and the place assigned. Concomitant with this 
misrecognition of self is an ideological misperception of the nature of social reality. 
Ideology, therefore, operates not by duping and gulling pre-given individuals but by 
constituting individuals in structures as subjects in such a way that they accept 
ideological fabrications as self-evident truths. Applied to film theory, this became the 
notion that if the spectator was placed in the cinematic structure – the darkened 
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auditorium and illuminated screen - then filmic images like the specular image had 
the power to spawn misrecognitions. In two canonical articles Jean-Louis Baudry 
(Baudry, 1970 and 1975) sought to shift the focus from the ideological content of film 
texts – what he termed ‘the field of the signified’ – to the structure of the 
cinematographic apparatus (Baudry, 1970:533). This structure, he claimed, created 
an ‘impression of reality’ which deluded the subject (Baudry, 1970:539).  Developing 
a parallel foreshadowed by Lacan he likened the cinema spectator to a denizen of 
Plato’s cave (S.VIII:33). Imagining him or herself to be in the location ‘of a god’ 
(Baudry, 1970:540), and consequently able to discern the truth, the spectator like, 
‘Plato’s prisoner,’ is in reality ‘the victim of an illusion of reality’ (Baudry, 1975:209). 
Crucially, ‘it is the apparatus that creates the illusion and not the degree of fidelity 
with the real’ for the apparatus produces a subject (Baudry, 1975:211). Baudry 
writes, ‘if this apparatus really produces images, it first of all produces an effect of 
specific subjects – to the extent that a subject is intrinsically part of the apparatus’ 
(Baudry, 1975:212-13). Following Baudry, Christian Metz similarly claimed that the 
spectator imagined himself in a god-like position and ‘as a kind of transcendental 
subject’ (Metz, 1975:49). In consequence, he concluded, the cinematic spectator is a 
‘radically deluded subject’ (Metz, 1975:52). Translated to England, apparatus theory 
became the notorious concept of subject positioning associated with the journal 
Screen. As important as ‘the multiple processes of signification at work in film’ 
Stephen Heath claimed, were ‘the positions of the subject they decide’ (Heath, 
1973:12). 
Plainly any such thesis was and is preposterous, which is why Screen toyed 
with it only briefly – Heath chose not to republish the piece cited above in Questions 
of Cinema (Heath, 1981). If psychoanalysis holds any lesson, it is that each of us is 
singular - we all see films slightly differently. Furthermore, if the Other is barred, 
subject positions cannot be ascertained with any certainty for, as Lacan observed, ‘It 
is always a question of the subject qua indeterminate’ (S.XI:26). Ethnographic studies 
bear this out (Prince, 1996:77-79): different audiences perceive in (often 
unpredictably) different ways – recall as a particularly powerful example Jackie 
Stacey’s Star Gazing (Stacey, 1994). Further, as the cognitivists persuasively contend, 
if a text is to be intelligible, the spectator must actively engage in the construction of 
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sense. David Bordwell powerfully makes this case in relation to the distinction drawn 
by the Russian formalists between the syuzhet and the fabula (Bordwell, 1985:49-
57). For present purposes, the term ‘fabula’ can be taken to signify the story of the 
narrative in chronological order, while the syuzhet is the mode in which the narrative 
is presented which may, for instance, be non-chronological. The fabula – what 
happened – has to be inferred from the syuzhet and this process requires an active 
subject (Bordwell, 1985:57). In Éloge de l’amour, for example, there is an underlying 
story about Edgar’s parents, which has to be inferred from the elliptical narrative, 
and the story of Edgar’s relationship with Berthe has to be constructed by the 
spectator from the syuzhet, in which what happened between them in Brittany is 
subsequent to the Parisian episodes which occurred two years later.  Now, if the 
spectator is active, his or her making sense cannot be unilaterally determined by 
textual structure, there is a latitude as each spectator brings different competences, 
knowledges, interests and value systems to bear. 
Considering this, it might appear that apparatus theory is to be dismissed in 
its entirety but that would be a mistake for there was a valuable insight: namely that 
a social being is an ‘evanescent subject’ and that how a subject is constituted at a 
particular place and moment determines, in part at least, what weighs with him or 
her and the manner in which it weighs (Lafont, 2004:19). The pivotal notion, namely 
that the subject is not a given and therefore can be constituted otherwise in the 
event of art can usefully be retrieved. This thesis leaves open the question of whether 
or not individuals have, on occasion, been constituted by processes of interpellation 
as subjects of particular ideologies and instead proposes the possibility that art in the 
mode of bien-dire succeeds to the extent that the subject is constituted differently. 
Crucial to that process of subjective constitution is where and when ‘instances of the 
subject’ occur (Lacan, 2001a:251). This point is clearly made by the syuzhet/fabula 
distinction. In certain modes of cinema, the questions posed by the real are 
contracted to an easily answered question, say, whodunnit? The syuzhet is the 
problem, the fabula the solution: the syuzhet asks a question – say, who committed 
the crime? – and the fabula gives us the answer (Murder on the Orient Express, 
Lumet, UK 1974). In instances of expanded cinema which address problems with no 
such easy solutions, the unfolding of the fabula is no longer the resolution. Here the 
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syuzhet functions not as a problem to be surmounted but as a form of thinking, which 
goes beyond puzzling over how to construct the fabula, to search for truths 
irreducible to knowledge. In Éloge de l’amour, the non-chronological syuzhet, in 
which the events in Paris precede the flashback to Edgar’s first encounter with Berthe 
in Brittany constitute two series which revalue each other. Neither is a metalanguage 
for here it is impossible to tell the truth about the truth. Truths in this register are 
evental, that is they are momentary flashes between the series which have the effect 
of revaluing the significance of what occurs in each. Similarly, in The Conformist, the 
flashbacks, in which Marcello, while on his way to the assassination, considers the 
developments which have brought him to the pass of murdering his ‘father’ and the 
latter’s wife, the woman Marcello desires, constitutes not only an ordering of time 
but a unique mode of thinking. The flashback structure becomes a form of montage 
which, as with the juxtaposition of images in the lines by Rimbaud, creates a sense 
which had no prior existence. In both cases, the sense created is contingent on the 
position of the subject within the organisation of the syuzhet. In other words, while 
there is no necessity for a spectator to occupy the positions made available, position 
counts: it can enable the subject to become other. Consider, for example, the 
moment when, after Manganiello has made it plain that no witnesses can be allowed 
to survive, and that Anna must be murdered, Marcello gets out of the car and walks 
alone until Manganiello persuades him to return to the vehicle. This is intercut with 
the sequence in which Marcello, the schoolboy, to escape a gang of bullies, flags 
down the car chauffeured by Lino and gets in. There is no equivalence or identity 
between the scenes. In the first, Marcello, in full knowledge, commits himself to 
cowardly complicity in murder while in the second he is unknowingly on his way to 
Lino’s room where, he is initially a victim and later imagines himself a killer. Again, 
there is no metalanguage – neither sequence is the truth of the other. They occupy 
the same plane and reciprocally revalue each other. In both cases, the sense created 
is contingent on the position of the subject within the organisation of the syuzhet.  
So, although, as David Bordwell has noted ‘the subject-position view’ of 70s 
film theory has ‘collapsed’ (Bordwell, 1996:8), psychoanalytic approaches to 
questions of position are of continuing interest because, as Fierens observes, 
psychoanalysis exists not to find meanings but to change structures (Fierens, 
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2010b:66).  The treatment does not seek to discover the meaning of what is said for, 
if the Other is incomplete and inconsistent, that is impossible. Rather the aim is to 
alter the structures which have come to prevail. If, for example, a male obsessional 
elects a woman to the status of ‘the exalted object’ and if for some reason she falls 
from this elevated position, he will almost certainly find a substitute (S.X:322). Only 
if the structure in which he is positioned relative to an idealised woman - a crucial 
component of the structure of his neurosis - is relinquished can the cure proceed. 
Now, while an artwork is extremely unlikely to have as radical repercussions as the 
treatment, it can, at least for the duration, enable a restructuring of where, when and 
how the subject happens and, concomitantly, who the subject is. Thinking in the 
event of art is often less a matter of changing the content of representations than of 
changing the structures of time and space in which those representations occur. 
Whereas in much contracted cinema the structuration of time and space is in the 
service of the narrative with its fore-ordained resolution, in the expanded cinema of 
India Song and Éloge de L’amour the syuzhet’s creation of times and spaces enables 
the spectator to perceive truths which, while not resolving the irresolvable, reorient 
the spectator such that the real as impossible matters differently. ‘We have the 
truths that we deserve,’ wrote Deleuze, ‘depending on the place we are carrying our 
existence to, the hour we watch over and the element that we frequent’ (NP:102). 
Psychoanalytic theories of the positions of the subject enable us to conceive of 
certain artworks as not just representing but as creating an element in which these 
truths could occur. If as Deleuze claims, ‘we only find truths where they are, at their 
time and in their element,’ art - this thesis argues – can, by restructuring time and 
place, enable us to find them (NP:102). 
 
Section 3: Feminist Film Theory 
 
This section continues the survey of the literature with a consideration of the work 
of psychoanalytically-inspired feminist theorists. Again, the theses are twofold. On 
the one hand, it is suggested that psychoanalysis is not yet exhausted and can still 
usefully contribute to at least some aspects of the questions around women and film. 
On the other hand, the evident limitations of Freud and Lacan’s theories of female 
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desire are one of, if not the, strongest argument for the reinvention of 
psychoanalysis.  
Psychoanalysis has proved indisputably useful to some feminist theorists. The 
most influential article in film theory of the last fifty years, Laura Mulvey’s, Visual 
Pleasure and Narrative Cinema, drew extensively and effectively on Freud and Lacan 
(Mulvey, 1975). This thesis contends that in diagnoses of male cinematic pathologies 
more can still be taken from the latter. There is space for only one example. 
Fetishisation is puzzling for the Freudian explanation, in terms of a female anatomical 
lack, is far from convincing. ‘What is blindingly obvious,’ Lacan remarks ‘is that the 
woman lacks nothing’ (S.X:181).  And yet, as Mulvey demonstrates, fetishism does 
exist. Perhaps a comment made by Lacan in another context, namely that ‘the eye’ 
tends to ‘misrecognise how beneath the desirable there is the desirer,’ can assist 
(S.X:271). In this perspective, fetishism is the pretence that the fetishized woman has 
no desires at variance with the man who desires her. Psychoanalysis’s concern is the 
unconscious, the fact that as Lacan put it at the beginning of Encore: 
‘With the passage of time, I learned that I could say a little more about it. 
And then I realized that what constituted my course was a sort of “I don’t 
want to know anything about it”’ (S.XX:1).  
On this account, fetishisation is, in at least one of its dimensions, a strategy of those 
men who don’t want to know that women are not content to be used.  
However, while psychoanalysis may still serve in certain areas, its limitations 
are patent. Freud and Lacan’s accounts of female sexuality are, at best, less 
persuasive than their accounts of some heterosexual males. When Lacan tells us that 
‘man knows nothing of woman and woman knows nothing of man,’ the question 
arises of how much he knew (Lacan, 2001a:412). Was he an exception? Recall that 
believing oneself an exception is often the hallmark of narcissistic misrecognition. Of 
course, many women have found aspects of Freud and Lacan useful – and made 
telling and important contributions: within Lacanian psychoanalysis, Colette Soler 
(Soler, 2011), Marie-Hélene Brousse (Brousse, 1995, 1996), and Véronique Voruz 
(Voruz, 2002), and in film theory, Elizabeth Cowie (Cowie, 1997), and Joan Copjec 
(Copjec, 1994), immediately come to mind. However, it is even more apparent that 
for every woman who finds Freud and Lacan useful there are many more who do not. 
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Given the masculinist cast and heterosexist presumption of so much of the work of 
Freud and Lacan this is unsurprising. Freud’s failings in this respect are so well-known 
as to need no rehearsal here. Suffice to say the absence of any plausible account of 
the female Oedipal trajectory is telling evidence of the limitations of his work. In film 
studies the unavailing attempts to develop, using his ideas, a theory of female 
spectatorship commanding a consensus comparable to that around Mulvey’s 
account of the male spectator are further testimony. As for Lacan, he made little 
secret of his heterosexism. On his own account, what brought him from medicine to 
psychoanalysis was the ‘suspicion that relations between men and women played a 
determinant role in the symptoms of human beings, and he terms ‘the true truth’ the 
fact that, ‘between man and woman it does not work’ (Lacan, 1976:16). Worse, he 
said of Plato’s Symposium: ‘Homosexuality still was what it is, a perversion’ 
(S.VIII:31). And worse still said of homosexuals: ‘they are absolutely curable’ 
(S.V :190). Nietzsche famously observed that every philosophy is disguised 
autobiography and this is patently also the case with psychoanalysts (Nietzsche, 
1886:6). Writing of his Écrits, Lacan said, either ‘one takes what they formulate or 
one leaves them’ (Lacan, 1970a:vii). Until psychoanalysis reinvents itself and 
addresses the diversity and variety of desires, it is probable increasing numbers will 
leave them. 
 
Section 4: Slavoj Žižek 
 
In support of the argument that psychoanalytic film theory remains useful - and 
continuing the survey of existing approaches - this section considers the writing of 
Slavoj Žižek, the most significant recent innovator in psychoanalytic film theory. As 
lines of thought inspired by his reading of Lacan are central to this thesis, it is worth 
exploring them in some detail. 
His starting point is ours: the lack in the Other: ‘what comes first is the lack’ 
(Žižek, 2012:376). For Žižek, ‘[t]he subject,’ as stressed above, ‘is in the most radical 
sense “out of joint”’ for ‘it constitutively lacks its own place’ (Žižek, 1993:12). The 
impossibility of a subject finding its own place like the impossibility of ‘desire, which 
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is lack’ (E:638) attaining its (lost) object is ‘structural’. The absence of the place is the 
condition of the subject just as a ‘fundamental gap’ is the condition of desire (Žižek, 
2001:83).  Developing Žižek’s conception of the real as structural impossibility in a 
new direction, this thesis claims that with artworks like Éloge de l’amour and India 
Song the thinking addresses not just realities with a certain currency but the real of 
structural impossibilities. The work of the work, in such instances is not just the 
representation of those realities but the finding of a way of being towards them. With 
cinema, the first task is to decide how to figure the problem posed by the real as 
impossible, for, if the key signifiers are missing from the Other, the mode of figuration 
does not exist: the problem is not given in itself it has always already been figured in 
a way. In some forms of the visual arts figuration is the primary mode of the work of 
the work for it is itself a revaluation. Consider, as an example, what is perhaps the 
paradigmatic instance of bien-dire in the visual arts of the twentieth century: Marcel 
Duchamp’s The Bride stripped bare by her bachelors even, (also known as The Large 
Glass). Here Duchamp figures the ‘impossible desire’ of the bachelors for the bride 
with two panels (de Duve, 1996:185). In the lower, the bachelors are busy with their 
thing – each, as Duchamp famously explained, ‘grinds his chocolate himself’ 
(Duchamp, 1934:68).  In the upper, the bride, who ‘basically is a motor,’ appears as 
a rather tattered apparatus floating free of the endeavours of the bachelors – the 
pipe connecting them is severed (Duchamp, 1934:42). The two apparatuses fail to 
conjoin in a smoothly functioning machine. Here the work of the work resides in the 
playful inventiveness of the figuration which, makes something new of the absence 
of a sexual rapport, and thereby revalues it. While the machines depicted do not 
function, the artwork does, creating a tonality that is as profound as it is hilarious.  
In other art forms, for example cinema, figuration is only the inaugural move. 
Its function is to render further moves and revaluations possible. In contracted 
cinema, the figuration lays out a path to what becomes the fore-ordained narrative 
resolution. In expanded cinema, it launches a trajectory or series of trajectories 
where the positionings and happenings made available are creative of sense. Žižek’s 
theories can contribute to our thinking of the thinking which occurs in both forms. In 
respect of contracted cinema, he has brilliantly elaborated narrative models as 
responses to the real of structural impossibilities discussed above. The most 
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important is developed on the basis of Lacan’s analysis of courtly love. According to 
Lacan, courtly love is ‘the only way to elegantly pull off the absence of the sexual 
relationship’ (S.XX:69). His argument is that some men, rather than accept the fact 
that no sexual partner embodies the object a, and that, consequently, they will never 
be at one in a sexual union, choose an unattainable person as their love object. In 
this way, they can imagine that, if the barrier rendering the other unattainable was 
removed, they could be as one. Žižek’s astute insight is that a similar strategy of 
libidinal investment underpins certain ideological operations. His celebrated and 
persuasive example is Nazi ideology which, to mask the structural antagonisms of 
Weimar Germany, peddled the fantasy that all the problems, instability and conflicts 
were attributable to the activities of the Jews. Just as a subject engaging in courtly 
love can imagine that the removal of a barrier would bring a blissful jouissance, so 
Nazis could imagine that the Jews were the only obstacle separating Germany from 
social harmony (Žižek, 1989:125). In both cases the real of a structural impossibility 
– in love the impossibility of sexual rapport, in politics the impossibility of harmony 
in a class society – is disguised as contingent upon the functioning of a surmountable 
impediment. Coming back to cinema, Žižek discerns a similar operation. In much 
contracted cinema, the bulk of classic Hollywood, the narrative addresses the real as 
impossible by claiming that, if only an obstacle was removed, all will be well. If the 
barrier is overcome, the lovers can be happy, if the villains are overcome, social 
harmony can be restored and so on. 
This is very convincing. The question is: can psychoanalysis contribute to our 
thinking of textual operations which have not opted for such easy solutions? Žižek 
demonstrates it can. The argument of this thesis is that art in the mode of bien-dire 
can address the real without evasion by transforming the subject, by altering how, 
where and when the subject happens. Whether or not Žižek would approve of this 
line of argument, his reading of Lacan can contribute at every turn. Following Lacan, 
Žižek gives the notion of the mutability of the subject a radical cast:  
‘the subject (of desire) is not a substance – not a thing which persists in time, 
but an entirely non-substantial evental entity which disappears even before 
it appears, which appears in /through its very disappearance, as the result of 
its very failure to be’ (Žižek, 2014:322).  
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Now, while it seems unlikely that any artwork can effectuate changes as far-reaching 
as those sought in the cure, the argument of this thesis is that, at least for the 
duration of the art encounter, the subject can be transformed.  
In respect of space and time – the where and when of the subject – Žižek can 
make an even more decisive contribution. If there is a lack in the Other, there are 
situations in which issues arising from the real of structural impossibility cannot be 
seen as a whole. As a result, we have what Žižek terms a ‘parallax view’, that is a 
‘constantly shifting perspective between two points between which no synthesis or 
mediation is possible’ (Žižek, 2006:4). The argument here is that art in expanded 
cinema can be conceived as not merely registering this ‘confrontation of two closely 
linked perspectives between which no neutral common ground is possible,’ but as 
responding to it. Montage in Éloge de l’amour and India Song does not illustrate the 
parallax – what would that achieve? – nor does it circumvent the parallax to give us 
the whole for, if the crucial signifiers are missing from the Other, the ‘parallax gap’ 
is ‘insurmountable,’ but it can free us from existing perspectives and enable us to 
think differently (Žižek, 2006:4).  
Further, Žižek’s reading of Lacan emphasises that space is organised, not just 
by structures such as the existence of a cleft, an ‘internal limit’ which prevents it 
being envisioned as a whole, but by significance (Žižek, 2000:29). On the 
psychoanalytically-inspired approaches explored in this thesis, subjects take their 
bearings from what they believe matters. The point can be made by Žižek’s joke 
about the ‘fool’ who ‘thought he was a grain of corn’ (Žižek, 1989:35). 
‘After some time in a mental hospital, he was finally cured: now he knew he 
was not a grain but a man. So, they let him out; but soon afterwards he came 
running back, saying: “I met a hen and I was afraid she would eat me.” The 
doctors tried to calm him: “But what are you afraid of? Now you know that 
you are not a grain but a man.” The fool answered: “Yes, of course, I know 
that, but does the hen know that I am no longer a grain?”’ (Žižek, 1989:35). 
Žižek’s point is that our thoughts are informed by libidinal investments. While on a 
conscious level one may know one is not a grain of corn, unless the libidinal 
investment in this belief is shifted, the delusion will persist. Consequently, space is as 
libidinal as it is geometric. Space is populated and the perception of space is informed 
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by who the subject takes himself, and the other denizens, to be. Little Hans, with his 
perception of his familial situation, inhabits a space organized around his phobic fear 
that the horse in the street will bite him. An SS officer perceives the space of Germany 
as disrupted by what he imagines is a Jewish conspiracy.  This is important, for this 
notion of space as libidinally organised provides further grounds for my claim that 
psychoanalysis is of continuing interest. Let’s take Kafka as an example, for The Trial 
can be read as a thinking of ways in which space can become libidinally charged.  
‘The Other,’ as Laurent de Sutter so brilliantly puts it, ‘is a (practical) joke (une 
farce), and it is hilarious that we continue to act as if it were not the case’ (Sutter, 
2017:38). Lacan, following Freud, recognised that ‘the artist always precedes’ the 
psychoanalyst (Lacan:124). In respect of the Other, Kafka certainly paved the way for 
Lacan for The Trial is an even more hilarious account of the Other’s law than Lacan’s 
teaching. Josef K, like the madman in Žižek’s joke, inhabits a space organized around 
the supposed existence of the Other. He knows perfectly well he is not a grain of corn 
– K knows he is innocent - but fears that the Other does not know and hence tries to 
establish his innocence in the court system of the Other. Despite all the proof to the 
contrary, for example the law books, which are works of pornography, he comically 
persists in his belief that the Other does exist. 
To be clear, this is not to argue that works in the mode of bien-dire must 
organise space in such a fashion. Welles’ adaptation of the novel (Welles, 
France/Italy/Germany 1962), which constructs a cinematic space to indict the horrors 
of judicial systems in totalitarian regimes has an equal claim to the title ‘bien-dire’. 
The use of Albinoni’s Adagio on the soundtrack may turn Kafka’s comedy into a 
tragedy but in conjunctures where, say, oppression takes more overt forms than 
neurotic belief in the Other, that shift in tonality, like the alterations in spatial 
organisation, may be a more useful move. The argument is only that - developing 
Žižek’s insights - spatial organisation can be a crucial component of the thinking 
which can occur in art. In much contracted cinema space is structured in forms which 
also prevail outside cinema, for example the fantasies subtending courtly love and 
fascism: but for a contingent obstacle… In expanded cinema, in contrast, spatial 
organisations – both geometric and libidinal - which have no anterior existence can 
enable forms of thought possible nowhere else. In India Song, for example, a space 
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is constructed by the external shots of the derelict building and the voices off that 
enables a thinking, which rather than delineating familiar realities, creates structures 
within which the issues assume a different valency. 
Žižek’s thinking on time is equally useful. As he emphasizes, the cure is a 
process. The analysand cannot reach the conclusion in one go: ‘We cannot go directly 
for the truth’ (Žižek, 1989:63). The analysand must, in the transference, imagine that 
the analyst is the Other so that at the end he can realise that the Other does not exist. 
‘We cannot bypass…the illusion proper to the transference’ that the analyst is the 
Other who knows the truth if we are to realise there is no such god-like Other (Žižek, 
1989:57). Žižek typically makes the point with a joke:  
‘Rabinovitch wants to emigrate from the Soviet Union for two reasons: “First, 
I fear that, if the socialist order disintegrates, all the blame for the communist 
crimes will be put on us, the Jews.” To the state bureaucrat’s objection: “But 
nothing will ever change in the Soviet Union! Socialism is here to stay 
forever!” Rabinovitch calmly answers: “This is my second reason”’ (Žižek, 
2012:242). 
 Žižek explains the purport of his example: ‘The true (second) reason can be 
enunciated only insofar as it is produced as a reaction to the bureaucrat’s rejection 
of the first reason’ (Žižek, 2012:242). Developing Žižek’s line of thought, this thesis 
argues that in an artwork one similarly cannot get there in one go. Indeed, in the 
majority of artworks there are series of ‘gos’. It is these series which, at least in 
expanded cinema, are productive of sense and the element in which truths can 
appear. As in the treatment, the temporalization creates moments in which what 
happens acquires a new weight, force and significance. In Éloge de l’amour perhaps 
the most powerful and affecting element is the music of David Darling and Ketil 
Bjørnstad which, as James S. Williams remarks, provides ‘its very rhythm and 
backbone’ (Williams, 2016:149). In particular, there is a ‘gentle, sparse and elegaic 
25 second segment’ which  
‘is heard in truncated form at the very beginning of the film and then 
reproduced close to twenty times in different forms, tones and volumes, 
sometimes interrupted or suspended, but always there and always 
reappearing as if new’ (Williams, 2016:149).’   
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The argument of this thesis is that a crucial component of the work of the work of 
Éloge de l’amour is the construction of places and moments, in whose element the 
little phrase can occur in such a way that it revalues and is, in turn, revalued by the 
context. 
Where, in its attempt to develop a psychoanalysis worthy of the event, this 
thesis goes beyond Žižek is in claiming that some artworks do not operate within 
existing spatio-temporal coordinates. Ordinarily, as argued above, in many social 
practices space is constructed by the significance of what appears and as significance 
alters so does the nature of the space. What matters orientates the viewer 
determining the points of focus, the coordinates, and the relations of figure and 
ground. In artworks like expanded cinema that priority can be reversed. By 
constructing new spaces and articulating new temporalities, art can revalue and 
create new forms of significance. Art as creation, not the representation or 
expression of the pre-existent. We shall discuss this in more detail in the next 
chapter. 
Finally, this thesis more radically departs from Žižek in its estimate of Deleuze. 
As indicated in the rationale, part two argues that Deleuze is much closer to Lacan 
than Žižek allows, and that reading Lacan in the light of Deleuze can give us not only 
another Lacan but other ways of thinking the event of art. For example, in relation to 
the foregoing discussion of cinematic space and time, instead of thinking in terms of 
structures, we could usefully use the concept of agencement, not only because it is 
more dynamic and less static than the notion of structure but because it foregrounds 
the interaction of heterogeneous elements in reciprocally transformative ways which 
characterises much expanded cinema. To return to the earlier example of the musical 
phrase in Éloge de l’amour, it does not have a fixed sense or value. Instead, with each 
appearance, it revalues and is revalued by the narrative, the images, the citations and 
the other elements of the montage. Insofar as it affects and is affected by the other 
components of the agencement, it constitutes an exemplar of the forms of thought 
which can occur in the event(s) of expanded cinema and nowhere else.  
Even more importantly, this thesis will take its distance from Žižek’s 
unquestioned acceptance of Lacan’s notion of desire as lack by asking the 
Nietzschean question implicit in Deleuze’s thinking of desire: who desires in this 
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manner? Who craves wholeness and, therefore, desires an irrevocably lost object? 
Who yearns to be at one when being at one would be the obliteration of difference 
and the arrest of life? In part two of this thesis it will be argued that we will never be 
worthy of the events of art in the mode of bien-dire until we expand our conception 
of the range of desires in play.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has assayed what have been historically the most significant 
psychoanalytic approaches in film theory to retrieve what is of continuing value. It 
has argued, in relation to content-based analyses that, while they are useful in 
highlighting what is at issue and what gives the film its ‘point’, their poverty attests 
to the importance of the work of the work. If the Other is conceived as Ⱥ, it is 
impossible to tell the truth about the truths which occur in art in the mode of bien-
dire for they are dependent upon the work of the work. Consequently, 
psychoanalytic approaches – like other critical approaches in this area - can, in 
relation to such truths, only show, not tell. However, this chapter has further 
demonstrated that, if the subject is ‘“out of joint”’ (Žižek, 1999:157) and if, therefore, 
the place and the time do not exist, then psychoanalysis can be useful in thinking how 
artworks can create places and times constitutive of an element in which new truths 
can occur.  
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CHAPTER TWO: CINEMA, ANOTHER FREUD, AND ‘THE LACAN EVENT’  
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the possible alternatives to 
existing psychoanalytically-inspired approaches to film theory. To that end, it 
explores the prospects for a psychoanalytic criticism worthy of the event of art, 
taking its points of departure from the work of Freud and the ‘Lacan event’ (Balmès, 
1999:5). Its contention is that there are resources in both which have not yet been 
exhausted and which suggest new directions for psychoanalytic film criticism. The 
chapter falls into two sections. In the first, Freud is revisited to highlight those 
aspects of his work which can contribute to a thinking of art as an instance of bien-
dire. Subsequently there is an exploration of those moments from Lacan’s teaching 
which, it is argued, are still of value in thinking about what art does – this 
constitutes the bulk of the chapter. 
 
Section 1: Another Freud 
 
This section reconsiders Freudian concepts which can still usefully orientate our 
thinking in regard to certain modes of textual functioning. Freud suggests that we are 
constantly thinking of what matters to us, for example our afflictions, losses and 
disappointments. Secondly, we often think of these matters in forms inimical to 
translation and signification. Thirdly, these styles of thought have as their affective 
concomitants modes of enjoyment – jouissance - to be found nowhere else. I argue 
that these ideas give us an initial approach to thinking the functioning of certain 
artworks as instances of bien-dire. Viewed in this light, art as bien-dire would be a 
way of thinking of what matters to us in forms whose sense is irreducible to 
signification and in styles productive of new modes of jouissance. The three Freudian 
theses cited above derive respectively from the ‘canonical’ books on slips, dreams 
and jokes (E:434). I will consider how each can contribute to the development of a 
psychoanalytic film criticism worthier of the event of film. 
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Slips 
 
In the celebrated, opening chapter of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud 
recounts how in a conversation he found he had forgotten the name of the painter 
of the frescoes of ‘The Four Last Things’ in Orvieto cathedral: Signorelli (Freud, 1901). 
After reconstructing the context of the lapsus, he concluded that it was derived from 
a desire to repress thoughts about sex and death – amongst other factors, a patient 
troubled by his sexual orientation had just committed suicide (Freud, 1901:39-40). In 
the present context the details of Freud’s analysis do not concern us. Our focus is the 
matter of his unconscious thoughts. As Žižek has observed, Freud’s analysis arrived 
not at a single, hidden, clear-cut meaning which was subsequently reworked in the 
form of the substitute names but at a ‘complex rhizomatic texture’ of ‘associations 
and displacements’ woven around the themes of love and death (Žižek, 2012:456).   
The slip did not represent a pre-given meaning but rather it was an attempt to think 
what cannot finally be thought through: our relation to desire and mortality. The 
importance of this is that it suggests that the starting point of some art works is not 
a pre-given thought – which criticism could unearth – but something altogether more 
inchoate. There is a sense in which we are always thinking about desire and death to 
the extent that we are always taking up an attitude to both even in our evasions and 
attempted forgettings. In this perspective, art is one mode of such thinking.  
 
Dreams 
 
Dreams provide a telling example of the continuing interest of psychoanalysis. It 
might appear that The Interpretation of Dreams has long since been exhausted by 
film theory (Freud, 1899). Its central thesis, namely that ‘a dream is a (disguised) 
fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish’ has given rise to innumerable analyses 
claiming to unmask the latent meaning of texts (Freud, 1899:244). In most instances, 
these have diminished the text: as we shall see, Hamlet is not just the articulation of 
Oedipal desires famously identified by Freud (Freud, 1899:364). However, I argue 
that Freud’s masterwork remains useful insofar as its claim that the dream-work, 
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with its mechanisms of condensation and displacement constitutes ‘a particular form 
of thinking,’ highlights the fact that thought can take many forms (Freud, 1899:650). 
Thinking can have objectives other than cognition and assume modes other than the 
propositional. My argument is not that the dream-work is similar to the art-work. As 
dreams like fantasies ‘have always been dead-ends in cinema’ they are a poor guide 
to the thinking which can occur in art (TRM:283).  My claim is only that there are 
some similarities. Two are important for this thesis. As Christian Fierens has 
perspicaciously noted, ‘essentially the dream is more movement and work than 
content or material,’ and I will argue that the same holds for many instances of art 
as bien-dire which are more way-making than signification (Fierens, 2008:92). 
Secondly, in art, as in dreams, the thinking, to a significant degree, does not concern 
‘what are usually called thoughts, since what is involved is always desire’ (S.1:45). 
 
Jokes 
 
‘We have to laugh a little from time to time.’ 
Jacques Lacan (S.XXIII: 14) 
 
Since jokes are central to the discussion of art elsewhere in this thesis, they will be 
discussed at greater length. Before coming to Freud, it is worth emphasizing that 
bien-dire in the majority of cases exists not to enable us to endure but to enjoy.  Since 
‘the human drama is not tragedy, but comedy,’ its most frequent form is that of jokes 
(S.X:332). As an example, consider Linda Smith’s joke ‘I was so happy. I had just 
bought this CD of whale songs. Then I got it home and found it was a dolphin tribute 
band’ (Smith, 2018). It is impossible to live without making investments – in their 
absence life is pointless – but investments often turn out badly. Taking as an issue 
the real of the impossibility of living without disappointments, Linda Smith is worthy 
of the event by making something new: a joke in the form of bien-dire.  
Bien-dire - for Lacan and this thesis - is far removed – and this cannot be 
emphasized too much – from any long-faced, sententious, gloomy sermonising. 
Cinema boasts nothing quite so witty as Duchamp’s Large Glass, but as an example 
of cinematic bien-dire in a predominantly humorous vein let’s consider the portrayal 
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of Falstaff in Welles’s version of the battle of Shrewsbury in Chimes at Midnight 
(Welles, Spain/Switzerland 1966) which draws on Henry IV Part One (Shakespeare, 
c1597, reprinted 2002) and Henry IV Part Two (Shakespeare, c1597, reprinted 2016b) 
and Henry V (Shakespeare, c1597, reprinted 1995). Described on its release as the 
‘the most brutally sombre battle ever filmed,’ (Pauline Kael, 1971:141) the sequence 
– in what Joseph McBride termed ‘a stroke of genius’ - interlaces ‘the cataclysm of 
destruction’ with shots of the ‘breathtakingly funny’ Falstaff – his mountainous, 
elderly form encased in an enormous, cumbersome suit of armour - as he waddles 
around intent primarily on saving his own skin but with an eye to any opportunities 
to filch others’ glory (McBride, 1972:158). As bien-dire, the film addresses amongst 
other issues: the pain of existence – figured here by the agonies attendant on 
medieval warfare – and the impossibility, if the Other is barred, of finding the place. 
In the film, all of the protagonists are, to a degree out of place: Bolingbroke is 
troubled by his usurpation, and Hal, sowing his wild oats with Falstaff, knows duty 
summons him elsewhere. This theme is then taken up in the battle scene: tragically 
in the case of the levies encountering the unimaginable horrors of combat and 
comically in the case of Falstaff’s fish out of water. Crucially for our concern with the 
role of jouissance in bien-dire the thinking is cinematic. The film does not simply 
represent and thereby impart knowledge about medieval warfare and the 
problematic nature of socially assigned roles, rather it constitutes a form of cinematic 
thinking. Through the figuration, for example Welles’s performance in the 
preposterously large, ill-fitting suit of armour and the creation of moments and 
places by the montage, that cinematic thinking is elaborated on two lines: one tragic 
the other comic. AND not IS. Each is what Welles makes of the real. Welles does not 
discover the humour in the issues but rather creates it through a form of thought 
unique to cinema.  
The claim of psychoanalysis to be of continuing interest in this regard rests on 
Freud’s Jokes and their Relation with the Unconscious for it is as useful in thinking the 
nature of art as of humour (Freud, 1905b). Ernst Gombrich   famously suggested it is 
the most important work of Freud for aesthetic theory (Ernst Gombrich cited in Van 
Haute and Geyskens, 2012:68) and more recently Philippe Van Haute and Tomas 
Geyskens have similarly argued that Freud’s text ‘is the book on sublimation and 
  75 
Freudian aesthetics’ (Van Haute and Geyskens, 2012:68).  This thesis concurs, arguing 
that the text is of continuing interest but at the same time, argues that, if 
psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art it must take account of the book’s 
limitations. Freud famously distinguished two principal forms of jokes: firstly, the 
playful, such as puns and secondly the tendentious.  In the latter case, jokes like slips 
and dreams constituted compromise formations whose form allowed the expression 
in a socially acceptable fashion of aggressive and transgressive erotic impulses.  A 
joke – in the majority of instances – he wrote ‘is either a hostile joke (serving the 
purpose of aggressiveness, satire, or defence) or an obscene joke (serving the 
purpose of exposure)’ (Freud, 1905b:140).  
In every instance form is crucial. Jokes succeed because of what Freud terms 
the “’joke-work”’ (Freud, 1905b:91). Consider, as an example, a joke related by Simon 
Hoggart:  
‘an ageing actor is ‘taking a melancholy drink with an eager young newcomer. 
“I’ve had some terrible times in the theatre,” he says, “Take the night we 
played Goodnight Vienna in Accrington. There were three people in the 
audience: the heroine’s mother, the local paper reviewer, and a tramp who’d 
come in to keep warm.” 
“Gosh, sir,” says the newcomer. “Was that the worst night you’ve ever spent 
in the theatre?” 
“No. That was when we played Goodnight Accrington in Vienna.”’ (Hoggart,  
2011:5).  
As Freud pointed out, there is nothing inherently amusing in the content of jokes 
such as Hoggart’s. It could be summarised as follows: the actor told the young man 
that the Viennese audience for Goodbye Accrington had been even less appreciative 
than the Accrington audience for Goodbye Vienna. While the joke is amusing, the 
summary is not. Although the propositional content of the joke and the summary are 
the same, the effect is very different – the former is amusing the latter is not. 
Something is achieved by the work of the work – which in this case makes the joke 
an instance of bien-dire. 
 The argument of this thesis is that psychoanalysis is of continuing interest in 
this regard not simply because of Freud’s focus on form – the notion that form is 
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central to art is a commonplace – but because Freud’s work brings out the 
interdependence of form and what is usually called ‘content’ but which here is 
conceived as the issue(s). While ‘technique’ is indispensable – as Deleuze observed, 
‘there is no imagination outside of technique’- unless connected to an issue, it 
achieves no more than the Wittgensteinian wheel discussed above (TP:345). Further 
Lacanian psychoanalysis (implicitly) rethinks the form/content distinction. If there is 
a lack in the Other, if there are issues which we must address and, therefore, have 
addressed, form in art does not impose itself on pre-existing content. Rather it 
rethinks an issue which has already been thought but in a more joyful form. 
 Of course, this is not to say that psychoanalysis is the last word. On the 
contrary, the second argument of this thesis is that art points up the limitations of 
psychoanalysis and Freud’s work on jokes, for all its brilliance is a good example. For 
Freud’s focus on the erotic and aggressive wellsprings of tendentious jokes, and his 
thesis that such jokes are pleasurable because their forms disguise their intent to the 
extent that the energy normally expended in repression is released as a form of 
satisfaction, has missed the achievement of style in the jokes – and, by implication, 
the artworks - which are instances of bien-dire. 
 
Art after Freud 
 
‘It must puzzle us to know what thinking is,  
if Shakespeare and Dante did not do it.’ 
Lionel Trilling (Trilling,1950:286) 
 
Bringing the three texts of Freud together, a model of certain modes of aesthetic 
functioning as instances of bien-dire emerges. On this model, as Freud’s slip reminds 
us, the artwork begins from our dilemmas, predicaments, and plight, that is from the 
existence of issues to which we cannot remain indifferent. As bien-dire, art answers 
not with a formula or precept but with an evaluation. Old age can serve as an 
example. The elderly, of necessity must adopt an attitude to growing infirmity and 
decrepitude. Art in the form of bien-dire is one of the innumerable ways of forming 
such an attitude. The obvious extra-cinematic examples are the self-portraits 
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produced by Rembrandt in his old age. They function not to depict old age – what 
purpose would that serve? – but to find a way of thinking it without evasion. A 
cinematic example of bien-dire as a thinking of the self-same issue is Amour (Haneke, 
France/Germany/Austria 2012). The film concerns an octogenarian Parisian couple, 
Anne and Georges. After Anne suffers a stroke she is hospitalised. The experience is 
so horrible she persuades her husband to promise that she will never return. 
Consequently, as her condition deteriorates, as she becomes increasingly paralysed, 
incontinent and demented, Georges must assume the entire burden of nursing her.  
Finally, as her suffering and distress become insupportable, he accedes to the wish 
she had expressed while still lucid, that in such circumstances she be allowed to die. 
Hence the title: love is not the romantic couple in one another’s arms but a pillow 
over the face of a beloved partner in an unendurable situation. Although the film is 
‘unflinching’ (D. Calhoun cited in Grønstad, 2013:187) it is not depressing for it 
affirms the fact that love, contra Lacan, is not merely giving what one ‘does not have’ 
(E:580). 
In respect of dreams, the argument is that as a unique form of thought they 
indicate the existence of others which, similarly accomplish something which can be 
accomplished nowhere else: for example, art. As an example, consider the role of 
paradox, a topic usefully explored by Jacques-Alain Miller. He takes as his point of 
departure the thesis of Ricardo Piglia that at the centre of any story is a paradox. 
(Miller, J-A., 2006:11). For example, a Chekhovian story could have as its ‘nucleus’: ‘A 
man goes to the casino at Monte Carlo, wins a million, returns to his place and 
commits suicide’ (Miller, J-A., 2006:11-12). Such a narrative ‘always tells two stories 
at the same time’ (Miller, J-A., 2006:12). In narratives of this kind, the elements and 
events ‘are inscribed in two narrative registers which are at the same time distinct, 
simultaneous, and antagonistic’ (Miller, J-A., 2006:12).  For our purposes what 
matters is that the forms of thinking in certain artworks, while illogical by everyday 
standards, have a logic of their own, where the sense is in the relationship between 
two contradictory positions. Better, I want to argue, that certain artworks hinge on 
the ultimately undefinable relationship between determinate elements, in which a 
logic unique to narrative operates.  As a literary example consider Isabel Archer in 
Henry James’ Portrait of a Lady (James, 1881). She has every reason not to go back 
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to her repellent husband Gilbert Osmond, for in deceiving and betraying her he has 
revealed himself to be a calculating and loathsome creature, yet she returns. 
Psychologically this is implausible and commentators have struggled to come up with 
an explanation. Paradoxically, it is the absence of a persuasive account of her 
motivation which lends the text its force. The impossibility of our fathoming her 
decision is the possibility of the text figuring/thinking what can be thought in no other 
form, for example, what Lacan terms ‘the love/hate ambivalence’ (S.VIII:89) which 
characterizes so many of the sexual relationships of subjects who are never wholly 
at one with either self or other (S.VIII:89). This is equally evident in a cinematic 
example: The Searchers (Ford, USA, 1956). The narrative centres on Ethan Edwards 
whose determination, to avenge the murder of the woman he loved by a Comanche 
war party, extends to the ambition to murder his niece Debbie, as she has been 
abducted by the Comanche and raised as one of their own. But, when the 
opportunity finally presents itself, he has a psychologically implausible change of 
heart and, lifting her in his arms says ‘Let’s go home Debbie.’ While as psychologically 
unconvincing as Isabel’s choice, this reversal has a similar narrative force. Again, a 
paradoxical truth arises from ambivalence – while the subject may desire the place 
as the end of a supposed exile, its very existence depends on its absence, that is, on 
the difference between any place and the place. The work of the work is not to 
represent this truth but to make something new of it, that is, a sense, by finding a 
passage through the impasse. The truth is not a thesis but the passage enabled by 
the work of the work and the life this process allows. Bien-dire in such art forms 
furnishes not truths to live by but truths to live for – truths which are lost as soon as 
found and which consequently must be perpetually rethought to be regained 
(differently). 
This brings us to jokes. The argument is that, if psychoanalysis is to be worthy 
of the event of art, it could, in many instances, usefully take as its point of departure 
Freud’s joke book. The claim is not that jokes and artworks, when bien-dire, are one 
and the same – they cannot be conflated – but that the study of jokes can point up 
certain forms of textual functioning, which, not least because they are in plain sight, 
tend to be ignored. The first is that if a joke works it is because it makes something 
new of an issue which concerns us. A joke begins by figuring the issue either in 
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existing terms or a new form created by the joke. Staying with the Accrington 
example above, the joke matters to us because to be a social being is to be a 
performer. As Orson Welles reportedly observed, ‘everyone acts all the time’ – ‘in 
each and every conversation we’re busy performing ourselves’ (Orson Welles cited 
Newton, 2015:14).  And this is not without mishap: many of us, while playing Vienna, 
have, unhappily, performed Goodbye Accrington. A second example, a Barry Cryer 
joke, can underline the point:  
‘A man became increasingly annoyed by his parrot which would not stop 
swearing. Finally, he said to the bird, “If you don’t stop swearing I’ll put you 
in the fridge for 5 minutes.” As the parrot persisted, the man lost his temper 
and placed the parrot in the fridge. After five minutes, he opened the fridge 
door and said “Do you promise to stop swearing?” The parrot nodded his 
assent so the man let him out. As he exited, the parrot asked “What did he 
do?” indicating the frozen chicken on the shelf behind.’ (Cryer, 2016). 
In this instance, the issue is the opacity of the Other.  If there is a lack in the Other 
and, in consequence, we are not transparent to one another, then, interpretations 
based on our own limited experience, like that of the parrot, can seriously mislead. 
The joke displaces previous figurations of the issue – for example, Lear’s question to 
the homeless Edgar: ‘Didst thou give all to thy daughters?’ - so that we can relate to 
the question differently (Shakespeare, King Lear, act 3, scene 4, line no 48). Crucially, 
the figuration is only the initial move for the figuration does not just revalue the issue, 
it constructs spaces and temporalities in which we can make further moves creative 
of further relationships. The punchline of a joke is not inherently amusing. The 
humour is contingent upon the hour and the place. Hence the frequent comment 
when somebody relates a joke which now seems rather flat: ‘You had to be there.’ 
Reputedly during the Apollo 11 mission, when Armstrong and Aldrin returned from 
the lunar surface and docked with the command module, Collins the commander of 
the module asked, ‘Who’s there?’ Now plainly there is nothing inherently amusing in 
that question - in many contexts, for example the opening of Hamlet, it is bereft of 
humour (Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 1, scene 1, line no 1) but, in those circumstances, 
it was undeniably witty (and a fine illustration of the fact that bien-dire is ultimately 
nothing less than a way of being as alive as circumstances allow). For present 
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purposes, the key point is that a specific temporal context is essential to the success 
of many jokes and that the when and where of a joke can be constructed. Collins’ 
witticism was a response to a pre-existing situation but, in much comedy, the space 
and time is created by, say, a stand-up comedian, who establishes a certain identity 
vis à vis her audience, and positions the audience at a moment and place such that 
her final utterance becomes a punchline. To summarise: the work of a joke consists 
in the figuration of an issue and the construction of a space and moment in which 
the style of the joke can impart a new sense and import to the real occasioning the 
joy of laughter. 
A psychoanalytic criticism seeking to be worthy of the event of art, when bien-
dire, should take account of the form assumed by the thinking in jokes. Such 
artworks, like jokes, begin by figuring an issue of concern – without which the work 
holds no interest. The figuration makes something new of the issue by speaking of it 
in a particular style. If, for example, the issue of the opacity of the Other and the 
perils of (mis)interpretation is treated comically – as in the balcony scene in Annie 
Hall (Allen, USA 1977) where the subtitles to the conversation between Woody and 
Annie reveal the misrecognitions of self and other in play – or tragically – as in 
Chinatown (Polanski, USA 1974) where the detective thinks he knows what is going 
on and this leads to the death of his lover – different evaluations come into play. The 
work of the work can achieve more than the representation of realities with an 
existing currency or the reiteration of truths with a pre-existing valency; it can be a 
form of thinking creative of new truths, senses, attitudes, evaluations and 
orientations. Integral to this making new is the construction of times and places in 
which elements, at moments constituted within this textual operation, like the 
punchlines of jokes, can take on a significance which subsists nowhere else. In other 
words, jokes remind us that in certain artworks while the issue – the what – counts, 
who the subject becomes as a function of how, where and when he or she happens 
also determine how that issue matters. In both cases, a sense can be created which 
had no anterior existence and which largely dissipates after the duration of the work. 
 ‘Sense’ in this context is to be distinguished from meaning. Where meaning 
is a product of signifying systems, sense is a function of a particular form or style of 
life, in psychoanalytic terms of particular libidinal dispositions. While meaning is 
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always available to and transmissible between competent language-users, sense is 
not. If overtaken by circumstances, a subject may find sense has disappeared. 
Consider the following clinical vignette from Darian Leader:  
‘When she was fourteen, her father had died of cancer, yet no one in the 
family had told her either what he was suffering from or that it would prove 
fatal. She knew that he was unwell, yet the news of his death came as a 
dreadful and unpredicted shock. She had assumed all along that she would 
see him soon, yet when she was led out of the classroom at school to receive 
the bad news, it was as if, she said, “nothing made sense anymore”’ (Leader, 
2009:23).   
As this episode demonstrates, sense is not a given; it can be lost. Without libidinal 
investments existence is bereft of significance or point: it is libidinal investments 
which colour what would otherwise be the world’s blank canvas. The corollary of this 
is that when libidinally invested hopes, projects and activities do not turn out as 
intended, when there are setbacks, losses and disappointments, sense can vanish. 
Libidinal investments then become difficult to sustain and existence can appear 
futile.  Sense is dependent on a form of life so, when that form of life becomes 
impossible, sense can drain from the world – the fate, as we shall discuss later in this 
chapter of Hamlet (Freud, 1917:255). 
Developing Lacan’s notion of a ‘difference’ (Lacan, 2001a:479), even an 
‘antinomy’ (Lacan, 2001a:480) between sense and signification, the argument of this 
section of the thesis is that, if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the thinking which 
occurs in the event of art, it should recognize that art can be one of the forms of life 
in which sense is created or recreated. While it would be absurd and, indeed 
offensive, to suggest that art is the way to deal with the real when sense has been 
lost – there are innumerable ways - I contend that for certain individuals in certain 
circumstances art in the form of bien-dire can be a way of thinking the real in which 
a new sense can be won. Just as laughter takes innumerable forms, so does sense. In 
some instances, the sense created by an artwork may dispel the affliction of 
senselessness but more usually the sense created displaces an existing sense which 
has come to impede, hobble and impair.  Psychoanalysis for Lacan entails ‘the 
subversion of sense,’ that is, it undermines the sense the analysand has made of 
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things, self and other so that the analysand has the chance of finding another path. 
In translating this approach to thinking about art the danger is of undervaluing the 
sense(s) which can be created by artworks (Lacan, 2010a:13). Sense can be a prison. 
As a stark example, consider John Musgrave a veteran of Vietnam. After a near-fatal 
wound, he was invalided out of the Marine Corps, became a university student and 
began to read books about the war. When he concluded that he could no longer 
defend the US presence in Vietnam, this realisation, compounded with survivor guilt, 
triggered an overwhelming depression. He constantly contemplated suicide for, as 
he said, ‘at the time it just made so much sense’ (John Musgrave cited in The Vietnam 
War, 2017). If that sense stands at one pole, at the other can be found the sense 
which can be created by art, say a late Beethoven quartet. The sense symptomatic of 
Musgrave’s dreadful depression is to be distinguished from that which can be 
produced in the event of art (and, of course, myriad other activities - for example, in 
Musgrave’s case, his eventual commitment to, and participation in the anti-war 
movement may have helped him overcome his illness). Sense viewed through the 
optic of the treatment may be suspect but elsewhere, far from blocking progress, it 
may occasion it. Outside the cure, sense can unburden as well as burden. As we shall 
explore in chapter five, sense can be the counterpart of what Deleuze terms belief 
‘in this world’ (C2:171-2). The paradox is that, if there is a lack in the Other, 
components of that sense, in art works like The Portrait of a Lady, The Searchers, and 
Éloge de l’amour, will be opaque and enigmatic. 
To conclude: this section has made the case for the continuing importance of 
psychoanalysis by arguing that jokes in the style of bien-dire are often the most useful 
starting-point for thinking about artworks in that register. Such jokes revalue – make 
something different of – an issue, produce, however briefly, a new sense with a 
correlative, again often transient, transformation of subjectivity and, most 
importantly, create joy in the form of laughter. Similarly, the work of the work in art, 
such as Godard’s, does not merely acknowledge, register, reflect or represent an 
issue but makes something new of it. The further argument of this section – and of 
the thesis – is that psychoanalysis lacks concepts worthy of the sense(s) and joy(s) 
created by this process and must, therefore, learn from Deleuze. 
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Section 2. Cinema and ‘the Lacan event.’ 
 
‘Take my honey such as I offer it to you  
and try to put it to some use.’  
Jacques Lacan (S.III:150) 
 
This section grounds the claim that Lacan’s work is of continuing importance by 
showing how his ‘honey’ can be put to use in thinking about art and more particularly 
cinema. As always with psychoanalysis, the emphasis is on singularities so no general 
methodology is proposed. Instead the chapter considers approaches from different 
moments of his teaching. It begins with the most important feature of his teaching, 
his style, before examining how the ‘essential registers of human reality: the 
symbolic, the imaginary, and the real’ could be used to develop a thinking worthier 
of the event of cinema (Lacan, 2005a:4). 
 
Lacan’s Style 
 
The argument of this section is that a psychoanalytic thinking which seeks to be 
worthy of the event of art should begin not from any particular psychoanalytic theory 
but from the style of Lacan’s teaching. The importance of Lacan’s statement: ‘I don’t 
have a “conception of the world,” but I have a style,’ (Lacan 2013b:13) at least in the 
context of psychoanalytic thinking on art, cannot be exaggerated (Lacan 2013b:13). 
Lacan’s teaching is notoriously ‘opaque’ (Porge, 2000:7). As he himself 
acknowledged, his ‘books are called incomprehensible’ (Lacan, 2015:16). Responding 
to this ‘legendary difficulty’ by imagining that the supposed obfuscation can be set 
aside to reveal a clear and systematic set of theories is the biggest mistake a reader 
of Lacan can make (Lee, 1990:8). While it is possible, and indeed necessary to abstract 
the theories, pronouncements, precepts, mathemes, hypotheses which are the stuff 
of all the handbooks, to read Lacan solely for his theories is rather like going to opera 
for the plot. While the plot matters, rather more is going on than a plot outline would 
suggest. Similarly, with Lacan’s teaching, although theories are advanced, more is 
happening. 
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Three aspects of the Lacan event are particularly relevant. First, Lacan cited 
his own ‘practice’ as an instance of bien-dire: ‘the ethic of the Well-Spoken’ (T:41).  
Although it begins from the – frequently unimaginable - pain and horror disclosed in 
the clinic, it does not capitulate to the misery disclosed therein. Like Sophoclean 
tragedy in the face of suffering, he finds a way of speaking which is ultimately 
exhilarating and affirmative. ‘If psychoanalysis is a source of truth,’ he insisted, ‘it is 
also a source of wisdom’ and ‘all wisdom is a gay savoir. It is being opened up, it 
subverts, it sings, it instructs, it laughs’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Nobus, 2016:47). As 
such – and this is the second point – he does not merely claim that signifiers can have 
an effect which surpasses what can be understood, he demonstrates it. Lacan’s 
teaching is not ‘altogether easy’ because it is premised on the assumption that 
signifiers can engage in such work only if they are freed from existing meanings 
(Lacan, 2013b:13). In this context, there is the danger that meaning can short circuit 
thinking. To avoid that risk, Lacan’s style is pitted, as Bruce Fink underlines, ‘against 
understanding’ (Fink, 2014). While there are innumerable activities where the 
precise transmission and communication of information and knowledge is an 
essential and indispensable part of social existence, in the psychoanalytic treatment, 
existing meanings and, more importantly, the significance with which they have been 
endowed, are part of the problem. If the sense the analysand has ascribed to his or 
her existence and world was working, he or she would not be in analysis. ‘Something 
that you understand nothing about,’ Lacan observed, ‘is full of hope.’ He explained: 
‘it is fortunate if you have understood nothing, because you can only ever understand 
what is already in your head’ (Lacan, 2013c:23). ‘The Gay Science,’ on his account is 
‘not understanding, not a diving at the meaning’ but rather ‘a flying over’ the 
signifiers in question 'as low as possible without the meaning gumming up’ the 
process (T:22). To enable his analysands to break with what was already in their 
heads, Lacan would, for example, make an equivocal remark or end the session 
thereby giving a new sense, value, and force to whatever the analysand had just 
enunciated. To ensure that the audiences at his seminar could not assimilate his 
teaching to existing forms of knowledge, he constantly wrong-footed them by 
departing in unexpected directions. Surprise was as much a feature of his seminars 
as it is of jokes and artworks which are similarly instances of bien-dire. 
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Placing Lacan’s teaching in a Nietzschean perspective, it becomes apparent 
that being-active is an indispensable feature of his teaching.  In contrast to the 
neurotics and phobics confined to travelling in physical and psychical areas as 
circumscribed as those of Little Hans, Lacan is always underway differently, always 
making something new of psychoanalysis. Where the truths in many disciplines 
possess a measure of permanence and persist, at least for a period, the truths of 
analysis are ‘always new.’ ‘Analytic discourse implies a promise: to promote a 
novelty’ (T:28). Such truths are of moment only in the moment: they have to be 
perpetually won again, and in a new form. Similarly, there are truths in art which 
depend upon the work of the work and which must be perpetually recreated. In 
respect of such truths, psychoanalytic criticism worthy of the event must recognise 
the impossibility of a metalanguage. As with the truths in analysis, ‘il n’y a pas de vrai 
sur le vrai’ [there is no truth about the truth] (Lacan, 2007:14). Hence in relation to 
the event of art, we can, as emphasised above, only show not tell. 
 
The Imaginary 
  
In support of the claim that psychoanalysis is not yet exhausted, this section 
considers the pivotal notion of his conception of the imaginary, the mirror stage, and 
argues that even this, the most familiar of Lacan’s concepts, can still be put to 
innovative use in thinking the thinking which occurs in the event of art. If there is a 
lack in the Other, neither the signifier nor the image to represent the subject exist.  
‘The subject (of desire)’ is as we have seen ‘a question without an answer’ (Schuster, 
2016:165). To answer that question – who am I (for the Other)? -  the neonate 
typically resorts to an identification with an idealised, unified image. As, for Lacan, 
‘there is no One but in mathematics’, this is a misrecognition (Jacques Lacan cited in 
Chiesa, 2005:163). When the child looking at its image in the mirror says ‘that’s me’ 
it has not discovered its true self but constituted a narcissistic fiction. ‘Once things 
are structured in a certain imaginary intuition, they seem to have been there from 
the beginning, but that is a mirage’ (S.2:312). There are no identities in Lacan’s 
teaching, only identifications. Importantly for what follows, the relationship 
elucidated in the mirror stage is not dyadic. Desire is desire of the Other insofar as 
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the child seeks to secure the love of the Other and fashions its narcissistic self-image 
in the terms he or she presumes will secure that love. According to Lacan, this 
explains why, after identifying with the specular image, the child turns to the adult 
supporting him or her ‘and who here represents the big Other, to ratify the value of 
this image’ (S.X:32). 
The import of this for cinema is clear. The raison d’être for the majority of 
cinema is to afford spectators the opportunity to respond to the real as impossible 
by identifying with an idealised figure. Typically, this figure is as invincible in the face 
of his or her foes as the spectator’s narcissism becomes in the course of the narrative. 
By itself, this is an argument for the continuing importance of psychoanalysis in 
thinking about cinema, for identification with an idealised figure is the fulcrum of 
textual functioning in the majority of films. In support of the contention that 
psychoanalysis is not exhausted this section seeks to go beyond this commonplace. 
The mirror stage hinges on the constitutive nature of desire. As we have seen, the 
child imagines it has discovered its real self but the image is a fiction constituted by 
narcissistic desire. For 70s theorists such desires were productive only of illusions, 
however there is nothing in principle to prevent desire constituting selves and 
realities other than those proposed by some putative dominant ideology. A 
psychoanalysis worthy of the event of art should recognize that art, when bien-dire, 
can create and displace both existing subjectivities and prevailing realities. Indeed, 
the notion of art as bien-dire hinges on the claim the subject can become other. If 
bien-dire, in say India Song works, it is by transforming the spectator. 
Correlatively in bien-dire the reality inhabited by the subject may be 
transformed. ‘The real,’ Lacan taught, ‘is to be distinguished from reality’ (Lacan, 
2001a:408).  ‘The little we know about the real,’ he said, ‘shows its antinomy to all 
verisimilitude’ (S.XI:ix). Any ‘reality system, however far it is developed, leaves an 
essential part of what belongs to the real a prisoner in the toils of the pleasure 
principle’ (S.XI:55).  In other words, desire, in some measure, informs any perception 
of reality. This is a matter of everyday observation. Recall, for example, Saint Loup’s 
overvaluation of Rachel in A la Recherche du Temps Perdu. When introduced to her, 
the narrator recognises a prostitute he had encountered in a brothel who charged 40 
francs. This reality escapes Saint Loup who knows nothing of her past. In his 
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infatuation he considers her ‘worth more than a million’ beyond price; his desire 
colours his perception (Proust, 1920:213). The significance of this commonplace is its 
suggestion that, if an artwork can inaugurate desires – and this thesis claims it can – 
it is not limited to the exhibition of some pre-given reality: it can open on to new 
realities.  
 This is not to argue that film as bien-dire cannot or should not deal in selves 
and realities with an existing currency. Being worthy of what happens to us often 
requires exactly that kind of intervention. The fundamental lesson of the Hommel 
episode is that each subject and every situation is different and that interventions 
should be fashioned accordingly. What is useful depends on circumstances. In many, 
if not most conjunctures, bien-dire will present recognizable subjects and realities. 
Nor is it to argue that identification may serve no useful function.  Politically it may 
be important for a social stratum to have images in which they can ‘recognize’ 
themselves. Films which encourage identifications with protagonists who are the 
victims of oppression like I, Daniel Blake can be politically progressive. Just as 
identification with an ideal may enhance performance in music, sports and drama so 
identification with an ideal may inspire politically. As Deleuze and Guattari 
acknowledge, the establishment of identities can be politically indispensable 
(TP:276). 
Similarly, just as identifications can be useful, so essentialisations – the 
positing of essences - may be indispensable. Indeed, many films seek to achieve 
closure not with a ‘That’s me’ but with a ‘That’s it’: the sense that’s how things 
ultimately stand. The Conformist ends with just such a summative shot. As we have 
seen, Marcello’s craving for normality is motivated, in large part, by his belief that he 
has murdered the chauffeur. Pasqualino. At the end of the film, in July 1943, when 
Mussolini has been overthrown, Marcello encounters Pasqualino trying to pick up a 
boy and denounces him to anti-fascist demonstrators as responsible for the murder 
of Professor Quadri. He then sits down behind a row of bars in the shadows cast by 
a fire before turning to look at the camera. Earlier in the film, Marcello, while recalling 
Quadri’s lectures on Plato, had re-enacted the allegory of the cave by closing the 
shutters of the professor’s study thereby, through the mise en scène, turning the 
room into a cave and himself into an evanescent shadow. Now, in the final shot, the 
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trope is repeated. Trapped like Plato’s enchained prisoners and with a fire the sole 
light source he is depicted as seeing ‘only the “shadows of things”’ (Restivo, 
2010:174). So, the final shot essentialises: the central truth of the narrative is that 
Marcello is still imprisoned by illusion.  
In considering the value of this strategy, as always with psychoanalysis, one 
must proceed case by case. The conclusion of Tree of the Wooden Clogs essentialises 
– the truth about the quasi-feudal society is injustice – but is a paradigmatic instance 
of bien-dire. In contrast, the summative shot of The Conformist, by comparison with 
the modes of thought operative elsewhere in the text, seems trite. And this makes 
my argument, namely that while, on occasion, identifications with idealized figures 
and the determination of ‘essences’ can be useful, elsewhere it can put thinking into 
a stall. In films like Éloge de l’amour and India Song while some modes of thought 
determine (essentialise) in relation to questions around capitalism and imperialism, 
other, non-propositional modes of thinking can open, in the agencement of the art-
encounter, on to a becoming-other untrammelled by identifications. 
 
The symbolic  
 
This section considers the value of Lacan’s concept of the symbolic, that is, the laws 
and value systems, the prescriptions and proscriptions, in which one is situated in 
any social setting; the norms, values and ideals which, in whatever historically 
specific form, always obtain. Earlier it was suggested that art could be seen as the 
strife, not as in Heidegger between earth and world, but between the real and the 
symbolic where the real is that of the body and the symbolic is language insofar as it 
subjects. On this account, it might appear that art is an insurrection driven by the 
difference between the subject and the place assigned. The argument here is that 
psychoanalysis, in this regard, has a continuing claim upon our attention because of 
its capacity to go beyond such simplistic thinking. 
Language, as Lacan’s teaching in the early 50s emphasizes, is, for the most 
part, a boon. In contrast to Freud, Lacan sees the initial relationship between mother 
or care-giver and child as troubled. Where Freud emphasized the experience of 
satisfaction, Lacan stresses the problematic nature of the situation (Leader, 2011:58-
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63). As with Little Hans, the child is tormented by the turmoil produced by its 
conflicting drives, wishes and impulses and by anxiety-provoking questions as to 
what the (m)Other wants. If there is a lack in the Other, then the desires of the 
principal care-giver are opaque – what accounts for his or her absences and what is 
the nature of his or her desire? For Lacan, as Harari puts it, the child experiences not 
‘a warm foetal ambiance’ but an ‘anxiety-provoking threat coming from the desire of 
an Other who devours’ (Harari, 2001:218). To cope with this turbulence, the child 
requires ‘something that maintains a relation, a function, and a distance’ (S.III:96). 
This structure is provided by language which introduces ‘a degree of stability in 
interhuman relationships’ (S.III:99). ‘The signifier is conciliatory’ (Silvestre, 
1987:306). Without language, ‘we would remain in a world with no mediation 
between ourselves and the mother’ (Leader, 2011:65). 
To describe this process, Lacan reworks Freud’s conception of the Oedipus 
complex. On his account, by identifying with the name-of-the-Father, the child is able 
both to find an answer to the question of what the mother wants beyond him or 
herself and to secure an anchorage in language (E:230, 464-5, 723). To stave off chaos 
‘there has to be a law, a chain, a symbolic order, the intervention of the order of 
speech, that is, of the father.’ He continues: ‘The order that prevents the collision 
and explosion of the situation as a whole is founded on the existence of this name of 
the father’ (S.III:96). At best, where the father cannot fulfil his symbolic role, the 
child, like Little Hans, ‘is completely adrift at the whim of his mother’ (Lacan, 1961-
62: Session of 20/12/61 p. 3). At worst, if the arch of language is missing its keystone, 
the name-of-the father, psychosis impends. This gives us a first approach to textual 
functioning. If the first task of the subject is to stave off psychosis, the first of an 
artwork is to install sufficient structure to fend off chaos. In other words, prior to any 
other undertaking, a text establishes a structure in whose absence nothing can be 
achieved. As we shall see, structuration alone is deadening – to work an artwork has 
to be coupled with flows which escapes it: lines of flight. However, before coming to 
that let’s consider the problematic nature of language.  
If language is a boon it is also a bane for language is the language of the Other. 
Language is not first an instrument for communication it is a set of injunctions. ‘The 
voice at issue here is the voice as an imperative, a voice that demands obedience or 
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conviction’ (S.X:276). As Lacan puts it ‘language with its structure, exists prior to each 
subject’s entry into it’ (E:413) and ‘everything personal’ which happens to a human 
being is ‘located in relation to the law to which he is bound,’ that is, the laws implicitly 
and explicitly set out in language (S.I:197). Every child is born into a situation where 
a ‘place is already inscribed…even if only in the form of his proper name’ (E:414). The 
hopes, fears and expectations around a child’s birth inhere in the name ascribed, the 
place assigned and the ideals held out. ‘First of all,’ Lacan said the child hears ‘a Thou 
art’ (S.X:272). He or she is assigned an identity with which, if the Other of language is 
missing the signifier, there can be no coincidence.  
A further consequence of the absence of the signifier from the Other is that 
the ‘symbolic universe…is not the same for everyone’ (S.I:197). A subject does not 
encounter the symbolic but a singular symbolic. ‘Symbolic networks are constantly 
mutating’ (Dean, 2000:59). The symbolic encountered by Stephen Daedalus with his 
devout mother and alcoholic, spendthrift father is very different from that 
experienced by Proust’s narrator with his over-anxious mother and inconsistent 
father. As Lacan remarks, ‘to use the “the” is always suspect,’ the symbolic order does 
not exist: there are only symbolics (Jacques Lacan, 2010a:13). Some are preposterous 
like the demands of Miranda in The Devil Wears Prada, (Frankel, USA 2006) some are 
cruel like Moran’s in Beckett’s Molloy (Beckett, 1959) and others are deranged like 
the doctor’s restriction of Woyzeck to a diet of peas before, of course, going on to 
mutton. 
As the Other is lacking every social being is subjected to a language which is 
not the language. Hence Lacan writes, ‘man is the subject captured and tortured by 
language’ (S.III:243). Fastening on this, Žižek writes that ‘Lacan varies Heidegger’s 
motif of language as the house of being’ by characterizing ‘this house as a torture-
house’ (Žižek, 2012:870). But this is a foreshortened view – it is always dangerous to 
take one of Lacan’s pronouncements in isolation. To read Lacan in this manner is to 
ignore the ‘gay sçavoir’ of his style: Lacan’s seminars are no torture-house. As Freud 
famously observed in The Question of Lay Analysis, while ‘words can […] cause 
terrible wounds’ they can also ‘do unspeakable good.’ ‘Originally’ he continued, ‘the 
word was magic – a magical act; and it has retained much of its ancient power’ 
(Freud, 1926:188). The Other is lacking but it is nevertheless ‘the treasure trove of 
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signifiers’ (E: 682). If, on the one hand, there is a lack, insofar as the words to say it 
all are missing, on the other, there is an excess of signifiers over signifieds, opening 
up new possibilities. As ‘the relationship between signifier and signified is not one to 
one,’ as no signifier is tied to a signified, signifiers have the capacity to enter new 
compositions and create something new (S.III:119). Indeed, as Fierens remarks, the 
defining feature of a signifier is the capacity to make ‘something other’ (Fierens, 
2010:139). Reworking Saussure’s linguistics, Lévi-Strauss argued that the ‘non-
equivalence’ or ‘non-fit’ (Lévi-Strauss, 1950:62) between the series of signifiers and 
signifieds, coupled with the existence within any language system of a floating 
signifier - that is ‘a sign marking the necessity of a supplementary symbolic content 
over and above that which the signified already contains’  - was the possibility of 
creation (Lévi-Strauss, 1950:64). Consequently, there is what could be termed a 
degree of ‘play’ in any system that is ‘the disability of all finite thought (but also the 
surety of all art, all poetry, every mythic and aesthetic invention)’ (Lévi-Strauss, 
1950:63). In short, the existence of a lack, an excess and an irreducible difference in 
the Other of language is the possibility of creation. If words can torture, they can 
equally free. The citations with which Godard’s films brim are, to borrow and adapt 
a phrase of Joyce, ‘not fragments but active elements’ creative of the new (James 
Joyce cited in Crispi et al., 2007:14). The bien-dire of Godard, Joyce and Lacan allows 
something of the life denied by the words of the Other. In Hemingway’s short story 
The Light of the World – a young Nick Adams and his friend Tom become caught up 
in a conversation in a railway waiting room.  What the other passengers say bespeaks 
egocentricity, self-delusion, pettiness and cruelty. As Nick and Tom make to leave, 
one of them asks, ‘“Which way are you boys going?”’ and Tom replies: ‘“The other 
way to you”’ (Hemingway, 1946:363). Art as bien-dire can be that way. What is the 
work of Joyce but his taking an ‘other way’ from that of Dubliners? In Nietzschean 
terms: art as ‘countermovement’ (Nietzsche, 1911:419).  
Deleuze similarly conceives of language as primarily comprising imperatives. 
He and Guattari claim that ‘the elementary unit of language – the statement – is the 
order-word.’ ‘Language,’ they continue, ‘is made not to be believed, but to be 
obeyed, and to compel obedience’ (TP:76) Deleuze also agrees that words can ward 
off chaos (TP:76). Elaborating on the Joycean notion of an artwork as ‘a chaosmos, a 
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composed chaos,’ he insists ‘art is not chaos but a composition of chaos’ (WP:204). 
Where, within the perspective of this consonance, he can contribute to a 
psychoanalysis to come, is in his rendering explicit the pragmatics implicit in every 
line of Lacan. To understand how language functions it is crucial, he insisted, to take 
into account the (always) singular circumstances in which an utterance occurs. 
Instead of merely asking what an enunciation signifies we should have regard to the 
extra-linguistic context. Consider Deleuze’s example: ‘“I love you.”’  This phrase, 
which is, of course, a cinematic commonplace, ‘has neither meaning nor subject nor 
addressee outside of circumstances’ (TP:82). Its significance depends on who 
enunciates the words and where, when and how they are uttered. Psychoanalysis is 
cognisant of this. It recognises that when, for example, the artist Robert 
Rauschenberg was told ‘I never liked you, you son of a bitch,’ the force, value and 
sense of the enunciation derived not just from the signification but from the 
pragmatics of the situation: the fact that his interlocutor was his father and the words 
were uttered by the latter on his deathbed (Laing, 2016:16). The argument of this 
thesis is that psychoanalysis should similarly bear pragmatics in mind when 
considering the event of art. On occasion, the sense, value and force of signifiers can 
count more than any signified and those forces are often, in large part, a function of 
the who, where, when and how. 
Even more importantly, Deleuze can contribute the notion of the ‘pass-word’ 
(TP:110). Pass-words do not constitute a separate set of words rather they are words 
which can be extracted from order-words by making order-words function 
differently. As every word ‘undoubtedly has this twofold nature: it is necessary to 
extract one from the other’ to ‘draw out the revolutionary potentiality of the order-
word’ and to ‘transform the compositions of order into components of passage’ 
(TP:110). Now this is precisely how I have argued psychoanalysis should conceive the 
achievement of art as bien-dire: the transformation – albeit probably only for the 
duration of the work – of impasse into passage. When enunciating order-words, the 
subject of enunciation, as Deleuze and Guattari observe, ‘does not function without 
drying up a spring or stopping a flow’ (TP:276). As psychoanalysis has it, the signifiers 
‘mortify’ (E:513) and ‘petrify’ (E:714). But my argument is that, with pass-words, bien-
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dire can reinvigorate the flow of desire in a becoming creative of new senses and 
values.  
As an indication of how these considerations could shape a psychoanalytic 
approach, let’s consider a text which foregrounds the problems posed by symbolic 
orders which are further than many from being the symbolic: Woyzeck (Herzog, 
Germany 1979). Adapting Büchner’s unfinished play, it figures the absence of the 
place through the predicament of Woyzeck, a soldier who is subjected not just to 
military discipline but to the demands of the captain, and the doctor. To earn extra 
money for his family he acts as the captain’s barber and allows the doctor to use him 
for his experiments. Both humiliate. At the same time, it deals with a further problem 
posed by the lack in the Other: the discordance of desires. Woyzeck lives with Marie 
and their child but Marie is seduced by the drum major. When Woyzeck discovers 
the affair, he murders Marie and, in trying to hide the evidence of his crime, drowns. 
This figuration allows the creation of a chaosmos. The cosmos of life in a provincial 
garrison town is rent by the chaotic passions of Marie and Woyzeck and everyday 
discourse is shattered by Woyzeck’s psychotic episodes when he hears voices and 
hallucinates in forms which are at once insane and violently poetic. In Herzog’s 
version, the bien-dire assumes the form of critique: he indicts the injustice suffered 
by Woyzeck which he then visits so cruelly on Marie. If there is a lack in the Other, 
more than one style of bien-dire is possible in relation to the issues. In Berg’s version, 
the bien-dire takes a very different form (Berg, 1925). Where the Herzog film ends 
with the official investigation of the crime and the inability of bureaucrats to take the 
measure of what has happened, at the conclusion of Berg’s opera, Marie’s son is 
playing with the other children, when the news arrives that his mother has been 
murdered. All the others then run off to see what they can of the crime, leaving the 
boy alone on the stage. However, his opera does not merely register the horror. 
Following the murder of Marie and the death of Wozzeck there is a musical interlude. 
As Josipovici, following Kierkegaard, claims, music in opera can take on ‘the role of 
the chorus in ancient Greek drama’ and that is the function it assumes here 
(Josipovici, 2010:145-6). After such dreadful events, it might seem impossible to say 
anything. Berg’s achievement is to create a style of bien-dire which speaks of 
Wozzeck’s anguish and Marie’s pain but also of the life which the events eclipse and 
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of which Marie is so horribly deprived. AND not IS. Where suffering and loss can wipe 
out the world of sense, art in the mode of bien-dire can be the reminder that suffering 
is not the sum of existence. 
 
The signifying chain 
 
‘I am concerned with a thing’s not being what it 
 was, with its becoming something other than what it is, 
 with any moment in which one identifies a thing precisely, 
 and with the slipping away of that moment.’  
Jasper Johns (Jasper Johns cited in Kozloff, 1975:144)  
 
This section argues that Lacan’s conception of the signifying chain and, more 
specifically, his notion that meaning slides, enables us to think how art in the mode 
of bien-dire can transform existing orders of value, sense and force. Contra the doxa, 
which as François Balmès notes holds that ‘structuralism ended long ago,’ it is argued 
that the key structuralist notion, namely the priority of relationality over the 
elements in play, enables us to conceive the work of the work as a dynamic process 
of structurations and restructurations in which new perspectives transform the 
subject and impart a new and correlative significance to what matters for that subject 
(Balmès, 2011:13). If ‘the relationship between signifier and signified is not one to 
one’ (S.III:119), if ‘in no case can the signifier signify itself’ (Lacan, 1964-65: Session 
9/12/64 p. 5), if there is ‘an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier’ 
(E:419), there is the possibility of making ‘something other.’ 
Art, as we have seen, is not restricted to mimesis. A signifier by entering into 
a new composition with other signifiers can create different senses and values. Lacan 
(S.I:41) underlines this point with a citation from Freud’s The Dynamic of 
Transference (Freud, 1912):  
‘If in the course of a battle there is a particularly embittered struggle over the 
possession of some little church or some individual farm, there is no need to 
suppose that the church is a national shrine, perhaps, or that the house 
shelters the army’s pay-chest. The value of the object may be a purely tactical 
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one and may perhaps emerge only in this one battle’ (Freud, 1912:104 
footnote 1).  
The significance and value of something is a function of who perceives and for what 
purpose in a particular pragmatic and or libidinal context. Where, when and how it is 
viewed and evaluated can alter what had constituted its presumed identity. Similarly, 
in a text, elements of an accepted reality can be reconfigured in a new perspective 
and assume another import. 
Such revaluations are an everyday occurrence and cinema reflects this insofar 
as the narrative often turns on a revaluation within the diegesis. Lore (Shortland, 
Australia/Germany 2012) can serve as an example. It is 1945 and Germany is under 
allied occupation. Lore’s parents are high ranking Nazis. After the father disappears 
and her mother is raped and imprisoned, Lore and the four younger children set out 
to walk from the Black Forest to her grandmother’s house in Hamburg. During this 
journey, she learns that much of what she had been taught was false – most 
significantly, it is the Jew she initially despises, who protects them – and she 
undergoes a number of ordeals: her brother is shot by the Russians and she is party 
to a murder. When she reaches Hamburg, she discovers that her relations continue 
to adhere to their established lifestyle. Her aunt invites her to join in a dance round 
the kitchen table and her grandmother insists that her starving grandchildren 
observe strict table manners. Appalled at how little the ‘grown-ups’ understand, she 
retreats to her room. There she places her mother’s treasured figurine, which she 
had preserved throughout her hardships and ordeals as a keepsake, under her heel 
and crushes it. The value previously assigned to the object has, in the context of the 
horrors endured, become unaccountable. The argument of this thesis is that Lacan’s 
teaching on the signifying chain can enable us to explore how certain artworks do 
not merely depict such revaluations within the diegesis but effectuate them through 
recontextualisation. 
The importance in our lives of revaluation through recontextualisation is very 
movingly rendered in the film Nostalgia for the Light (Guzman, 
France/Chile/Germany 2011), a documentary about an observatory in the Catacama 
desert which is home not only to astronomers but also – somewhere in its barren 
vastness – the bodies of many of those ‘disappeared’ during the Pinochet regime. 
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One of the astronomers interviewed, Valentina Rodriguez tells how, when she was 
one year old, she and her grandparents were seized by Pinochet’s secret police and 
threatened: if they did not reveal the secret whereabouts of the girl’s parents the 
child would ‘disappear’. After unendurable deliberations, the anguished 
grandparents took the police to the hiding-place and as a result it was the parents 
who ‘disappeared’. Now herself a mother, Valentina tells the interviewer how 
astronomy has ‘somehow helped to give another dimension to the pain, to the 
absence, to the loss.’ For, she explains, ‘sometimes when one is alone with that pain’ 
- in moments which she insists are ‘necessary’ - and the pain becomes ‘oppressive’ 
she tells herself it is part of a cycle in which stars must die so that others can be born 
to ‘a new life.’ ‘In this context,’ she continues, ‘what happened to my parents takes 
on…another meaning that frees me a little.’ The two points to make here are first 
that, if there is a lack in the Other, the context no more exists than the way and 
second that a context is always operating. In this light one of the functions of art is 
to recontextualise, that is, art can ‘free’ by placing issues in a new context. While it 
seems unlikely that many artworks can be as successful in this as the cosmos is for 
Valentina, it is possible that some, on occasion, can achieve something analogous.  In 
conclusion two points need to be underlined.  First, nothing – not even something as 
insupportable as this woman’s loss – has a value in itself for, as Derrida insists, ‘there 
is nothing outside of context’ (Derrida, 1988:136). Its value depends on how it is 
contextualised and that can be altered. Second, a recontextualisation is not 
necessarily an evasion. As Derrida observed, ‘there are only contexts’. None is the 
context for there is no ‘centre of absolute anchoring’ (Derrida, 1972:320). If art 
recontextualises, this need not be escapism for the previous context was not the 
context only a context and often one best left. 
To return to Lacan, if meaning is context-dependent, if the meaning and value 
of a signifier depend on its relations to other signifiers and those relations are mobile, 
then the new is possible. The ‘process of differenciation’ can be productive (Fierens, 
2012:11).   
In the lines of Rimbaud cited above: 
Ô saisons, Ô châteaux, 
Quelle âme est sans défauts? 
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 each of the terms – seasons, châteaus, soul and fault – is revalued by the 
recontextualisation. 
Césareé (Duras, France, 1979) can serve as a cinematic example. Like India 
Song this short film is a cinematic thinking of desire, loss, rejection and 
abandonment. It is composed of a soundtrack in which Duras reads a prose poem 
reflecting on the city of Cesarea, which became the place of exile of Bérénice, the last 
Queen of the Jews, and an image-track largely filmed in the Jardins des Tuileries, the 
Place de la Concorde and from a Seine riverboat, consisting principally of shots of 
weathered statuary (often under repair and surrounded by scaffolding), a series of 
bronze female figures sculpted by Aristide Maillol (1861-1944), and a travelling shot 
of the Seine’s banks and bridges (Gunther, 2002:45-47). As images of Paris, the 
statues and the river unfold, Duras recounts how Bérénice became the lover of the 
Emperor Vespasian’s son, Titus - despite the fact that, as the destroyer of the temple, 
he was considered ‘a criminal’ by her people -  only to be ‘repudiated’. After following 
him to Rome, she was rejected when, ‘for reasons of state’, the Senate denounced 
‘the danger of such a love’. ‘Ripped from him, from his desire’ she had to retire to 
Cesarea. For our immediate purposes, what matters is the final line: after speaking 
of ‘the sorrow’ and ‘the pain of their separation’, after ‘she was very young, eighteen, 
thirty, two thousand – he took her’ and the analogy between her emotional death 
and the fate of Pompeii and Herculaneum – ‘In the sky, suddenly the ash descends’ - 
she concludes in a very different register: ‘In Paris it is a lousy summer. Cold. With 
mists.’ The ‘intolerable’ exile suffered by Bérénice is replayed in the more minor key 
of petty irritations and small dissatisfactions. In a manner analogous to the punchline 
of a joke, the enunciation recontextualises the foregoing and takes off in a new and 
unexpected direction. As such, it recalls the final line of the first stanza of Eliot’s 
Waste Land: ‘I read much of the night and go south in the winter.’ After the pain of 
awakening desire in April – ‘the cruellest month’ - the contrast between the repose 
afforded by a winter which ‘kept us warm’ and the delight in the surprises of summer, 
the erotic intensity of the sledge ride at the Archdukes, the protestation of mistaken 
identity by the Lithuanian , the anguish and vivid memories at once combine and 
collide with the quotidian, the habitual and  inconsequential – there is a revaluation 
(Eliot, 1963:63). As in the lines of Rimbaud, the juxtaposition and montage create a 
  98 
sense beyond determinate meaning, releasing the hold both of habitual, petty 
concerns and the pain of separation. The signifying chain goes beyond expression 
and representation of the pre-given to create a sense, which like Lacan’s intervention 
with Suzanne Hommel does not conjure the issues away but does enable the subject 
to think them differently. 
On occasion, (re)contextualization can halt the slide of meaning and, however 
briefly, anchor signifiers in signifieds but in works of expanded cinema like Césarée 
an altogether more complex operation occurs. Instead of the revelation of some 
supposed essence, there is the creation of what I shall term ‘constellations of sense’ 
which, in the course of the work, are perpetually reconfigured. In these 
constellations, significations occur but these specifiable meanings are of less 
importance than the resonance created between those elements and the sub-
representational dynamic of the text. As with the style of Lacan’s teaching, that 
dynamic, while as dependent on the signifiers as they, in turn, are dependent on it 
for their significance, has the capacity to carry us beyond any determinable meaning, 
thereby launching a line of flight freeing us from the hold of any particular imaginary.  
What is evidently missing from the above discussion of the signifying chain is 
the specifically cinematic. For present purposes, that is best introduced by recalling 
the importance of the pragmatic. Just as the success of a joke and its punchline 
depends on how, where and when it is performed, the work of the work of a film (in 
the mode of bien-dire) depends upon a pragmatics. My argument is that cinematic 
procedures can create temporalities, construct spaces and furnish a style which by 
altering the when, where and how of the spectator produce new senses and truths. 
Postponing the discussion of style until the direct consideration of the register of the 
real, let’s focus for the moment on temporalisation and spatialisation. Ordinarily time 
and space are organized by our concerns. Bérenice, for example, at least by 
implication, on Duras’ account, inhabited a world organized by her (over)valuation of 
Titus and therefore measured both space and time in terms of the distance 
separating them. On this model, space is structured by accented points and time by 
privileged moments. Contracted cinema proceeds on a similar basis. Space and time 
are structured to generate suspense – can our hero cross Paris in time to save his 
daughter being trafficked? Taken (Morel, France 2008). Can Benjamin locate the 
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church in time to prevent the woman he loves from marrying a man she does not 
love? The Graduate (Nichols, USA 1967) etc. etc. Expanded cinema, on the other 
hand, can turn the tables on existing modes of desire. Rather than tailoring time and 
space to prevailing forms of fantasy, it can create times and spaces which had no 
anterior existence and thereby fashion new modes of desire. In contrast to the 
apparatus theorists who conceived the cinematic creation of time and space as 
productive only of illusions, I argue that in the cinema of bien-dire, spatio-temporal 
organisations can enable the subject to become other in happier modes than 
delusion. Duras’ achievement in Césarée, through the composition of sound and 
image with each contextualizing the other is precisely to have created new spaces to 
think the pain of separation. The line, ‘In Paris it has been a lousy summer’ only works 
at that moment, and that moment had no existence prior to the work. In contracted 
cinema, forms such as framing, editing etc. are subordinated to the telos of the 
narrative drive. They function only to recruit the spectator to the cause of attaining 
the narrative’s goal – by, say, soliciting identifications with idealized but currently 
imperilled figures thereby heightening the tension. In some forms of expanded 
cinema, on the other hand, these cinematic forms are liberated to think the real 
outside fantasy.  
The point is powerfully made by the opening sequence of Une Femme Mariée 
(Godard, France 1965) where sense, to an important degree, is manifestly a function 
of the moments created and the places traversed. At first sight, this text might appear 
an unlikely candidate for the status of bien-dire for the narrative, centring on an 
adulterous affair, was made at the time when Godard’s wife, Anna Karina, was having 
just such an affair with the actor, Maurice Ronet (Brody, 2008:191). In these 
circumstances a content analysis could read the work as ‘autobiographical’ (Brody, 
2008:191). However, to see the opening sequence as informed by nothing more than 
the ‘almost vengefully clinical detachment of a scorned ex-lover’ is to miss the 
possibility of its - at least at moments - constituting an instance of bien-dire (Brody, 
2008:193). Reviewing Une Femme Mariée Jean-Louis Comolli wrote ‘thinking and 
filming are one and the same thing for Godard’ (Jean-Louis Comolli cited in Brody, 
2008:201). Developing this reading, my argument is that spatio-temporal 
constructions constitute a key component of that cinematic thought. Consider the 
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temporalisation produced by two moments in the opening sequence. After the 
announcement that we are watching ‘fragments of a film shot in 1964’ ‘in black and 
white’ there is a series of shots of Charlotte in bed with her lover. Despite the nudity, 
the sequence is unerotic (French, 1967:74-5) – the censors were troubled by only one 
shot which was replaced by a shot of the plane piloted by the absent husband - for 
the focus is not on the physical aspects of love-making but the friction in the 
relationship (French, 1967:75). Every shot contains an exchange which brings out the 
distances and tensions between them: he does not want her to shave her armpits, 
she does; he wants to lift the sheet so that he can look at her, she does not want to 
be cold. Despite their physical proximity they are apart. This is clear from the very 
first shot which begins with a blank screen that turns out to be a bed sheet. As she 
says, ‘I don’t know,’ her naked arm enters the frame as if in search of something. He 
responds, ‘You don’t know if you love me?’ to which she rejoins: ‘Why do you talk so 
much?’ before adding: ‘This is so nice.’ They are out of step. Meanwhile his arm has 
entered the frame and seized her by the wrist but, while held fast her fingers still 
stretch towards something more. Fade-out. 
For present purposes, what matters is that the sense of the shot is created by 
the fade-out. The significance is born of the temporalisation.  The fade-out at the end 
of this and every other shot in the sequence, like a line-ending in poetry or the 
punctuations of the sections in the Wandering Rocks chapter in Ulysses, retroactively 
revalues all that has been said and depicted enabling something to be thought which 
could be thought nowhere else. There is no conjuring away of the real as impossible: 
she is as unknowable as she is inappropriable. Like Albertine in A La Recherche du 
Temps Perdu and indeed – if ‘Incompleteness inheres in the Other’ – every subject 
(Julien, 1990a:99). Given the terms in which Godard poses the problem, there are no 
solutions only responses such as a thinking – which is a choice of existence - in the 
form of the fade-out.  
Consider, as a second example, the shot in which she sings. It begins with her 
naked knees. Then she is heard to sing ‘Where have all the flowers gone?’ As she 
does so, her hand enters the frame. His hand then appears, touches hers and 
withdraws. In response, her own hand also departs the image and the original 
composition of her knees against a blank background recurs. The moment is at once 
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pathetic – she is no singer – and affecting insofar as its isolation within this single 
shot makes it representative of both all that goes unheard in what is spoken and all 
those performances – think of the Accrington joke – which do not find their desired 
audience. Her solitariness is further emphasised insofar as she uses the words of an 
other and the ‘words fail’ as - given the lack in the Other - to some degree, all words 
do (T:3). The presentation of solitude, transience and disappointment is unflinching: 
nothing is wished away – the flowers, if they ever existed outside the imaginary, are 
not recuperable. And yet the bien-dire creates a sense. And it does so cinematically: 
the work is in the framing, the static camera and the fade-out. In both shots the fade-
out functions as, what Lacan termed a ‘point de capiton’. If there is a perpetual sliding 
of the signified beneath the signifier as new signifiers are added to the chain (E:419), 
the point de capiton is the punctuation of the chain. ‘The signified and the signifier 
are knotted together’ calling a halt to the slide and producing a context in which a 
new sense can emerge (S.III:268).  
If cinematic thought creates new temporalities, it equally creates new spaces. 
If there is a lack in the Other and if, in consequence, the way does not exist and the 
real eludes representation, we inhabit a world where there are only enframings, 
angles, reframings and perspectives. My argument is that in Godard these 
procedures enable an aconceptual cinematic form of thinking. For example, at the 
end of the sequence of single shots concluding with fade-outs there is a series of 
shots of the lovers talking together in bed. They are plainly rather pleased with 
themselves and their relationship. In the first, while kissing his hand, Charlotte, in 
close-up, tells him she loves him and he responds, ’Moi aussi.’ There follows a cut to 
a close-up of him as she caresses his eyebrows. He too says ‘I love you’ to which she 
responds as he had done: ‘Moi Aussi.’ The next shot, is again a close-up but of a more 
serious and questioning expression on Charlotte’s face as she asks ‘Do you love me?’ 
and we hear him reply ‘Oui’. At this point the sequence becomes more interesting. 
Instead of a shot of him we get another of her but from an unusual angle above her 
forehead as she echoes his reply with ‘Ah oui.’ and then, turning her head as the 
camera moves to accommodate her new position, ‘Oui.’ The next shot is again a 
close-up from an unusual angle but this time from below her chin as she repeats ‘Oui’ 
and then, once more turning her head in a moving shot, ‘Ah oui.’  
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 The question is do the angles, reframings and edits count? My argument is 
that these forms of the work of the work, in such texts, do matter and that 
psychoanalytic criticism should give them their weight. Where in contracted cinema 
they are subordinate to the narrative, in expanded cinema they can constitute a non-
discursive mode of thought. At this moment she is again beyond his and our ken. Her 
intonation is at once enraptured, reflective and ironic. It is impossible to know what 
she is thinking. The achievement of the angle, camera movement and edit is not 
simply to convey her inscrutability but to take up an attitude to it. 
Historically women have been used to figure male fantasies and to either 
assure heterosexual men of the attainability of their desires, or, where their desires 
are thwarted, of womens’ ‘culpability’. As such, they were treated as objects and 
were denied in their difference: for all too many men wished to know nothing of the 
discordance of their desires with their own. At least in this moment of bien-dire in 
Une Femme Mariée, Godard affirms this difference. And he does so cinematically: it 
is in the angle, the movement and the cut. At such moments, he ceases to be the 
jealous, rowing, Godard of the biographies and says ‘yes’ with her (Brody, 2008:129). 
Like the Proust who, in writing, abandoned the attempt to appropriate Albertine, 
Godard here leaves the world of impossible demands upon others in order to allow 
desire to find other courses. Charlotte ceases to be Godard’s symptom as Molly 
ceases to be Joyce’s at the end of Ulysses. Molly’s repetition of ‘Yes’ may partake of 
Joyce’s fantasies about Molly and other men but is in excess of that. Molly says yes 
to more than Leopold Bloom and with her so does Joyce. Equally, Godard with 
Charlotte says, ‘Ah oui.’ 
Before leaving this topic, it is worth reiterating the point that bien-dire is not 
the prerogative of modernism.  The organisation of time and space can be as 
indispensable to the work of the work in films where, in contrast to Godard’s cinema 
the devices in play do not foreground spatio-temporal stucturations. Mia Madre 
(Moretti, Italy 2015) can serve as an example. Like L’amour fou, the content is 
unremarkable. The protagonist has problems at work – she is making a film about a 
sit-in at a factory – and with her family, for her mother is terminally ill. During the 
narrative, she has difficulties with a self-promoting, leading man who has trouble 
remembering his lines, she learns that her daughter has not confided her teenage 
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heartbreak and is told some home truths by her ex-partner. In short, nothing out of 
the ordinary occurs. Again, like L’amour fou there seems to be an autobiographical 
element. Mark Kermode surmises that the film had its origins in the death of 
Moretti’s own mother ‘while he was completing 2011’s Habemus Papam/We Have a 
Pope’ (Kermode, 2015). The question addressed is therefore: what is one to think/say 
about the death of one’s mother? Of necessity, the answer to that question is always 
singular and will vary with circumstances. For present purposes what matters is that 
Moretti’s filmic response is, I would submit, as worthy of the event as any in cinema 
– fully deserving of the eight-minute standing ovation at Cannes (Kemp, 2015:89) -  
and a key, if unobtrusive, component of the bien-dire is the organisation of time and 
space: the rhythms and tempi of the temporalisation of the translations between 
locations. Although there are no comparable formal innovations, temporalisation is 
as indispensable in Mia Madre as in Une Femme Mariée. Bien-dire in both instances 
is more event than thesis. 
 
The Real 
 
We come now to the third register: the real. In the preceding section, I considered 
the importance of the positions and occasions – the where and when - of the subject 
– in the work of film. Here the focus is on the style – the how of the subject, in 
particular, the styles of enunciation. I argue that, when bien-dire, enunciation can 
function to transform modes of desire and jouissance such that the alterations in 
libidinal investments revalue and create new senses.  Like many Lacanian concepts 
the real has different meanings at different moments. Even what he once described 
as ‘the best definition that can be given of the real,’ (Lacan, 1966b:68) namely, ‘the 
impossible’ (E:54) has two principal, though closely related, meanings. We have 
already encountered the first: structural impossibility. ‘Structure,’ Lacan writes in 
L’Étourdit ‘is the real’ (Lacan, 2001a:476), hence, for example, ‘the real’ is ‘the cut 
itself’ (E:487 footnote 14). For the moment I want to focus on another aspect, the 
claim that ‘the real is not what is perceived’ (Silvestre, 1987:306). The real is 
impossible to either image – ‘one cannot imagine it’ (Lacan, 2005b:76) - or symbolize 
- it is ‘that which subsists outside of symbolization’ (E:324). The real is therefore to 
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be distinguished from reality (Harari, 1996:7). Developing Serge Daney’s 
proclamation of what he termed the ‘Cahiers [du Cinèma] axiom’, namely, ‘the real 
is not represented – and that’s final,‘ my claim is that cinema can achieve more than 
the reproduction or reflection of ‘reality’ (Serge Daney cited in Dudley Andrew, 
2010:5). This is not to say – ridiculously – that there are no realities. On the contrary, 
as the discussion in the preceding sections makes clear, existence is rife with realities 
without which social existence would be unintelligible, unendurable and impossible. 
As repeatedly emphasised, cinematic interventions in debates around the nature, 
valency, currency, epistemic status and ideological effectivity of these realities and 
their representations can be the most important mode of filmic bien-dire. My 
argument is rather that there are certain artworks whose achievement is importantly 
at the level of sub-representative instances, principally the subject, desire and 
jouissance. As ‘a signifier represents a subject for another signifier’ the subject is at 
once included in and excluded from the signifying chain (S.XVII:180). ‘It is 
represented, undoubtedly, but also it is not represented’ (S.XVII:89). ‘The subject 
constitutes himself only by subtracting himself from it’ [the signifying chain] ‘and by 
decompleting it’ so that ‘he must, at one and the same time, count himself here and 
function only as a lack here’ (E:683). Similarly, desire cannot be fully expressed in 
signifiers. ‘Precisely because desire is articulated,’ that is, bound up with the signifiers 
of the Other, ‘it is not articulable’ (E:681). Equally, the object a, ‘the cause of desire’ 
(Lacan, 2005a:58) ‘resists any assimilation to the function of a signifier’ (S.X:174), for 
it is ‘what gets lost in signifierisation’ (S.X:174).  Hence the truths (of desire) can only 
be half-spoken. As for jouissance, the signifying chain ‘cannot signify the jouissance 
to which it aspires.’ ‘The signifier,’ Braunstein continues, ‘is incommensurable with 
jouissance’ (Braunstein, 1992:68). Each of these instances of the real matters for this 
thesis for art, as bien-dire, operates by transformations of the subject entailing 
alterations in modalities of both desire and jouissance. Let’s consider each in turn.  
 
The subject 
 
The claim that Lacan’s teaching has a continuing claim upon our attention rests, 
above all on his notion of the subject as ‘asubstantial’ (Soler, 1995:43-44) and 
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‘evanescent’ (Gilson, 1994:18): a process of ‘disappearance-apparition’ rather than 
an enduring being (Jacques Lacan cited in Greenshields, 2017:106). As the brilliant 
Patrice Maniglier puts it, the Lacanian subject has ‘the being of an event rather than 
a thing’ (Maniglier, 2012:28). This conception provides the fulcrum for my 
argument that art, when bien-dire, responds to the real as impossible by altering 
the subject. If, as Verhaeghe astutely notes, the Lacanian subject has ‘a mere pre-
ontological status’ and is only ‘a fading, a vacillation, without any substantiality,’ it 
is open to transformation (Verhaeghe, 1998:165).  
For Lacan, at least prior to the work on knots, the subject is an indispensable 
concept. His claim is that the existence of meaning entails a subject: ‘Only a subject, 
can understand a meaning; conversely, every phenomenon of meaning implies a 
subject’ (Lacan, 1996c:9). Hence his insistence that ‘subjectivity is not eliminable 
from our experience as analysts’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Chiesa, 2007:36). As such, 
the subject is only a supposition: ‘it is its condition to be only supposable’ (Lacan, 
1975c:164).  That said, he advances a number of hypotheses about the subject. Most 
importantly, he insists on the mutability of the subject. As we saw above, 
psychoanalytic practice proceeds on the premise that the subject can change: 
‘psychoanalysis creates a new subject’ (Verhaeghe and Declerq, 2002:64). Although, 
in a particular individual, habitual responses and (neurotic) patterns of behaviour 
may persist – perhaps prompting that individual to undergo analysis – there is no 
self-subsistent, enduring subject. Rather the subject is brought into being by a call – 
the summons to occupy an assigned place in the symbolic. As there is always a 
disparity between subject and place, the subject is ‘ecstatic’ – better, ek-static – 
never in place (Maniglier, 2012:27). Consequently, it ‘is not a being and…is constantly 
in movement’ (Fierens, 2010:181). In Deleuzean terms it is a becoming.  
The subject of the enunciation is just such a becoming. ‘Lacan’s thesis,’ as 
Colette Soler succinctly puts it, ‘is the subject is not the agent but rather the effect of 
speech.’ Psychoanalysis, she continues, ‘has to do not with the entire person but only 
with the subject, with the person to the extent that the person is transformed by 
speech’ (Soler, 1996:257). This, in a nutshell, is the theoretical underpinning of the 
notion of art as bien-dire. Changes at the level of the enunciation are as much the 
condition of the senses, values and forces created as what is said. Style, that is, what 
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is made of the issue, is the crucial component. In our concern with the nature of the 
representations propounded by a film, this dimension can be missed. As Lacan’s 
famous pronouncement has it, ‘Qu’on dise reste oublié derrière ce qui se dit dans ce 
qui s’entend?’ (Lacan, 2001a:449), - which Jeanne Lafont renders as ‘That one speaks 
remains forgotten behind what is said in what is heard/understood’ (Lafont, 2004:6). 
In many instances of bien-dire, whether Lacan’s teaching or an artwork, to the extent 
we forget the style of the saying, we miss the achievement.  
In art, which is worthy of the event, the mode of enunciation, can operate to 
transform the artist and those who later become with the work. Just as there are 
circumstances – say the need to clarify what is at stake in the clinic – when it is 
important to attempt to ascertain what is said/enounced in Lacan’s teaching (the 
theories propounded, the precepts advanced etc.) – there are conjunctures when, in 
considering instances of both contracted and expanded cinema, what takes priority 
is the interrogation of how representations function in politically. But equally, just as 
there are circumstances in which, rather than setting Lacan’s style aside to read him 
for his theses, we can usefully attend to what, in his style, is irreducible to what is 
said. In short, there may be occasions in the happening of art when what matters is 
the mode of enunciation: the style – the how rather than the what.  In this 
perspective, style far from being an adornment is the crux of the endeavour – it is 
the making something new of an issue which can be a making new of the subject. At 
the level of the enounced Éloge de l’amour is the story of failure – Edgar is a let-down 
- but Godard is not Edgar. Where Edgar fails, Godard succeeds. In the style – above 
all in the use of music and colour – something is achieved that goes beyond Edgar’s 
failure to be equal to the events of the diegesis. Whereas the case for contracted 
cinema as bien-dire is at the level of the enounced, that for expanded cinema rests 
primarily on how the work speaks. 
The point can be clarified by reference to Pierre Skriabine’s discussion of the 
‘logic’ of the neurotic illogicality characteristic of obsessionals (Skriabine, 2001) like 
Freud’s patient, the Rat Man, who feared that, as a result of his thoughts and 
behaviour, ‘something might happen to two people of whom he was very fond’ 
(Freud, 1909:39). As one of these was his father, it was ‘with astonishment’ that 
Freud learned ‘that the patient’s father, with whom his obsessional fears were, after 
  107 
all, occupied now, had died several years previously’ (Freud, 1909:43). To bring out 
the stakes in such behaviour, Skriabine cites what he terms a  
‘well-known British non-sense: a traveller gets off the train feeling unwell 
because he was not sitting facing the direction of the train. To the friends who 
came to welcome him, who said that he should have asked a passenger sitting 
opposite to change places with him, since no-one would have minded, the 
unhappy man objected that that was exactly the problem since none of the 
seats facing him was occupied’ (Skriabine, 2001:78).   
The logic here inevitably recalls Kafka but it is the difference from Kafka that makes 
my point. Whatever the neurotic sources of Kafka’s work, his art does not consist of 
neurotic outpourings. Instead something with a comic dimension, very different from 
the plague of neurotic symptoms, is made of his dilemmas. As Deleuze notes, ‘Max 
Brod recalls that when Kafka gave a reading of The Trial, everyone present, including 
Kafka himself, was overcome by laughter’ (Deleuze, 1967:85).  To reduce his work to 
a diagnosis of neurosis is to miss the achievement of the enunciation, the comic bien-
dire. Obsessional neurotics construct labyrinths without exits, for example, as 
Skriabine notes, ‘the Rat Man fabricated for himself a false debt impossible to repay’ 
(Skriabine, 2001:78). In contrast artists – we shall discuss this at greater length in 
chapter five – can create open-ended structures. Charles Melman remarks that ‘the 
Rat Man, like a good neurotic, has his future behind him’ (Melman, 1975:123).  The 
artist, if only – given the anguish which often accompanies the business of creation 
– momentarily, can have hers squarely before her. 
‘We use language,’ Lacan said, ‘in a way that goes far beyond what is in fact 
said’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Fink, 2007:167).  Consequently, we should be alive to 
what words can do beyond the expression, depiction, representation, reflection and 
contestation of pre-established realities. When we consider what a particular angle 
in Éloge de l’amour achieves, we may feel that the angle says something, and indeed 
it does, but what is said is exceeded by the saying. The process of articulation goes 
beyond what is signified. It will be immediately objected that cinema involves not 
just words but images, sounds and music and that, in consequence, the notion of 
enunciation is misleading. Deleuze, following Blanchot and Foucault, insists on ‘the 
irreducibility of the visible’ to words: ‘“speaking is not seeing”’ (F:61). As Edgar 
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remarks in Éloge de l’amour ‘an image never talks.’ Of course. Central to this thesis 
is the contention that the thinking which occurs in each mode is neither reducible to, 
nor completely translatable into, any other mode. As we have seen, much of the work 
of the work – the revaluations and concomitant creations of sense - in Éloge de 
l’amour occurs in the music. While the ‘little phrase’ assumes, like music in some 
operas, a choric function, commenting on the action by situating words, images and 
actions in different perspectives and thereby revaluing them, it is asemantic. 
However, my argument is that the notion of enunciation is still useful for, in every 
instance, there is the choice of a style which bespeaks an evaluation, betokens an 
attitude and indicates an orientation. 
Foucault famously concluded his essay ‘What Is an Author?’  with a question 
taken from Beckett: ‘“What matter who’s speaking?”’ (Samuel Beckett cited in 
Foucault, 1997:138).  My argument is that, on occasion, in films like Éloge de L’amour 
and India Song nothing matters more. For the only response approaching an answer 
to some questions is a style, which is ultimately, as Deleuze has it, ‘a style of life’ 
(N:100). David Bordwell is wary of the notion of enunciation. ‘In watching films,’ he 
suggests ‘we are seldom aware of being told something by an entity resembling a 
human being.’ It is only rarely that, as he puts it, ‘a text’s narration may emit cues 
that suggest a narrator’ (Bordwell, 1985:62). Indeed, but not in those modes of 
expanded cinema where the style of enunciation is the achievement. If in the 
majority of mainstream instances of contracted cinema, where the styles are 
indistinguishable, the mode of enunciation hardly matters, since it is only a more or 
less efficient delivery system for the prevalent ideologies and the usual fantasies, in 
expanded cinema it is crucial. In films like Éloge de l’amour, style is, to resume the 
citation from Deleuze, the inventing of ‘a possibility of life, a way of existing’ (N:100). 
And nothing is more fundamental. In this context, who is how. Writing of Dasein – 
that is, Heidegger’s notion of the human being as the being for whom ‘in its very 
being, that being is an issue for it’ (Heidegger, 1927:32) – François Raffoul astutely 
observes that ‘because Dasein is a way of being, a “how” and not a “what”, it can 
modify or modalise itself’ (Raffoul, 2016:292). The Lacanian subject is similarly a 
‘how’ and not a ‘what’ and, in the art of bien-dire, can modalise itself differently. 
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Art is decisions. ‘Choice is the main thing’ (Marcel Duchamp cited in de Duve, 
1996:162). This is not to say that the artist or author is in a position of mastery. 
Rather, as the subject is not a given, he or she can be transformed in the process of 
creation. In this process, as Julia Kristeva observed, the subject, caught up in language 
and other signifying systems, ‘makes and unmakes himself’ (Kristeva, 1989:272). In 
contracted cinema, a producer might coolly decide to maximize revenues by turning 
a box-office success into a franchise and a director might, with similar detachment, 
calculate how best to manipulate the audience – think of how Hitchcock refined his 
techniques for generating suspense. In contrast, in expanded cinema the director 
often does not know where the process will lead – to borrow a phrase from the B-
movies: he or she does not know what he or she ‘is getting into.’ After the inaugural 
initiative, the decision as to the terms in which the selected problem is to be posed, 
the artist is caught up in a process larger than him or herself. In that process, the 
artist at once shapes and is shaped by material which resists and enables, transports 
and transforms.  As the poet Liz Lochhead recently observed, in the artistic process 
‘you’re not in control’ (Desert Island Discs, 2017). Creation, at such moments, is an 
instance of what Catherine Malabou terms ‘plasticity’, which in her canonical 
formulation is defined as the ‘capacity’ to at once ‘give form’ and ‘receive form’.  In 
making of an issue a work of art in the mode of bien-dire, artists testify in favour of 
Malabou’s claim that the brain is ‘something modifiable, “formable,” and formative 
at the same time’ (Malabou, 2008:5).  In conceiving this process, we can usefully 
develop the psychoanalytic distinction between an action which is programmed to 
achieve an identified aim – for example the commercial film-making that constitutes 
the bulk of contracted cinema – and an act. In an act there is no specifiable end in 
view at the outset and something unforeseen can arrive and be relaunched ‘without 
one knowing whence it comes or where it goes’ (Fierens, 2012a:51). 
For Lacan, the subject is at once constituted – it is ‘defined as the effect of the 
signifier’ (S.XI:207) - and constitutive, insofar as ‘the subject constitutes himself out 
of the effects of the signifier’ (S.XI:126).  If one’s ‘cause is the signifier, without which 
there would be no subject in the real’ (E:708), it is equally the case that ‘one is always 
responsible for one’s position as a subject’ (E:729). Hence, ‘the “subject” exists’ in 
‘psychoanalytic formalization’ in Jeanne Lafont’s phrase ‘as a place of freedom, a 
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place of desire, a place of activity’ (Lafont, 2004:6). As Nietzsche put it: ‘in man there 
is united both creature and creator’ (Nietzsche, 1886:151). When constructing art in 
the mode of bien-dire, the artist is both. Creation is, as Derek Attridge has usefully 
pointed out, both an act and an event (Attridge, 2004a:9). In the terms proposed by 
this thesis, it is an act in that the creator decides to think an issue in a certain style 
and make something new of it. There is, to borrow a phrase from Deleuze, a 
‘becoming active’ (NP:179). If an artwork in the mode of bien-dire is, like the poetry 
described by Celan, ‘a step’ its initial movement is a getting on to the front foot 
(Celan, 1999:3).  But this act is not that of a master for it derives from what Lacan, in 
Sartrean vein, termed ‘an unfathomable decision of being’ and the inaugurating 
impulses which motivate the taking up of that position are not at the artist’s 
conscious command (Jacques Lacan cited in Braunstein, 2015:87). In the act, subjects 
are transformed and as de Sutter astutely notes they possess ‘no mastery of their 
own becoming’ (de Sutter, 2017:39). The work happens as much as it is made. As 
Lacan in another vein puts it: ‘an event has chosen’ (E:213). In the act of creation, 
subjects, who have taken ‘the unfathomable decision to pass to an act,’ must also let 
an unmasterable event occur (Laurent, 2006:242). What Deleuze termed ‘the time of 
a becoming-active’ (NP:180), is also in Derek Attridge’s phrase a ‘letting something 
happen’ (Attridge, 2004b:3). The work happens as much as it is made. In the to and 
fro of this event of creation, modes of desire and subjectivity are constituted, which 
in turn constitute the text, which then deconstitutes the existing form of the subject 
with a view to a different constitution. In short, creation is the construction of an 
agencement where desire, subjectivity, and reality are constituted, undone and 
remade. 
To conclude: the analogy between works of art which are instances of bien-
dire and jokes with a similar status usefully points up something of what can be at 
stake. Both begin with a problem – which gives the joke or the work its initial interest. 
Something is then made of the issue, which is generative of new senses, revaluations 
and truths which, like the laughter occasioned by a joke, do not (completely) outlive 
the moment. Although the said has an afterlife – representations and meanings 
circulate – the senses, evaluations and truths return (differently) only if the work is 
resumed in another enunciation. Discussion of the subject of enunciation brings us 
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immediately to the second aspect of the real under consideration, namely desire for 
to an extent ‘the subject is desire’ (S.VI:438). Will Greenshields’ observation, 
following Malcolm Bowie, that the subject is ‘the subject qua desire, since this desire 
is all that he [sic] is’, while something of a simplification – there are also the drives 
and the subject is always part of an agencement – a telling insight (Greenshields, 
2017:24). If ‘The subject’ is ‘determined by being, that is to say, by desire, speech is 
impelled by desire’ (Lacan, 1975c:166).  ‘Whatever animates, that which any 
enunciation speaks of, belongs to desire’ (S.XI:141). Deleuze claims ‘The question 
“who?” does not refer to persons, but to forces and wills’ (ECC:99). Psychoanalysis 
would agree but substitute ‘desires’ for ‘wills’ so let us now turn to the question of 
desire. 
 
Desire 
         
‘Desire itself is movement.’ 
T. S. Eliot (Eliot, 1944:13)  
 
The continuing claim of psychoanalytic film theory upon our attention rests not least 
upon the observation that the most salient feature of the history of cinema is the 
preponderance of works wedded to idealization and fantasy and the evident aptness 
of psychoanalysis for their theorization. However, in this section, I will argue that 
Lacan-inspired approaches are useful not only in the analysis of the ‘dream factory’ 
but in thinking the cinema of bien-dire as the launching of new desires as lines of 
flight (Powdermaker,1951). 
For Lacan – ‘desire is in itself identical to lack’ (SVIII:63). If the Other is barred, 
the subject experiences occupation of any socially assigned place as a separation 
from something of life, as a ‘want-to-be’ (manque à être) (E:549). Desire is born of 
difference - namely the difference between the place and its occupant – and is the 
encounter with difference. To assuage the manque à être, many subjects seek the 
lost object- the object a - which they believe will make good the lack. Typically, they 
demand that an other incarnate the object a only to encounter an ineradicable 
difference between the demanded and the obtained. Intersubjectivity is the 
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experience of disparity, non-reciprocity and incommensurability. In much contracted 
cinema this problem is posed in terms which can be addressed by what Lacan termed 
‘the three fundamental passions’: ‘love, hatred and ignorance’ (S.XVII:136). Each is 
associated with the imaginary and its correlate, the subject’s wish ‘to know nothing’ 
about ‘its being’ (S.XX:121). The passion for ignorance is the wish not to know, that 
is, the wish to know nothing of the unconscious desires of oneself and others. In 
contracted cinema difficult and ultimately unanswerable questions about identity 
and desire are occluded by the positing of all too answerable questions. Who is Jason 
Bourne? Although not immediately apparent, the question has an answer – David 
Webb - and our hero the wherewithal to find it (The Bourne Identity, Liman, 
USA/Germany 2002; The Bourne Supremacy, Greengrass, USA/Germany 2004; The 
Bourne Ultimatum, Greengrass, USA/Germany 2007). Equally love is a way of not 
knowing the real of either one’s own or the other’s desire. ‘Analysis,’ according to 
Lacan, ‘demonstrates that love, in its essence, is narcissistic’ (S.XX:6). Love is the 
subject’s projection of a narcissistic ideal upon the other in the hope that other will 
then love that self-same ideal in the subject. This fantasy, prevalent in much 
contracted cinema, serves to ‘obfuscate the enigma of the other’s desire’ (Žižek, 
2012:750 footnote 13). As for hatred, it is the concomitant of love. To the degree that 
love is a way of knowing nothing of the Other’s desire, ‘there is no love without hate’ 
(S.XX:89). Both love and hate seek ‘to negate the other’s being,’ that is, negate the 
other’s lack and desire (E:525). The strategy of movies like Avatar (Cameron, United 
States, 2009) is to demonise certain others and thereby mask the real of antagonisms 
unconfined to fiends. In such modes of contracted cinema, the telos is the imaginary 
annulment of difference as a way of not knowing that ‘desire is the desire of the 
Other’ (Lacan, 2005c:40).   
In contrast, difference in expanded cinema is at once the problem and the 
answer. Desire gives existence its point for desire is sense: ‘the only sense is the sense 
of desire’ (S.XVII:61). As Miller notes, in Lacan’s teaching ‘desire is conceived as 
meaning’ - [that is, what I term ‘sense’] – ‘running underneath the signifying 
articulation without ever appearing as such’ (Miller, J-A 2011:16). As all perception is 
libidinally invested, ‘desire,’ as Lacan said, ‘is interpretation itself’ (S.XI:176).  Without 
desire the world would be a blank. To desire is to evaluate and as Nietzsche observed 
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‘only through evaluation is there value: and without evaluation the nut of existence 
would be hollow.’ (Nietzsche, 1891:85). In respect of sexual desire, the point is 
brilliantly made by the psychoanalyst Jacques Hassoun in his recounting of an 
episode from the poet Marina Tsvetayeva’s journals. She was, Hassoun informs us,  
‘deeply in love with a man, but then she lost all interest in him and barely 
recognized him when their paths crossed. When he asked what had 
happened, she replied that when a woman loves a man she sees him as god 
created him, when she doesn’t love him she sees him as his parents created 
him, and when she no longer loves him she sees a table or chair instead of 
him’ (Jacques Hassoun in Feher-Gurewich et al., 1996:242-3). 
The purpose of the treatment is to free desire where it has become snagged on 
captivating images and fixated by fantasy so that the subject can experiment anew. 
This is possible because the real of desire does not exist outside compositions with 
the symbolic and imaginary. When something new is made of existing signifiers and 
imaginaries, new desires can emerge and with them new senses and values. The end 
of the treatment is not the discovery of a pre-given meaning but a new mode of 
desiring. As Antonio Quinet so aptly puts it: ‘this is what the analyst gives the 
analysand: a ticket to board that streetcar named desire’ (Quinet, 2017:112). My 
argument is that an analogous movement can occur with the event of art where the 
birth of new desires can be accompanied by the emergence of new senses. Whereas 
much contracted cinema merely rehearses pre-existing fantasies, expanded cinema 
can produce new desires and senses. Just as, in India Song, the style of the 
enunciation is irreducible to what is enounced, so the style of desiring is irreducible 
to the modes of desire represented. The desire which speaks in the enunciation 
differs from those of Stretter, the vice-consul and the beggar-woman. In instances of 
contracted cinema, like Speed (de Bont, USA 1994), success is achieved by desire’s 
attainment of its goal in fantasy: Jack and Annie get together and the murderous 
sadist is despatched. Paradoxically in certain modes of expanded cinema, failure can 
be the condition of success for the failure sustains desire and hence sense. As Harari 
so perspicaciously observes: ‘the subject must fail necessarily, so that its desire is not 
suffocated’ (Harari, 2001:99). Instead of closure in fantasy, desire is relaunched in a 
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movement of way-making – what Lacan terms ‘un parcours’ – ‘for’ as he continues, 
‘c’est lá le sens’ - literally: that is where the sense is (Lacan, 1966b:795).  
The question is whether Lacan’s conceptions of desire as opposed to his style 
are worthy of such events in art and this brings us to the argument of the second part 
of this thesis namely that Lacan’s teaching has to be supplemented by Deleuze’s 
philosophy. Although Lacan affirms desire – ‘we do not believe in the [imaginary] 
object, but we affirm desire’– his teaching lacks concepts worthy of the desires 
correlative with bien-dire (Lacan, 1975-76: Session 9/12/75 p. x). At moments, Éloge 
de l’amour and India Song attain that condition of poetry in which as René Char has 
it: ‘The poem is the realised love of desire that has remained desire’ (René Char cited 
in Blanchot, 1969:47). Now, while Lacan’s style bespeaks just such desires, his 
theories do not. A similar limitation obtains in relation to his conception of jouissance 
to which we now turn. 
 
Jouissance 
 
This section supports the claim that Lacan’s teaching is of continuing interest by 
arguing that jouissance is as important in the constitution of sense as desire.  Just as 
the world without desire would be blank so, ‘it is jouissance whose absence would 
make the universe vain’ (E:694). At the same time, the section underwrites the 
second claim, namely that Lacan’s teaching has to be supplemented by Deleuze, for 
it is argued that the notion of jouissance is too rooted in the psychoanalytic clinic to 
be equal to the task of thinking the joy possible in the event of art.  As the stress on 
jokes and the discussion of The Large Glass should have made clear, bien-dire is rarely 
solemn and never glum.  
 Lacan’s notion of jouissance is useful insofar as it points up two problematic 
aspects of enjoyment. First, far from being a desired satisfaction, jouissance can be 
experienced as a threat for ‘the organism,’ as Lacan observed, ‘seems made to avoid 
too much jouissance’ (Lacan, 1970b:195). On a first approach - reliant on a distinction 
between inside and outside, which will be problematized in the subsequent 
discussion of topology – children, like Little Hans, are troubled by the tumult of 
sensations ‘within’ and by the opaque jouissance of their mother or other care-giver 
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without. As we saw earlier, the child’s only recourse in this situation is language taken 
up through an identification with the name-of-the-father. Despite the costs 
associated with this occupation of the place assigned by the law of the father, there 
is a gain insofar as language orders and stabilizes what would otherwise be an 
insupportable chaos (Braunstein, 2015:88). On this account, if the failings of the 
father prevent identification with the name-of-the-father, chaos impends. 
The second problem is that jouissance can assume toxic forms.  Jouissance is 
a function of the drives. As these derive not from a putative biological body but the 
body cut and carved up by language, no drive is unmarked by the signifier – in 
Deleuzean terms, no drive operates outside an agencement. Consequently, 
jouissance can take innumerable forms. The only constant is that jouissance is always 
in play. As Miller puts it, ‘The subject, at some level, is always happy, is always 
enjoying himself’ (Miller, J-A, 1995b:12). Even in symptoms for ‘the symptom, in its 
nature, is jouissance’ (S.X:125). While in consciousness a symptom occasions 
‘apparent unhappiness or displeasure, the subject’ [at an unconscious level] obtains 
satisfaction (Miller, J-A, 1995:12).  
And this is the problem: some modes of jouissance are baleful. In light of this, 
Lacan reformulated his notion of the treatment as enabling the patient to achieve a 
savoir-faire with his or her symptom. As Žižek with his joke about the man who 
believed he was a grain of corn reminds us, telling patients the nature of their 
problem accomplishes nothing. The cure only occurs with a change in the patient’s 
libidinal disposition, in other words, his or her mode of jouissance. ‘The end of 
analysis’ he proposes is ‘knowing how to deal with one’s symptom,’ that is knowing 
‘how to manage it, how to handle it’ that is knowing how to find a happier mode of 
jouissance (Jacques Lacan cited in Julien, 1990a:189).  
This reoriented Lacan’s thinking on art. The first task of an artwork is to 
institute a structure which, like the name-of-the-father, keeps chaos at bay as the 
necessary condition for the creation of new and more vital forms of jouissance. Joyce 
provided the starting-point for this rethinking. For Lacan, the irresponsible and 
improvident John Joyce was ‘an unworthy father, a deficient father’; hence the 
paternal metaphor did not function (Lacan, 1975-76: Session 31/1/76 p. 1). 
Consequently, Lacan asked: why did his son, James, not go mad? why did he remain, 
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in Darian Leader’s phrase, a case of ‘non-triggered psychosis?’ why was he not, like 
psychotics, invaded by overwhelming jouissance? (Leader and Groves, 1995:167) 
Typically, as Harari points out, Lacan’s response was not just to apply existing notions 
(Harari, 1996:26) but to rethink the nature of the symptom and create a new concept: 
the ‘sinthome’ a neologism, a ‘remaking’ (Harari, 1996:23) and piece of Joycean 
wordplay which in French ‘includes references to “sin”’ (Cochet, 2002:89) ‘symptom’, 
‘saint’ and ‘Saint Thomas’ (Leader and Groves, 1995:167). In response to ‘the radical 
deficiencies of the symbolic order,’ Joyce’s sinthome, that is, his writing, at one and 
the same time, structured his world and afforded him a satisfying mode of jouissance 
(Le Gaufey, 2016:41). 
Art, on this account, becomes ‘a practical form of knowledge, a savoir-faire 
of jouissance’ (Levine, 2008:128). ‘What is savoir-faire?’ Lacan asks and answers, ‘it 
is art, artifice’ (S.XXIII:47). Indeed, Miller goes so far as to claim art is ‘the supreme 
form of savoir-faire’ (Miller, J-A, 2016:67). On this view, while art in the manner of 
bien-dire can contribute to our knowledge - for example, Nostalgia for the Light can 
teach us about the torture, slaughter and suffering visited on Chile by Pinochet – in 
other instances it is primarily a form of ‘know-some-how, which is to say, knowing 
how to find a way in this world, which is not at all a world of representations’ (Lacan, 
2010a:11). On this view, art is a form of way-making. ‘The way things stand, such as 
we are moving through them,’ Lacan observed, ‘always entails picking things up en 
route.’ (S.X:180). Art, as argued above, is a way of being en route.  
Existence for Lacan, as his graphs and mathemes make clear and as 
emphasised above, is a matter of vectors and trajectories. In the diagram below, for 
example, the ‘insubstantial, fading subject’ is patently a process not a stable, fixed 
being. Impelled by the real of the lack in the symbolic, the subject seeks and fails to 
find wholeness in the imaginary and is forced back upon the symbolic where, in the 
absence of the place, the circuit incessantly resumes (Greenshields, 2017:41). Being 
en route is the making of this always singular circuit. En route, forms of thought 
emerge available nowhere else. As Shelly Brivic observes, the truth ‘develops out of 
the whole movement of the circuit and could no more exist outside it than a heart 
outside a body’ (Brivic, 2008:89). These truths, as Dany Nobus underlines, are 
irreducible to knowledge: ‘knowledge and jouissance/truth are incommensurable’ 
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(Nobus, 2002:32). Here, thinking is less conceptual than affective: ‘thought is 
jouissance’ (S.XX:70). 
 
 
 
 
The strength of this approach is its insistence on the need in art for a 
structuration which is the necessary condition for the creation of what escapes 
structuration: laughter in jokes and joy in art.  But this is also its weakness. The 
emphasis is on art as defence. Lacan describes ‘the function of beauty’ as the 
constitution of ‘the ultimate barrier that forbids access to a fundamental horror’ 
(E:654). A notion recently echoed by Miller’s claim that ‘beauty is the last defence 
against the real’ (Miller, J-A, 2015:128). A further weakness is its undervaluation of 
the joy to be found in art. Jouissance in art tends to be viewed by analysts through 
the prism of the clinic where ‘jouissance’ is pleasure in pain (Chiesa, 2005:164), and 
‘is felt 99 per cent of the time as unbearable suffering’ (Leader and Groves, 
1995:141). My argument is that psychoanalysis, by approaching art from that angle, 
can only be unworthy of the event. In many art-events, ‘joy needs,’ as Scott Wilson 
maintains ‘to be strictly differentiated from jouissance’ at least as ‘conceptualised by 
Miller and his followers’ (Wilson, 2008:5). The focus of psychoanalysis is on what 
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does not work and this leaves it ill-equipped to deal with art which often does (Lacan, 
2015:14). Reflecting on his career Godard remarked: ‘I don’t think I’ve succeeded in 
making any really good films,’ but immediately added ‘there are moments, scenes, 
whole movements that sing’ (Jean-Luc Godard cited in Dixon, 1997:205). At the end 
of Éloge de l’amour the presence of what Deleuze termed the ‘intolerable and 
unbearable’ is palpable (C2:18). As Berthe says every ‘problem is defiled by its 
solution.’ And yet, at the same time, in the intensity of the colours of a dashboard 
against the ground of night and rain, and above all in the final repetition of the 
musical refrain the film also sings. My claim is that psychoanalysis lacks concepts 
worthy of the joy to be found in such singing and for that reason should turn to 
Deleuze.  
Paul Celan concludes ‘Cello-Entry’: 
‘all is less, than 
it is, 
all is more.’ (Celan, 1967:69) 
A similar paradox informs the modes of jouissance of expanded cinema in the mode 
of bien-dire. There is ‘less’ in that a limit is encountered but whereas in neurosis that 
‘less’ is experienced as a lack in a work like Éloge de l’amour the limit gives on to a 
beyond. At the same time there is ‘more’, an excess. In neurosis this can take the 
form of what at a conscious level is experienced as a burdensome symptom but in 
bien-dire, whether an artwork or a joke, the ‘more’ is an energy carrying the subject 
beyond limits. The capture by the ‘less’ is also the liberation of a ‘more’.  
 
Topology 
 
‘There is no longer a whole man confronting a whole world.’ 
Ulrich in Robert Musil’s The Man without Qualities (Musil, 1930:277) 
 
The danger in developing these lines of thought is of collapsing into a simplistic 
notion of cinema as a series of perspectives in which a subject can view reality from 
a number of different angles. While, on occasion, a common-sensical ‘bipartition 
between interior and exterior’ (Miller, J-A, 1994:75) has its uses – where, for 
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example, a political intervention like I, Daniel Blake contests the ‘veracity’ of 
prevalent representations – in other contexts it oversimplifies for, as we have seen, 
in Lacanian psychoanalysis there are no givens (S.VIII:96). It is not a question of a 
given subject achieving different perspectives on a pre-given reality, but of the 
creation of perspectives constitutive of subjects and realities, in spaces and 
temporalities oriented by a real, which structures, but does not appear in those 
perspectives. Here space is ‘topological’ (SX:102) not ‘Euclidean’ (Jacques Lacan cited 
in Greenshields, 2017:206). The argument of this section is that Lacan’s topological 
explorations offer a further way of reconceiving the thinking which can occur in the 
event of art.   
In the space available it is possible to consider only two aspects. Let’s begin 
with Lacan’s contention - implicit in the notion of the mirror stage - that we do not 
inhabit space as we imagine. The world is not arrayed before us. It is not just that we 
are in the midst of things but that, in many instances, it is impossible to clearly 
distinguish inside and outside. Lacan explored this point at length in seminar seven 
with his reworking of Freud’s notion of das Ding as La Chose. Like so many of Lacan’s 
concepts, La Chose, as Miller observed, ‘is worked out enigmatically’ and ‘wrapped 
in mystery’ (Miller, J-A, 1994:80). ‘As the absolute Other of the subject’ (S.VII:52), it 
is ‘the primary object’ which either ‘failed to give satisfaction’ (S.VII:53-4) or afforded 
‘too much pleasure’ and is thereby associated with the mother (S.VII:54). As such, it 
is the precursor of the object a (Critchley, 1999:198): ‘something missed’ (S.VII:52). 
At once the object of desire’s quest and ‘the support of an aversion’ (S.VII:53). Equally 
it is both the subject’s unconscious desires – the desire of the Other – and, in Alain 
Juranville’s phrase, ‘the real of the other subject, encountered when the desire of 
the one collides with the desire of the other’ (Juranville, 1988:215).  Hence Lacan 
claims ‘the whole progress of the subject’ is oriented ‘around the Ding’ as ‘strange 
and even hostile on occasion’ (SVII:52). It is ‘the first outside’ but – and this is the 
topological point - it is a paradoxical outside which is at once within and without 
(SVII:52). If it is at the core of our being, it is also furthest from us (E:437). ‘In and of 
itself,’ in its relation with the subject, Lacan says, the Thing ‘is what is closest to him 
(sic) while escaping him more than anything else’ (E:549-550). Therefore, he 
describes its relation to us as one of ‘extimacy,’ that is, ‘intimate exteriority’ 
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(SVII:139). To exist, on this account, is to be at grips with a Thing which can never be 
represented and, consequently, never become an object of knowledge. Hence, in a 
bid to think this process Lacan experimented with topological figures like the torus – 
which provides ‘an intuitive representation’ of extimacy, ‘insofar as a torus’ 
peripheral exteriority and central exteriority constitute but one single region’ (E:264) 
- and the Klein bottle (S.X:205) which, as Miller notes, ‘materializes, mathematically, 
a relationship between inside and outside which places the outside, if I may use the 
expression, inside the outside’ (Miller, J-A, 1989:31.). See figure 1 
 
 
Torus 
 
In respect of cinema, the argument is that this provides us with a further way 
of conceiving the thinking and subject positions, which occur in the expanded cinema 
of Godard and Duras. The claim is not, of course, that the work of Duras and Godard 
represents such spaces for they are, precisely unrepresentable in Euclidean space. 
‘You can have a Klein bottle in front of your eyes, in three dimensions, only in an 
approximate form’ (Miller, J-A, 1989:31).  Rather the suggestion is that the thinking 
takes unique cinematic forms in response to issues which can usefully be thought 
topologically. Those forms do not reflect topological space rather they engage with 
it to make something new of the issues arising there. 
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To think the psychoanalytic process Lacan deployed the three registers. While 
always imbricated, these are heterotopic (Lacan, 1995:11). If there is a lack in the 
Other, the real cannot be completely spoken and the imaginarisations invoked to 
make good this deficiency are holed (Julien, 1990a:158). Analogously, in thinking 
issues, Godard and Duras create a heterotopic cinema in which the different modes 
of thinking in the images, words, music, citations and (in the case of Godard) written 
texts, while always imbricated, occur in zones which cannot be brought together in a 
unitary space. Instead of an englobing vision there are interlaced lines of thought on 
different planes which navigate rather than delineate. On the proposed account, 
perspectives as conceived by common-sense may emerge but always as part of a 
larger process which exceeds them. The subject – always out of joint - is a movement 
taking him or her beyond any single perspective. In this light, the films of Godard are 
a series of perspectives, which inaugurate a break with existing imaginaries and 
which, by dint of their patent limitations, propel the subject forward. Film thereby 
enables the subject to be between perspectives differently and this, in turn, enables 
another form of thinking where the apparently clear distinction of inside and outside, 
which seems to hold in worlds conceived in terms of the specular image, no longer 
obtains. In the expanded cinema of Godard there are moments when clarity emerges 
in the perspectives on say homelessness, where the subject is in a position to 
determine the crux of the situation: the manifest need for much better provision. 
But, in respect of other issues, for example the vicissitudes encountered in some 
intimate relationships, the subject is, ‘at an indeterminate place,’ for the subject is in 
process (S.XI:208).  
Coming to the second aspect, topology affords different ways of thinking 
relationality. Brent Adkins makes the point with admirable succinctness: 
‘The primary issue in topology is not the size or shape of the object but the 
relation of its parts to one another. The classic example of this is the doughnut 
and the coffee cup. Topologically speaking they are the same. The reason they 
are the same is that both a doughnut and a coffee cup have exactly one hole, 
the middle of the doughnut and the handle of the coffee cup. The cup part of 
the coffee cup can be thought of as a continuous deformation… of one side 
of the doughnut’ (Adkins, 2015:62). 
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In other words, in this form of topology, manipulations of an object by bending, 
stretching and distorting are permitted – here, the transformation of a doughnut into 
a coffee cup - as long as certain rules are observed. One can deform a given figure as 
long as ‘one does not separate points previously connected and, conversely, does not 
connect points previously separated’ (Plotnitsky, 2006:192). Invariants – in this 
instance the hole – have to be respected. So, staying with the present example, 
‘spheres and tori cannot be converted into each other’ for, as Arkady Plotnitsky 
reminds us, ‘the hole in tori make this impossible’ (Plotnitsky, 2006:192). Otherwise 
any distortion is allowed and this enables the creation of spatial relationships unlike 
those proposed by Euclidean, metrical geometry. In place of ‘the science of stable 
points and well-defined distances’, topology affords a ‘science of neighbourhoods’ 
(Smith, 2012b:29). What counts is not metrical distances between fixed points but 
relationships of proximity and distance effected by the transformations. Daniel W. 
Smith gives an example:  
‘I can mark out points on a flat piece of paper, but if I crumple or fold the 
paper, two distinct points may find themselves in the neighbourhood of each 
other, or even superimposed […] two points that were close can become very 
distant’ (Smith, 2012b:28-9).  
This is useful as it offers us a way of conceiving forms of thinking which can 
occur in expanded cinema where the thinking revalues by creating new relationships 
such as bringing elements into new neighbourhoods. Like the montage in the lines of 
Rimbaud, Godard’s juxtaposes different elements, revaluing each. Godard’s montage 
is not just the recognition that there are areas of existence which cannot be brought 
together in a unified vision. Nor is it merely fragments for there was never a whole 
outside the imaginary. Rather it is a way of thinking and thereby revaluing, in its 
conjunctions, aspects of issues which cannot all be brought into focus at once, and, 
in its interstices, the correlative sub-representative elements which cannot be 
specularised at all. Crucially, in such thinking the style of movement is not merely an 
encounter with limitations, checks and failures, but the making of a way which is a 
style of desiring and which, in consequence, can be its own sense. As such, it is not 
the mere registration of the failure to say or see it all – where is the joy in that? – but 
an achievement. 
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To conclude - there are innumerable situations in which it is useful to figure 
issues in terms, which can be situated in Euclidean space. Just as in many 
circumstances Einstein’s theories can be set aside and thinking proceed on a 
Newtonian basis so, more often than not, the cinema of bien-dire can, for example 
in the work of Ken Loach, undertake its work in Euclidean spaces. However, where 
what counts is the sub-representational, where knowledge falls short, and thinking 
assumes the forms of know-how and way-making, Lacan’s topological investigations 
suggest that such thinking can usefully be conceived as the traversal -  punctuated by 
positionings -  of spaces which are resistant to any totalizing envisioning and, 
therefore, very different from those associated with a common-sense perspectivism. 
 
Conclusion  
 
Using moments from Lacan’s teaching this chapter has demonstrated the first of my 
two arguments: namely that psychoanalytic approaches are not yet entirely spent. 
Conscious that every encounter with an art work is different, it has proposed no 
general methodology. Instead it has essayed a series of explorations of what various 
artforms can do and, in particular, how they can think in forms irreducible to any 
other. 
Before coming to part two of this thesis, I want to make one final point in 
support of my argument for the continued relevance of psychoanalysis and, at the 
same time, dispel any impression that there is anything highfalutin or rarefied about 
the approaches essayed. Bien-dire is not confined to difficult modernist texts. One of 
my purposes in drawing an analogy between the work of the work in jokes and in art 
– as instances of bien-dire - is to argue that artworks do not inhabit an ethereal realm 
apart. They are as engaged as jokes and like jokes, in the style of bien-dire, are as 
everyday as they are miraculous. Some of the most immediately enjoyable works of 
popular culture can be instances of bien-dire. The distinction between enunciation 
and the enounced is as useful in thinking about some instances of rock music as it is 
in considering Godard. In many songs, Satisfaction (The Rolling Stones, 1965) and 
Jumpin Jack Flash (The Rolling Stones, 1968) are obvious examples, what is said 
speaks of the pain of existence while in the saying, in the rhythms and energies of 
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the music, there is a zest for life.  AND not IS. In the temporalities and places created 
by such moments, life is as glorious as existence is unbearable. ‘You don’t define jazz,’ 
Miles Davis maintained. ‘Jazz is just like an attitude. Music is nothing but styles’ 
(Davis, 2010). On the account offered here, this proposition holds for all art. If there 
is a lack in the Other, there are only styles, evaluations and attitudes. Bien-dire 
denotes the innumerable styles worthy of the event. The claim of this chapter is that 
psychoanalysis is still useful when we attempt to think the thinking which happens 
there. 
 
Postscript: Hamlet, serialism and art after Lacan 
 
As a coda to the first part of the thesis, I will put the contention, that psychoanalytic 
approaches inspired by Lacan’s teaching - once amended by Deleuzean concepts - 
can be worthy of the event of art, to the test by considering a literary text: Hamlet. 
If the approaches explored above have any claim on our attention, they should be 
capable of contributing to our thinking of works beyond cinema. It is not only in films 
that art in the mode of bien-dire engages with the Other of language, the discordance 
of desires and the real as impossible. And it is not only in film that the work of the 
work creates an element in which a unique form of thinking can occur. Hamlet has 
been selected for this experiment for two reasons. First because of the centrality it 
has historically enjoyed in discussions around literature and art. ‘It has,’ as the 
theatre director Peter Brook remarks, ‘captured the imagination of the world more 
than any other’ (Brook, 2011). ‘This play of genius has never been replaced by a 
better one’ (Lacan, 1958-59: Session 4/3/59 p. 13). And secondly, because it was 
Darian Leader’s exceptionally insightful article on Hamlet - to which we will come 
shortly - that initially convinced me of the continuing value of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis when thinking the event of art (Leader, 2003). The argument of this 
section is that Leader’s analysis of Hamlet can usefully be developed along lines 
explored earlier to provide new approaches to both Hamlet and the cinematic texts 
which are the focus of this thesis.  
Leader’s reading of Hamlet develops in the context of a larger discussion of 
Lacan, Lévi-Strauss and myth which he begins with the case of Little Hans. As we have 
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seen, on Lacan’s account, Hans ‘was left in the lurch at the age of five by the failings 
of his symbolic entourage’ (E:432) when ‘faced with the suddenly actualised enigma 
to him of his sex and his existence’ (E:432). In other words, Hans used his phobia and 
the myths fashioned around it as a means of situating and orientating himself in a 
world where he had lost his bearings. The mythic constructions were his answer to 
the question which ‘being raises for the subject,’ (E:432) to ‘the question of his place 
between his mother and his father, experienced by him as an impasse’ (Leader, 
2003:41). The interest of Lacan’s approach as developed by Leader, for present 
purposes, is that it goes beyond the commonplace, that ‘myth is a way of treating an 
impossibility,’ (Leader, 2003:39) to argue that myth constitutes a unique mode of 
thought hinging more upon relationality and composition than the propositional 
content of representations. 
 The approach builds on further theses of Levi-Strauss. First that the building 
blocks of myths should be conceived less as ‘isolated elements than as bundles of 
relations’ (Leader, 2003:38). In his analyses, Levi-Strauss prioritised not items of 
content but the ‘relations between terms or sets of terms’ (Leader, 2003:37). In 
myth, ‘form takes precedence over the content of the narrative’ (Lévi-Strauss, 
1958:204). Lévi-Strauss’s subsequent move is, as, Leader so astutely perceives, even 
more important for Lacan – and indeed this thesis. Lévi-Strauss hypothesises ‘that 
what cannot be formulated as a proposition can take the form of a relation’ (Leader, 
2003:48). This notion informs Lacan’s teaching insofar as ‘problems involving a real 
or point of impossibility led him to the construction of relational modes of exposition 
involving stories, images and fictions caught up with logical and mathematical 
models’ (Leader, 2003:48).   Further it orientated his handling of myth. In contrast to 
Freud, who used a mythic structure, such as the primal father of Totem and Taboo 
‘to account for some contradictory or impossible real,’ (Leader, 2003:48) Lacan 
looked ‘to the relation between mythic structures’ to think this real (Leader, 
2003:48).  Hence ‘his reading not of the Oedipus story or of the Totem and Taboo 
story as separate narratives, but as two oppositional poles of a formula’ (Leader, 
2003:48). Where, if there is a lack in the Other, the truth can only be half-said then 
recourse is had to myth. As Lacan puts it: ‘half-saying is the internal law of every 
species of enunciation of the truth, and what incarnates it best is myth’ (S.XVII:110). 
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However, as truth can only be half-said, no myth expresses the truth. Instead ‘the 
truth reveals itself in an alternation of strictly opposite things, which have to be made 
to revolve around one another’ (SXVII:110). Composition and relationality are key. 
The truths at stake here are articulated not in meanings but between meanings. 
Second, and even more importantly, Lévi-Strauss argued that myth responds to 
impossibility ‘not with a solution but by finding new ways of formulating it’ (Leader, 
2003:39). The plural is crucial: instead of a single myth, there are series where each 
response to impossibility ‘replies, as it were to another’ (Leader, 2003:39).  Impasses 
are not overcome but the terms in which they are figured are recast in different 
relationships, various permutations are worked through and the thinking occurs 
between the series (Leader, 2003:39). This inspires Lacan to claim that the myth-
making of Little Hans consists of ‘all the possible permutations of a limited number 
of signifiers in the form of a myth around the signifying crystal of his phobia’ (E:432). 
As Leader elaborates, with his new sexual sensations and the arrival of a sibling ‘the 
question of his place between his mother and his father’ (Leader, 2003:41) is raised 
anew. At this juncture, Leader notes the ‘Oedipus complex could be elaborated as a 
myth to allow the child a positioning in the symbolic,’ but not in this case (Leader, 
2003:42). It is impossible for Little Hans to situate himself and the new, troubling 
elements within an Oedipal framework for the father – like Joyce’s father - fails ‘to 
function in a way appropriate to introduce the Oedipal myth’ (Leader, 2003:42).  
Little Hans is, consequently, at an impasse. His response is to create his own 
framework in the form of a phobia to set limits - thereby organizing space – and 
‘mythic constructions,’ where he situates himself and others ‘in a new symbolic 
configuration’ (Leader, 2003:41). In the manner described by Lévi-Strauss, his ‘mythic 
activity’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Leader, 2003:41) takes up and reshuffles a limited 
number of elements –here the horse, the street, and other children – in a 
‘proliferation of stories, ideas, dreams and scenarios’ (Leader, 2003:41). As with Lévi-
Strauss, his myth-making is, in Lacan’s formulation, ‘the response to an impossible 
situation by the successive articulation of all the forms of the impossibility of the 
solution’ (Leader, 2003:41). 
The importance of this for the present project – namely the development of non-
reductive modes of psychoanalytic criticism worthy of the thinking which occurs in 
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the event of art – should be evident. First it suggests a way of conceiving what certain 
artworks do. As Leader argues, ‘a fiction should not be understood simply as 
something “false” but as something that can be used to organise disparate and 
traumatic material’ (Leader, 2003:42). Like the mythic constructions of Little Hans, 
many artworks, which assume a fictional form, can be considered as ‘formally 
equivalent to the process of responding to and elaborating a question’ (Leader, 
2003:41). If the Ⱥ obtains, artists, like Little Hans, have to experiment but, unlike the 
constructions of that unhappy little boy, theirs afford more joy than the wretched 
mode of jouissance which can be garnered from a phobic symptom. Further, it 
affords a way of thinking about art as a form of thought irreducible to any other. 
Here, for example, in modes of thinking where relationality and composition are 
paramount, where content counts insofar as it gives the work its initial interest – but 
where, in the course of the work, what matters are the changing relations between 
elements within a series and the relations between series. A thinking which occurs 
between the different permutations and which is articulable in no other form. An 
initial content arrives with a particular valency – whether cultural or individual – and 
is then revalued by the relationships in which it is taken up. The work happens 
between the variants and, in that work, senses are created which constitute an 
element in which new truths can be created. 
This brings us to Hamlet for Leader himself makes the connection to art in relation 
to the play within the play in Hamlet. In the main plot Hamlet, commanded by his 
murdered father’s ghost to avenge his death, famously, hesitates. ‘In the midst of his 
indecision…he hits on the idea of staging a play before his guilty uncle Claudius in 
which the murder scene is played out’ (Leader, 2003:43). As a number of 
commentators have pointed out, there is a puzzle: in the-play-within-the-play: it is 
the nephew who is ‘the king’s murderer, not the brother, as in the main narrative’ 
(Leader, 2003:43-4). To explain the puzzle Leader argues we have to ask ‘why was it 
necessary to add the extra play?’, ‘what structurally is its function?’ and ‘what can 
the double-plot conceit tell us about the nature of this desire itself?’  (Leader, 
1997:25) Leader’s proposal is as much Freudian as Lacanian. He argues that ‘the two 
contradictory plots’ (Leader, 2003:44) exist because ‘when an unconscious wish is 
impossible to assume’ – for Leader, ‘parricidal desire’ - ‘it will take the form of pieces 
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of material that cannot be fully superimposed one on the other’ (Leader, 1997:25). 
The ‘margin between them’ and the ‘failure to map the one onto the other’ further 
suggests ‘a definition of desire as being exactly this failure’ (Leader, 1997:25). The 
two stories ‘cipher an initial point of impossibility, something that cannot be thought 
because it is so unbearable: that the son is himself in the place of the father’s 
murderer’ (Leader, 1997:25). Leader continues ‘what the play-within-a-play shows us 
is that when a wish cannot be expressed as a proposition (“I want to kill daddy”), it 
will take the form of a relation, a relation in which the “I” is missing’ (Leader, 
2003:44). Or, as he put it in the earlier piece, the wish in question exists ‘simply in 
the form of a set of contradictions, a group of contradictory and disparate motifs that 
articulate the point of impossibility, the place where there are no words, no 
proposition’ (Leader, 1997:25). 
The importance of Leader's brilliant study is that it, albeit implicitly rather than 
explicitly, provides an example of a form of thinking in art – the serial which depends 
on position, that is a subject’s being between. Its influence on earlier discussions of 
the serial in The Conformist will be apparent. However, as that discussion evidenced, 
Leader's line of thought opens up possibilities which he himself did not explore. It is 
to these possibilities we now turn.  How does the play appear in light of the 
approaches set out earlier? 
 It begins with problems and questions recalcitrant to resolution. At the 
immediately manifest political level, it is far from clear that Hamlet’s ‘execution’ of 
Claudius and accession to the throne would put all to rights for he is no saint. A thirty-
year old man plunged into melancholy because his mother’s desires go elsewhere – 
the condition of Hamlet before interpellation by his father’s ghost – appears unlikely 
to be the answer to any kingdom’s difficulties. It is no accident that his efforts to 
bring justice result in ‘the deaths of Polonius, Ophelia, Gertrude, Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern, Laertes and Hamlet himself’ and that ‘politically, the consequences are 
even more disastrous’ with the state of Denmark ‘annexed by the warlord Fortinbras 
who steps into the bloody shambles of the final scene to assume “some rights of 
memory in this kingdom”’ (Shaughnessy, 2011:193). 
 The problems which are the focus of psychoanalysis are even more 
intractable. For Leader these are pre-eminently Oedipal. Later I will suggest that 
  129 
there are other issues but for the moment let’s concentrate on the Oedipus complex. 
The key point to always bear in mind in relation to Oedipus is that ‘there is no happy 
definitive resolution of one’s Oedipal trials’ (Critchley, 2013:128). On a Lacanian 
account, the mother is more the problem than the solution. Murdering the father is 
no more of an option: in Totem and Taboo when the sons kill the father they find 
themselves even more effectively debarred from the desired women (Freud, 
1913:141-3). So, the choice is a forced choice. As Lacan explains, ‘Your money or your 
life! If I choose the money, I lose both. If I choose life, I have life without the money, 
namely, a life deprived of something’ (S.XI:212).  There is no alternative to the 
assumption of a social role. As, if the barred Other is operating, the place does not 
exist, this solution is never wholly satisfactory. The Oedipus complex is an evasion of 
this fact. It is the pretence there is an alternative. The play therefore addresses what 
is for psychoanalysis the fundamental problem: the impossibility of being at one with 
the symbolic order – it is Other – and the impossibility – this side of psychosis – of life 
outside it. In Freudian terms this is the desire to at once kill the father and accede to 
society and its benefits by identifying with him. In Lacanian terms it is the wish to be 
both an unbarred subject with unconstrained access to an imaginarised absolute 
jouissance and a barred subject not wholly lost in a chaotic flux of desires, drives and 
jouissance.  
For those uneasy with Oedipalism, elements of the problem could be recast 
in more everyday terms. Hamlet, like many other children, can find a workable place 
for himself only if he can put right what has gone awry in the previous generation: an 
impossible task. Like so many children he curses his fate: the task of putting right 
what is amiss between flawed parents: 
‘The time is out of joint; O cursèd spite  
That ever I was born to set it right!’ (Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 1, scene 5, line 
nos 186-187) 
And like those children he is haunted by the legacy of that discordance which, in the 
play is figured by the ghost. In the case of Hamlet – recall that all cases are singular – 
– the impossible task of putting right what has gone wrong is complicated by the fact 
that, after mandating his son to revenge him, the ghost continues: 
‘Taint not thy mind nor let thy soul contrive 
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Against thy mother aught; leave her to heaven’ (Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 1 
scene 5, line nos 85-60  
If the mother must not be harmed, Hamlet has to confront the question ‘Che Vuoi?’ 
(Lacan, 1977:13), that is, the question what does the Other want. If, in consequence, 
of the Other’s incompleteness, others are opaque, an unanswerable question. ‘What 
hinders’ Hamlet, Žižek concludes, is his ‘doubt concerning the desire of the other.’ 
(Žižek, 1989:120).  
As Leader so perspicaciously notes, the thinking of these issues is serial.  
However, that serialism is not confined to the relationships of the play within the 
play to the main drama. The play, as has often been observed, falls into two parts 
separated by the sea voyage (DR:89). On my reading these two parts become two 
answers to the real of impossibility, that is, two attempts by Hamlet to ‘situate 
himself in desire’ (Lacan, 1977:49). Neither could be said to be successful but, in 
conjunction, they create the most interesting play in western literature. Each is an 
attempt to find the appropriate distance from the symbolic order. Over-proximity to 
the signifiers of the Other is mortifying – a form of suicide. On the other hand, too 
great a distance robs the subject of stability and risks engulfing psychosis.  The 
problem is exacerbated, as indicated above, by the fact that the symbolic does not 
exist – it is only encountered in particular concrete forms. Hamlet encounters two. 
First the manifestly self-serving imperatives of the new regime to bear allegiance, 
accompanied by his mother’s injunction to ‘cast thy nighted colour off’ (Shakespeare, 
Hamlet, act 1, scene 2, line no 68) and the criticism by Claudius of his ‘unmanly grief’ 
(Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 1, scene 2, line no 94). Second, in the mandate from his 
father’s ghost to avenge his death while not harming his mother. His famed 
hesitation is his refusal of both. This brings a certain jouissance – in his wordplay he 
enjoys eluding the established meanings of the new rulers’ discourse and has fun at 
the expense of courtiers like Osric who have subjugated themselves to the powers 
that be, but this freedom comes at a cost. Without the stability conferred by the 
symbolic, madness impends and he is bereft of the capacity to desire. He becomes, 
as Lacan puts it, ‘the man who has lost the way of his desire’ (Lacan, 1977:12).  In 
consequence, existence becomes senseless and Ophelia, who had been the object of 
his desire, is abominably abused. The problem with rejecting the symbolic is most 
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apparent in the death of Polonius. Like every child, Hamlet is subjected to the gaze 
of the Other. With a lunge through the arras, Hamlet frees himself from one mode of 
this subjection but at the cost of turning himself into the brutal murderer of an old 
man guilty of little more than muddled incomprehension. The subject is not the only 
casualty of a refusal of the Other’s order. In the second series, after the sea voyage, 
he draws too close to the symbolic. As a result, the threat of madness lifts and desire 
begins to burn. He accedes to Claudius’s request that he fence with Laertes and this 
leads to his death. In the duel, he obeys first Claudius, and then, after Claudius’s 
treachery becomes patent, his father’s call for vengeance and this acceptance of a 
symbolic mandate is a form of suicide. Significantly, as Lacan points out, one of his 
first actions after his return is to identify with Ophelia and she is a suicide (S.X:36). 
The answer to his dilemma does not exist. When Hamlet refuses to play the King’s 
game he is unable to desire (Ophelia) and bereft of desire, finds existence valueless 
and senseless. When he does play the King’s game, when he accepts the wager, he 
discovers that this symbolic is, as figured by the plot of Claudius and Laertes, a fatal 
trap.  
For this reason, the analysis of the play as a case study and the diagnosis of 
Hamlet’s neurotic pathology is to pass up the possibility of forms of thought, which, 
while analogous to the thinking in myth, are ultimately irreducible to any other. 
‘Hamlet is not a clinical case.’ (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 18/3/59 p. 18) rather the 
play is a ‘myth’, that is, a unique mode of thinking the real (Lacan, 1958-59: Session 
of 8/4/59 pp. 2-3). As ‘the most enigmatic character in all writing’ Hamlet is our 
chance to engage in modes of bien-dire and savoir-faire irreducible to the categories 
of the understanding (Brook, 2011). Existence is, as always, a finding a way between 
– between, that is, the real of the body and a singular symbolic order. Serial thought 
is one form – there are innumerable others – of thinking the between from that 
between. ‘Poetic creations,’ as Lacan insists, ‘engender rather than reflect 
psychological creations’ (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 4/3/59 p. 13).  
Creation is first and foremost the creation of a style which makes something 
different of the issues. This is one of the achievements of the extraordinary poetry 
remarked upon Lacan: 
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‘There is not a verse of Hamlet, nor one of his replies, which does not have 
in English a percussive power, a violence of language which makes of it 
something at which one is at every moment absolutely stupefied. You could 
believe that it was written yesterday, that one could not write things like that 
three centuries ago’ (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 4/3/59 p. 13).  
Ultimately the response to the more difficult issues addressed by the play is a style 
where style is a mode of existential engagement. A crucial component of that style is 
the poetry, for the poetry is a saying as well as a said. If, as may be the case, 
Shakespeare, at times speaks through Hamlet it is also the case that, elsewhere, 
Shakespeare speaks of Hamlet. If at moments he appears to inhabit the perspectives 
of Hamlet, Ophelia and Laertes, he is never identical to any of their points of view. 
Like every subject he is ek-static to - that is, at once included in and excluded from 
every position. He is a saying between the lines of what is said – a movement creative 
of a sense irreducible to any meaning. In psychoanalytic terms – as pointed out by 
Hanna Segal and subsequently Darian Leader - it is this imputed ‘creator’ with whom 
(among others, for example, characters in the drama) the spectator identifies 
(Leader, 2008:86). In Deleuzean terms it is with this figure that the spectator 
becomes other. On this account, Shakespeare is not merely the empirical being of 
socio-historical studies, he is also the play or rather the dynamic process of the 
drama. As such, he is, at once, the ideologies propagated, the dispersed 
identifications with Hamlet, Ophelia and Laertes, and - beyond the representations – 
the sub-representative movement of saying generative of tonality and evental sense. 
In this final guise he is the movement(s) of desire which while articulating the text 
are not themselves articulable. It is with this Shakespeare, above all, that the 
spectator can find a line of flight.  
Shakespeare, as viewed through this optic is as much written as writer and 
becomes other in unforeseen ways in the writing. ‘Neurotic symptoms,’ Darian 
Leader writes, ‘are ways of asking a question.’ (Leader, 2008:38). So are many 
artworks but, on occasion, with this crucial difference: in certain artworks, if as a 
consequence of the work of the work, the artist becomes other, the question 
becomes its own answer. However, as we saw above, this answer can only arrive if 
the artist at once actively makes something new of the issue and allows something 
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unforeseen, unmasterable and inappropriable to occur. If an answer arrives it is an 
event not a result which can be formulated, translated or deterritorialised.  It is 
existential rather than propositional and, as such, has to be perpetually re-won.  
If such transformations are possible it is because, whatever its other 
achievements, the style creates an element in which new evental truths can occur. 
The evental truths of art – as opposed to the (ideological) truth claims of 
representations - can enable the subject to happen at those moments and sites. 
Famously Roman Jakobson described literature as an ‘organised violence committed 
on ordinary speech’ (Roman Jakobson cited in Eagleton, 1983:2). What this 
proposition misses is that ‘ordinary language’, if the language does not exist, is itself 
violent. As emphasised in the discussion of the symbolic, we do not encounter 
language in itself; we encounter the utterances of others and these utterances are 
tendentious. ‘The signifying relationships, the relationships of value, are given first, 
and all subjectivity…comes to be inscribed within this signifying dialectic’ (Lacan, 
1958-9: Session of 15/4/59 p. 8). The speech and writings of others decree, evaluate, 
and advocate, distinguishing the significant from the insignificant and demarcating 
the sanctioned from the unsanctioned. Above all, they make of the real, realities and 
demand we subscribe to these realities. In short, they seek to position subjects in 
particular perspectives. As we saw in the earlier discussion of art as counter-
movement, art can be a way of replying to the words of the Other. Usually by the 
construction of other realities, but often also by taking a (topological) distance from 
existing discourses. The poetry, by creating a different element, can afford new 
positions and concomitant revaluations. This poetic reworking of language, like the 
reworking of the world of images by the angles, framings and editing in the sequence 
from Une Femme Marieé, enables subjects to situate themselves differently relative 
to desire. 
This brings us to time. In this regard, the gap between mythical thought and 
the complexity of thinking in art becomes more apparent. Lévi-Strauss, in The View 
from Afar, describes the line from Wagner’s Parsifal, ‘Here, time turns into space,’ 
(Wagner, 1882) as ‘probably the most profound definition that anyone has offered 
for myth (Lévi-Strauss, 1983:219). As will be evident, the emphasis in the 
psychoanalytically-inspired approaches explored in this thesis is very different. On 
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my argument, the thinking which occurs in art is creative of and dependent upon 
temporalities in which revaluations and concomitant evental truths can occur. In 
Hamlet that temporalisation is achieved most tellingly by the ‘music’ of the text, what 
Frank Kermode terms the ‘the pace of the action and the tune of the language’ 
(Kermode, 2000:104). If the subject, in its multiplicity, is desire(s) and if desire is 
always in movement, then the sense created by this ‘music’ is productive of new 
sense. The play has, as Kermode claims, a ‘symphonic’ quality and, as in a symphony, 
there is a perpetual revaluation of the material and, therefore of the issues the 
material figures (Kermode, 2000:105). However, neither Freud nor Lacan had 
anything of interest to say about music. So, after pausing to note the limitations of 
psychoanalytic theories of art, which this failure, in respect of the most powerful and 
affecting art form, manifests, let’s turn to areas where Lacan can contribute to our 
thinking of temporalisation in the work of the work. 
Taking Leader’s article as a starting point, this approach to Hamlet has drawn 
parallels between the thinking which can occur in myth and the thinking which can 
happen in an artwork. However, this can be only a first approach for works, like 
Hamlet, are much more complex than a series of lines responding to a single issue. 
Not least because such artworks frequently address a number of issues. So, instead 
of a permutation of lines of thought addressing the one issue, there are multiple lines 
thinking different issues. This expands the possibilities for the creation of sense, and 
the happening of truths for, as the lines intersect, converge and diverge they become 
intricated, imbricated and dissociated and, in consequence, they resonate, 
recontextualise and, thereby, revalue. Here sense and truth are points on or between 
the lines; they are of an hour and place. Hence a principal function of what Lacan 
terms the ‘machinery’ of the text is the production of temporalities in which these 
moments can occur (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 18/3/59 p. 3). 
Viewed in this light Hamlet is not only a series of lines of thought addressing 
the question of Hamlet’s desires in relation to the symbolic. There is space to 
consider only one other (related) issue: the thinking of the collateral damage which 
can occur when individuals seek to situate themselves as to desire. The manner in 
which Gertrude and Claudius set about this task creates a situation, which, while 
none of Hamlet’s making, affects him deeply. Similarly, Ophelia and Laertes in their 
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different ways find themselves casualties of how Hamlet decides to deal with the 
problems posed by his mother and uncle. Such problems are, of course, unconfined 
to Elsinore. The majority of analyses are of analysands who find that past conflicts 
haunt, undermine and render problematic current relationships. The play is as much 
a thinking of this issue as of Hamlet’s problems with his symbolic mandate imposed 
by the ghost’s interpellation to avenge his father (Žižek, 1989:120).  
The Shakespeare constructed with the play thinks this issue serially on the 
three intersecting lines: Hamlet, Ophelia and Laertes. Like Hamlet, Laertes avenges 
his father’s murder at the expense of his own life and like Hamlet, who feigns 
madness, he dissembles – in his case when plotting Hamlet’s murder. So, he is Hamlet 
to the extent that he is Hamlet’s double. If a difference must always be maintained, 
to meet one’s double is lethal. Hence their fatal final encounter. At the same time, 
he is not Hamlet for the latter is the victim of another’s plot while Laertes is the victim 
of his own. Similarly, Hamlet is and is not Ophelia. Like Ophelia he is bereaved by an 
act of murder. At the same time, he is her Other and another. He is Other in that he 
issues commands: ‘Get thee to a nunnery!’ (Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 3, scene 1, line 
no 120) and he is other in that his desires are incommensurate with hers to the extent 
they drive her to madness and suicide. Serial thinking is this play of sameness and 
difference. So how does the work of the work create sense in the face of these issues? 
In the moment. Just as in a joke, the sense produced by the punchline depends on 
timing so here the sense depends on a mode of temporalisation. To be clear: this is 
not to diminish the value of the truths which temporalisation renders possible. There 
are no eternal truths in this area outside pretence. Truths here have to be won and 
then, as they vanish with the moment, won again. The argument of this thesis is that 
if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art it should recognise that art can 
be one of the innumerable sites where such truths can happen 
The senses and truths produced in Hamlet depend not only on the 
relationships between series but on the events created by those shifting 
relationships. There is space for only one example – Ophelia’s madness. In the 
preceding scene, Hamlet witnessing thousands about to risk being slain for ‘a little 
patch of ground’ in Poland (Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 4, scene 4, line no 17) because 
honour (namely, something of symbolic value) is at stake, is inspired to declaim:  
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   ‘O, from this time forth 
My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth’ (Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 4, 
scene 4, line nos 64-5). 
Ophelia’s affliction changes the drama’s direction,  opening a new perspective on 
Hamlet’s resolution to ‘be bloody’. The descent into madness of the daughter of the 
man he has slain recontextualises and thereby revalues Hamlet’s actions by making 
plain the costs. But, while this scene is close to being the final word on Hamlet’s 
cruelty towards Ophelia, it is far from being the final word on the other issues. 
 Which brings us to the conclusion. According to Lacan, Hamlet, after realising 
he is mortally wounded by the ‘envenomed rapier’, discovers, like an existential hero 
awakening to his finitude and mortality, the capacity to act. More precisely, he finds 
himself ‘capable of fighting, and capable of killing’. This, Lacan claims ‘is enough to 
end the play’ (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 18/3/59 p. 17). However, in light of the 
preceding chapters, it will be apparent that more is happening. There is a nodal 
moment: if he kills, he is also killed. Like Marcello in The Conformist he is at once 
murderer and suicide. Now, while this is ‘enough to end the play’ it is not the sum of 
what is achieved: if something is captured (about the relationship of desire to the 
Other and the ensuing casualties) something is also liberated. In excess of the said 
there is a (style of) saying.  
If the Other is barred, if there is no final word, then works seeking a final word 
and complete resolution are in difficulty. How can works addressing the real as 
impossible find a satisfactory conclusion? It seems all such works are doomed to 
failure. My argument is that one reason psychoanalysis is of continuing interest is 
because it has no truck with such simplistic approaches. Lacan’s seminar sessions 
never pronounce a final word and that is why they succeed rather than fail. Similarly 
jokes in the mode of bien-dire are never more than half-sayings. If something is 
captured – there is the determination/evaluation of an issue – something is liberated, 
namely laughter. Equally in art there is a double movement in which the 
arrangement, in Deleuzean terms, the territorialisation, is accompanied by a 
deterritorialisation. There is, in bien-dire, a going beyond. Of necessity, for we wish 
and do not wish to be at one. To be at one would be to attain completion but it would 
also be death. In seminar eleven Lacan famously insisted that any encounter with the 
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real must be a ‘missed encounter’ (S.XI:55) for, ‘if the encounter was successful’ as 
Michel Silvestre so astutely perceives, it ‘could only signify the death of the subject’ 
(Silvestre, 1987:312). To unite with the lost object would be a form of suicide. Hence 
the art of bien-dire is not the making of a whole but the making of a way. 
If the play is concerned, like Hamlet himself, to find a way of relating to a 
symbolic and to the desire(s) any such relationship entails, this requires a resolution 
which is, at once, ‘enough’ to end the work and a movement beyond any closure. 
What goes beyond is a saying/desire which is both affirmative and sense-making. The 
Shakespeare co-created by the work of the work is not Hamlet. If for Hamlet, 
existence is senseless, if for him ‘all the uses of this world’ seem ‘weary, stale, flat 
and unprofitable’ (Shakespeare, Hamlet, act 1, scene 2, line nos 133-134) - this is the 
evaluation of neither the Shakespeare, who emerged in composition with the work, 
nor the audience members who transport and are transported by the work of the 
work. As Lacan observes, Hamlet’s cry is often taken to be ‘Let me be given my desire’ 
(Lacan 1958-59: Session of 8/4/59 p. 1). But Hamlet’s cry is not Shakespeare’s when 
Shakespeare is constitutive of, and reconstituted by, the bien-dire which is the work 
of the work. Lacan misses this: 
‘The truth of Hamlet, is a hopeless truth. There is not a trace in the whole of 
Hamlet of raising up towards something which could be described as the 
beyond, atonement, redemption’ (Lacan 1958-59: Session of 8/4/59 p. 7).  
While accepting there may be neither atonement nor redemption, this thesis holds 
there is a beyond opened by the style of saying and desiring. If Lacan fails to perceive 
this it is because in his theorising – as opposed to the work of his work – he is 
operating with an unduly circumscribed notion of desire. In this respect, he needs 
Deleuze. So, let us now, in the second part of this thesis, explore how Deleuze and 
Lacan might be brought together in a ‘disjunctive synthesis’ enabling psychoanalysis 
to be worthier of the event of art. 
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PART TWO: LACANIAN FILM THEORY AFTER DELEUZE 
 
In part one it was claimed and demonstrated that psychoanalysis can still contribute 
useful approaches to the work of artworks and particularly cinema. At the same time, 
it was acknowledged that, to be worthy of the event of art, psychoanalysis would 
have to draw on other thinkers and Gilles Deleuze was proposed as a leading 
candidate. Part two explores what a disjunctive synthesis of Lacanian psychoanalysis 
and the philosophy of Deleuze can accomplish. Chapter three sets the scene for the 
encounter. By outlining key aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy it establishes a 
framework for the discussion of the degree of convergence and divergence between 
the two. Using that framework, chapter four examines Deleuze and Guattari’s 
critique of psychoanalysis and identifies both a fundamental consonance and 
significant divergences.  On this basis, it argues that, in considering artworks, 
psychoanalysis is suited for certain purposes and Deleuze others. Chapter five 
considers Deleuze’s cinema books and the lessons they hold for psychoanalytic 
approaches to art more generally.  
  139 
CHAPTER THREE:  GILLES DELEUZE: A PHILOSOPHER (THEORETICAL 
PRELIMINARY 2) 
 
Introduction 
 
The principal purpose of this chapter is to establish a framework within which the 
two subsequent chapters can consider the relationship of Deleuze (and Guattari) to 
psychoanalysis, and how a psychoanalysis to come could usefully draw upon 
Deleuze’s philosophy in thinking about what cinema does and could do. To that end, 
the chapter identifies certain crucial points of emphasis in Deleuze and signposts 
their proximity to Lacan’s teaching and usefulness in recasting psychoanalytic 
criticism. In outline, it is argued that for Deleuze, as for one of his most significant 
influences, Nietzsche, there is no higher value than life. ‘There are never any criteria’ 
for evaluating modes of existence other than ‘the tenor of existence:’ the degree to 
which it promotes ‘the intensification of life’ (WP:74). As such, Deleuze’s chief 
purpose was to free life from its entrapments and augment our capacity to live. Since 
he considered prevailing modes of subjectivity diminished this capacity, he sought, 
albeit prudently, to dismantle them. His ontology is constructed to establish the 
possibility of more vital - often unanticipable - forms of existence. As the cosmos is 
becoming rather than being, as everything is produced but never in a fixed or final 
form, in all emergent systems there are ‘lines of flight’ – which, as we have seen, are 
lines of liberation from oppressive structures which simultaneously put such 
structures ‘to flight’ (D:36). From this perspective, he indicts many psychoanalytic 
practices as blocking lines of flight and celebrates – as we shall see in chapter five - 
the creation of lines of flight within art. To approach these topics let’s consider the 
most relevant points of emphasis for present purposes, namely, vitalism, the concern 
to move beyond the human condition and his processual ontology. 
 
Vitalism 
 
‘[L]ife seems to me the essential.’  
   Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze, 2005:7) 
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Within philosophy the designation of Deleuze as a vitalist is a commonplace. 
‘Deleuze’s philosophical stroke of genius’ wrote Eric Alliez was ‘to invent a new 
vitalism’ (Eric Alliez cited in Dosse, 2007:317). Fredric Jameson has described 
Deleuze’s ‘vitalism’ as productive of an ‘energising’ worldview (Jameson, 2010:2, 
footnote 2).  In The Adventure of French Philosophy, Alain Badiou, after distinguishing 
two distinct orientations - the first, deriving from Bergson ‘a philosophy of life and 
change’ and the second a more mathematically based approach to the possibilities 
‘of thought and of the symbolic’– placed Deleuze in the former tradition (Badiou, 
2012:liii).6 Deleuze was happy with the appellation, commenting: ‘everything I have 
written is vitalist’ (N:143). ‘The essential thing for me,’ he wrote is ‘this “vitalism”’ 
(Deleuze, 2005:7). ‘Life,’ is ‘complete power, complete bliss’ (Deleuze, 1995:27). 
Thinking, he held, was ‘never just a theoretical matter. It has to do with vital 
problems. To do with life itself’ (N:105).  The importance of the vitalist orientation, 
for chapter four, is that it founds Deleuze’s claim that psychoanalysis is life-denying. 
In response I will argue that while Lacan eschewed vitalist terminology, he shared 
Deleuze’s aim insofar as psychoanalytic practice seeks to enable patients to exist in 
more vital forms. In chapter five it will be claimed that Deleuze has a vitalist 
conception of art as augmenting our capacity to live, and it will be argued that a 
psychoanalytic criticism, worthy of the event of art, should view art, in the mode of 
bien-dire, through a similar prism.  
 
Beyond the Human Condition  
      
‘The self is one more thing we ought to dissolve.’ 
Gilles Deleuze (DI:193)  
 
Vitalism, for Deleuze, is the imperative to go beyond personhood. In Phantasm and 
Modern Literature, Deleuze writes, ‘Klossowski’s entire work moves toward a single 
goal: to assure the loss of personal identity and to dissolve the self (LS:324). ‘This’ he 
                                                          
6 See also (Ansell-Pearson, 1999:4); (Meillassoux, 2006:37); (Bogue, 2003:2) among 
many others. 
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continues, ‘is the shining trophy that Klossowski’s characters bring back from a 
voyage to the edge of madness’ (LS:324). Deleuze’s entire philosophy shares the 
same goal and carries off the same trophy. For Deleuze, as for Klossowski, ‘the 
dissolution of the self’ is not a pathological condition to be avoided but the ‘mightiest 
power, rich in positive and salutary promises’ (LS:324). Indeed, Deleuze’s works are 
the delivery on that promise. Explicating - and endorsing - Bergson, Deleuze declares 
that the aim of philosophy is to ‘open us up to the inhuman and the superhuman… 
to go beyond the human condition’ (B:28). This ambition to think beyond 
‘anthropological predicates’ informs all of his philosophy (DR:xxi). ‘Life is not 
something personal’ (D:6) so, in order to free life and to become, in Nietzsche’s 
phrase, ‘worthier - of living,’ we must become inhuman (Nietzsche, 1887b:113). This 
exigency to break with existing forms of subjectivity is a political task for ‘the forces 
of repression always need a self that can be assigned, they need determinate 
individuals on which to exercise their power’ (DI:138). To escape such repression, we 
must achieve liberation from such selves for, ‘when we become the least bit fluid, 
when we slip away from the assignable Self, when there is no longer any person on 
whom God can exercise his power or by whom He can be replaced, the police lose it’ 
(DI:138). Dismantling the self is a political imperative and it is achievable for, as 
Deleuze’s entire philosophy demonstrates, ‘singularity is no longer enclosed in an 
individual life is in excess of any form of selfhood or organism’ (DI:138). 
Put like that, it might appear that Deleuze advocates a headlong plunge into 
acephalism, regardless of consequences, but this is far from the case. He constantly 
urges caution.  In Dialogues, the injunction ‘Experiment,’ is immediately followed by 
the reminder that ‘you need a lot of prudence to experiment’ (D:61). Later, he and 
Guattari write: ‘As a rule immanent to experimentation: injections of caution’ 
(TP:510). There is ‘an art of dosages, since overdose is a danger’ (TP:160). You have, 
they write, ‘to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn.’ 
‘Dismantling,’ they insist, ‘has never meant killing yourself’ (TP:160). 
In chapter four it will be argued that Lacanian psychoanalysis similarly seeks 
to prudently dismantle existing modes of subjectivity in the interests of a more vital 
existence but that the consonance is limited insofar as psychoanalysis is more 
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cautious. While Lacan feared that a too rapid dismantling could tip the patient into 
psychosis, Deleuze, as we shall see, advocated a non-pathological mode of 
schizophrenia as a way of going beyond the human condition. In chapter five it will 
be argued that Deleuze and psychoanalysis share a conception of certain artworks as 
processes dismantling existing forms of subjectivity while, at the same time, warding 
off an annihilating chaos.  
 
A processual Ontology 
 
By setting out key aspects of the various ontologies, which underwrite Deleuze’s 
ambition to go beyond the human condition, this section seeks to establish a 
framework within which we can explore the degree of consonance between Deleuze 
and Guattari’s philosophy and Lacan. With the framework in place, we can ascertain 
which of their concepts can contribute to the reinvention of psychoanalysis. In line 
with Deleuze’s conception of philosophy as ‘the art of forming, inventing, and 
fabricating concepts’ to address singular problems, his ontology took different forms 
at different times (WP:2). However, there are recurrent points of emphasis which are 
particularly relevant for present purposes, namely: difference, relationality, 
composition, the sub-representative, and open-ended systems. As these headings, 
along with the topics already examined, will orient discussion in chapters four and 
five, let’s briefly consider each in turn.  
 
Process 
 
Deleuze ‘is a process philosopher’ (Mullarkey, 2006:12). ‘Everything is event’ (Gilles 
Deleuze cited in Williams, 2011a:80). The cosmos, for Deleuze, is becoming – 
‘universal variation’ (C2:40). There are not first things which vary from each other 
but variations (differences) which produce things. Therefore, any thinking which 
begins from things and more generally from identity is bound to mislead. Things, that 
is, determinate identifiable entities, exist but they are the outcomes of processes. 
Consequently, in an echo of Bergson’s claim that ‘there are no things only actions’ 
(Bergson, 1907:248), Deleuze remarks: ‘I have, it’s true, spent a lot of time writing 
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about this notion of the event: you see, I don’t believe in things’ (N:160). ‘Nothing 
other than the Event subsists, the Event alone’ (LS:201). In thinking the event, 
Deleuze argues for the possibility of going beyond the human condition by insisting 
on the impermanence of existents including, most notably, subjectivities.  
Crucially for this thesis, in Difference and Repetition Deleuze conceives of 
process in terms of ‘the question-problem complex’ (DR:195). Problems are the 
drivers of becoming. Being for Deleuze is ‘a being of the problematic, the being of 
problem and question’ (DR:64). As Daniel W. Smith succinctly puts it: for Deleuze, 
‘Being is a problem. Being always presents itself to us under a problematic form, as a 
series of problematisations’ (Smith, 2012a:92). Deleuze explores this notion from 
many angles but, for our purposes, the most important is his Nietzschean conception 
of everything deriving from differences: the play between disparate forces produces 
states of affairs. ‘Every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is 
conditioned’ (DR:222). ‘Inequality,’ Deleuze writes, ‘forms the condition of the world’ 
(DR:222). Being is a problem because of the impossibility of these unequal and 
disparate forces achieving a resolution which would fully cancel the differences 
between them. Disequilibrium is never finally resolved in equilibrium.  
In thinking this process, Deleuze deploys the Bergsonian concepts of the 
virtual and actual. Like Lacan, Deleuze uses terms differently in different contexts. As 
we shall see, the virtual has various meanings, for example in Cinema 2 it refers to a 
form of the past (C2:54), while in What is Philosophy? it is chaos (WP:118). For 
present purposes, ‘the domain of the virtual’ as Eugene Holland observes, is 
‘composed of Problems’ (Holland, 2013:12). The virtual is not just ‘potential’ (Žižek, 
2004:4) – unactualized possibilities – for it ‘possesses the reality of a task to be 
performed or a problem to be solved: it is the problem which orientates, conditions 
and engenders solutions’ (DR:212). ‘“Problematic” and “virtuality,” in this sense, are 
strictly correlative concepts in Deleuze’s work’ (Smith, 2012a:252). For its part, ‘the 
actual is comprised of a variety of contingent Solutions to those Problems’ (Holland, 
2013:12). In this perspective, ‘the virtual, or the Idea, is a purely differentiated 
multiplicity that produces actual phenomena’ (de Beistegui, 2004:273). The actual, 
for example, a determinate state of affairs is an attempted resolution but – and this 
is crucial - no actualization is a complete resolution. There is always a disparity 
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‘between actualised forms and virtual forces’ (Sauvagnargues, 2016:179-180). This is 
not to argue that the virtual grounds the actual. If the cosmos is continuous variation, 
the virtual cannot be, as Clayton Crockett insists ‘a ground in any foundational sense’ 
(Crockett, 2013:46-7). There is no ground other than becoming – everything is in 
process – so the virtual and the actual are best conceived as ‘two sides of the same 
coin’ (Crockett, 2013:47). 
In this light, we can recast both Lacan’s teaching and psychoanalytic thinking 
on art. While the terminology is foreign to Lacan, the thinking is not. If there is a lack 
in the Other, the subject is a response to the virtual problem posed, for example, by 
the difference between an occupant and the place assigned. On this account, a 
subject is an actualisation which seeks to resolve a problematic disparity. As the 
problem is irresolvable, no actualisation is the actualisation. The virtuality of the 
problem persists. And this is the subject’s chance. If the virtual is never exhausted in 
the actual, if an analysand’s actualised subjective structure is never the subject, then 
the actual is no guide to what is possible. A subject can go beyond, what from a 
neurotic perspective might appear unsurpassable, limits and art may be one of the 
innumerable ways of doing so. 
 
Difference 
 
In conceiving difference, Deleuze takes issue with the Hegelian notion of difference 
which has informed so much psychoanalytically-inspired theorizing. On this view, 
difference is conceived in terms of identity: thus, A is A because it is not not-A, this is 
this because it is not that, night is night because it is not day etc. What such thinking 
misses, Deleuze points out, is the process which constitutes these items in the first 
place, that is the genesis of these – to use his own term – ‘differenciated’ items 
(DR:211). His argument is that the identifiable items which we distinguish from one 
another emerge from a process of what he terms ‘differentiation,’ that is, the 
differences between unequal and disparate forces (DR:207). ‘Difference is what 
constitutes being’ (PS:41). The identities of subjects and objects, as Daniel Smith 
notes, ‘are the effect of more profound relations of difference’ (Smith, 2012a:82). At 
first sight, Deleuze’s philosophy in this regard seems utterly at odds with Lacan. The 
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early Lacan, in Hegelian vein wrote: ‘The human being poses the day as such, and the 
day thereby becomes the presence of the day – against a background that is not a 
background of concrete nighttime, but of possible absence of daytime’ (S.III:148). 
However, any dismissal, based on such passages, of Lacan as, in opposition to 
Deleuze, a thinker of identity would be too quick: it would miss the fundamental 
orientation of Lacan’s teaching, namely that, with regard to subjectivity, there are no 
identities only identifications. After Lacan, as Stuart Hall puts it ‘rather than speaking 
of identity as a finished thing, we should speak of identification, and see it as an on-
going process’ (Hall, 1992:287). Unified subjects are to be found only in the 
imaginary. The subject is not a given but constituted by differences. For the Lacan of 
the structural impossibilities tributary to the Ⱥ, the cut, that is difference, is first. 
Everything begins from the incommensurability of the ‘living body’ and its ‘signifying 
existence’ in the Other, the subsequent non-coincidence of subject and signifier and 
separation of subject and object – in short from the impossibility of being (at) One 
(Silvestre, 1987:307). With regard to identity, as Hall maintains: ‘there is always 
something “imaginary” or fantasised about its unity. It always remains incomplete, is 
always “in process”, always “being formed”’ (Hall, 1992:287).  The subject and its 
world are a function of, and a response to, the differences which constitute the many 
faces of the disparate. 
 
Relationality 
 
Implicit in the fore-going is the importance of relationality. The given is a function of 
the forces in play in the processes of differentiation and ‘force is never singular but 
essentially exists in relation with other forces’ (F:70). ‘Any force is already a relation’ 
(F:70).  As such relationality is paramount: ‘the relation is prior to what it places in 
relation’ (TP:318). The given is consequently never given once and for all. With 
different relations different modes of existence can emerge. The importance of this 
for Deleuze’s ambition to go beyond the human condition becomes even more 
apparent when he recast the notion that there is no essence of the human condition 
in Spinozist terms. On his reading, Spinoza is the philosopher of AND not IS: ‘no one 
has ever had such an original feeling for the conjunction “and”’ (D:59). ‘We do not 
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even know of what a body is capable’ (Deleuze, 1968a:226). What a body is depends 
on the relations into which it enters; it is defined by its ‘capacity for affecting and 
being affected’ (SP:123). 
 The consonance of this with psychoanalysis is patent. Psychoanalysis turns 
upon relationships, most importantly those of analysand and analyst, subject and 
signifier and jouissance and the Other. The cure proceeds not by determining some 
supposedly essential truth about the analysand but by altering relationships such 
that the subject can affect and be affected otherwise. As the preceding chapters 
suggested, the event of art is often similarly concerned to alter relationships such 
that the real assumes a different cast.  
 
Composition 
 
Deleuze’s vitalism is no simple-minded faith in a liberatory life-force only awaiting 
release.  His ‘philosophy is a constructivism’ (WP:35). Difference is at once 
constitutive of what is actualised and the hallmark of what is thereby constituted. 
‘Experience itself,’ Deleuze insists, ‘offers us nothing but composites’ (B:22). 
‘Everything in Nature is just composition’ (Deleuze, 1968a:237). In the universal 
variation that is the cosmos everything interacts. This interaction is equally 
characteristic of more local arrangements. The defining feature of the machines and 
assemblages (agencements) described in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus is 
the interactions of the heterogeneous components which constitute them. ‘The 
assemblage [agencement] is co-functioning’ (D:52). AND not IS. As these 
arrangements are never established once and for all, beings are not givens but 
functions of ‘the relations composing, decomposing, or modifying an individual’ 
(TP:256). The relevance of this approach for Deleuze’s ambition to go beyond the 
human condition is apparent in his alignment with the work of his friend Michel 
Foucault. ‘Foucault’s general principle,’ he writes ‘is that every form is a compound 
of relations between forces’ (F:124). As mutation is possible the future of ‘man’ is 
open. Whether or not the existing ‘composition of a Man-form’ persists depends on 
which ‘forces from the outside’ the ‘forces within man’ combine (F:124). 
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The importance of this for my argument is that, as chapter four will 
demonstrate, psychoanalysis is also a thinking of composition (analysand and 
analyst; symbolic, imaginary and real etc.) and, perhaps more surprisingly, the 
outside. Subsequently, in chapter five, we will further explore what psychoanalysis 
can learn from Deleuze’s contention that an artwork is a composition not a unity and 
as such a way of creating a new relationship with the outside. 
 
The Sub-representative 
 
Deleuze’s argument that we can go beyond the human condition is premised on the 
claim that there are levels and planes other than that inhabited by stable subjects 
and delimited objects and that the processes on these planes elude representation. 
Among the many planes, Deleuze and Guattari, in A Thousand Plateaus, distinguish 
two in particular. The first is a plane ‘of organisation or development:’ (TP:266), that 
is ‘a plane of forms, substances and subjects’ (TP:261-2). The other is ‘a plane of 
consistency or of composition,’ (TP:261-2) where ‘there are no longer any forms or 
developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the formation of subjects’ (TP:266). 
Instead ‘unformed elements and materials dance that are distinguished from one 
another only by their speed and that enter into this or that individuated assemblage 
depending on their connections, their relations of movement’ (TP:255). On this plane 
of ‘immanence’ (TP:266), a play of ‘intensities, events and accidents’ comes to 
‘compose individuations totally different from those of the well-formed subjects that 
receive them’ (TP:253). Now, as each plane ‘continually passes from one to the other’ 
(TP:269) there is the possibility that the ‘substantial forms and determined subjects’ 
on the plane of organisation can be dissolved and surpassed (TP:253). The 
stratification on the plane of organisation – ‘forms and subjects, organs and 
functions, are “strata” or relations between strata’ - is always accompanied by a 
destratification (TP:269). Territorialisation is always part of a larger process of 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialization. There is a double movement:  
‘The plane of organisation is constantly working away at the plane of 
consistency, always trying to plug the lines of flight, stop or interrupt the 
movements of deterritorialisation, weigh them down, restratify them, 
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reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of depth. Conversely, the 
plane of consistency is constantly extricating itself from the plane of 
organisation, causing particles to spin off the strata, scrambling forms by dint 
of speed or slowness’ (TP:270).  
On this ‘plane of consistency or composition’ subjectivity does not intrude upon 
individuations (TP:266). ‘There are only haecceities,’ that is ‘subjectless 
individuations’ (TP:266). Here, ‘nothing subjectifies.’  Instead ‘haecceities form 
according to compositions of nonsubjectified powers or affects’ (TP:266). 
Consequently, not all can be captured by regimes of representation. This is 
the purport of a further distinction. In A Thousand Plateaus, while there is ‘the molar 
realm of representations’, a plane of determinate, assignable identities, there is also 
the molecular level where there are no longer beings only becomings (TP:219). On 
the molar level there are ‘molar subjects,’ recognisable objects and entities with 
defined forms (TP:275), which undergo perceptible changes but on the molecular 
level there is the ‘emission of particles which enter relations of movement and rest’ 
(TP:275). On this level it is a matter of becomings not beings: ‘all becomings are 
molecular’ (TP:275). 
 The importance of this for ensuing chapters should be apparent. As the real 
in Lacan’s teaching is also sub-representative, there is a proximity permitting 
psychoanalytic thinking on art to take a Deleuzean direction and conceive the work 
of the work as only partially visible in representations. 
 
Open systems 
 
If we think of being in terms of ‘the question-problem complex’, (DR:195) and, if the 
problems are not ultimately susceptible of solution, if the ‘irreducible inequality’ 
which ‘forms the condition of the world’ is never completely cancelled, no system is 
closed (DR:222). Hence, as Keith Ansell Pearson observes, what motivates all 
Deleuze’s ‘thought experiments is a concern with the character of open systems’ 
(Ansell Pearson, 1999:8). If, ‘finally, everything is process,’ (AO:368) then ‘it is an 
illusion to believe that structure is the earth’s last word’ (TP:41). In a cosmos 
characterised by ‘universal variation’ and ‘universal interaction’ any emergent 
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system is open (C1:81). Again, this holds out the possibility of going beyond the 
human condition. If the virtual is not completely exhausted by any actualisation, then 
any actual subjectivity can be surpassed. As each plane ‘continually passes from one 
to the other’ there is the possibility that the ‘substantial forms and determined 
subjects’ on the plane of organisation can be dissolved and surpassed (TP:253).  
For Deleuze, as for Bergson, ‘there can be no entirely isolated system’ 
(Bergson, 1907:203). Instead there is always ‘a thread, however thin, that relates the 
smallest particle of the world we live in to the whole of the universe’ (Bergson, 
1907:10-11). For the purposes of this thesis, this thread is better thought of as a line, 
more precisely what Deleuze terms ‘the line Outside’ (N:110). From any organization, 
system or agencement there is always a line to the Outside. Thinking is a 
confrontation with this line. Thinking, Deleuze writes, ‘comes from this Outside, and 
returns to it, it amounts to confronting it’ (N:110). In thinking this Outside, to which 
we are open, we are at risk for while ‘we can ride such lines whenever we think 
bewilderingly enough or live forcefully enough,’ they ‘go beyond knowledge’ (N:110). 
Caution is required for ‘it’s the fearsome whaling line, which Melville says - in Moby 
Dick - can carry us off or strangle us as it flies out’ (N:110). Consequently, ‘we need 
both to cross the line, and make it endurable, workable, thinkable’ (N:111). Our task 
is ‘to find in it as far as possible, and as long as possible, an art of living’ (N:111). The 
overriding question for thought is: ‘how can we protect ourselves, survive, while still 
confronting this line?’ (N:111) The importance of this aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy 
for my thesis cannot be overstated. It establishes a fundamental consonance with 
psychoanalysis. Lacan’s chief question is: how can the analysand ‘ride’ the ‘line 
Outside’, that is depart existing neurotic structures without risking psychotic 
breakdown. And that is also Deleuze’s question. Although the terminology is foreign 
to Lacan, the conception of the Outside is not, for Deleuze defines the Outside 
topologically: the Outside is at once ‘something more distant than any external 
world’ and ‘also something closer than any inner world’ (N:110). For both Deleuze 
and Lacan ultimately it is always the same question: ‘how far can we unfold this line 
without falling into a breathless void’ (N:113). Art, I will claim, can be just such an 
unfolding. 
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Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out key aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy in such 
a way as to lay the groundwork for the argument in the subsequent chapters that 
there is a greater degree of consonance between Deleuze and Lacan than the 
polemics suggest and an ‘aparallel evolution’ is possible. Chapter four will develop 
the argument that Lacan’s teaching similarly emphasises process, difference, 
relationality, composition, the sub-representative, and open-ended systems. In 
chapter five the same foci will be employed to examine how Deleuzean concepts 
could usefully inform psychoanalytic approaches to art and, more particularly, 
cinema. 
As a foretaste, consider Deleuze’s Nietzschean notion of ‘the powers of the 
false,’ (C2:126) that is, as Daniel Smith succinctly explains ‘the production of truths 
that “falsify” established truths’ (Smith, 1993:xxvii). If the cosmos is becoming, the 
danger is that established truths, in claiming to represent the true world, will block 
the production of new truths; there is a risk that a truth will come to be perceived as 
the truth. Now, while in innumerable pragmatic contexts it may be useful to consider 
truths as relatively stable and permanent, elsewhere life can depend on subscription 
to what Deleuze terms ‘Nietzsche’s critique of truth’ (C2:137). In this perspective, 
‘the “true world” does not exist, and, if it did, would be inaccessible, impossible to 
describe, and, if it could be described, would be useless, superfluous’ (C2:137). If 
‘time,’ as Deleuze argues, ‘has always put the notion of truth into crisis,’ (C2:130) this 
is not merely the ruin of any hope of eternal truths but our chance to break with 
apparently settled and established truths. Miller concurs – ‘Deleuze said it well: “time 
puts truth in crisis”’ (Miller, J-A, 2005:18). Psychoanalysis is as much the ally of the 
powers of the false as Deleuze. If the Other is in deficit with regard to signifiers, the 
truth no more exists than the way. Patients enter analysis because what they take to 
be established ‘truths’ – that is, the master-signifiers (S.XVII:188-9), which have come 
to enjoy an unchallengeable authority such that they order their thinking and orient 
their behaviour, have become burdensome. Master-signifiers, as Mark Bracher 
astutely notes, play a key role ‘in structuring the subject – specifically, in giving the 
subject a sense of identity and direction’ but, on occasion, the operation of these 
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signifiers can fixate (Bracher, 1994:112). Hence, Lacan remarks, a master signifier can 
be identified ‘with death’ (SXVII:170). In analysis, the truths embodied in master 
signifiers can cease to appear self-evident – ‘truths’ such as the existence of ‘the 
Other’ and ‘La Femme’ can be subverted - so the analysand has the opportunity to 
depart identities such as that set out in signifiers like Thom Yorke’s ‘I’m a creep’ 
(Radiohead, 1992), and to challenge what Simon Critchley describes as ‘the lacerating 
superego that tells you you’re a worthless piece of shit’ (Critchley, 2010:90). When 
the master-signifiers such as the Other emerge as semblances not lodestars, the 
analysand can slip anchor for the open sea. To become worthy of the event of art 
psychoanalysis must realise that the powers of the false can similarly operate in art. 
Art in the mode of bien-dire can, in Edward Said’s famous phrase, ‘speak the truth to 
power’ (Said, 1996:85) as in say, Leviathan but it can also free the ‘artistic and 
creative power’ of the false (C2:131). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DELEUZE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
 
Introduction 
 
In part one, to enable psychoanalytic criticism to be worthier of the event of art, 
Deleuzean concepts, such as agencements, order-words, 
territorialisation/deterritorialisation and lines of flight, were introduced. In this 
chapter, the relationship of Deleuze and psychoanalysis is considered more directly. 
It will be argued first, that there is more common ground than the vituperative 
polemics suggest and that many more Deleuzean concepts can be introduced into 
psychoanalysis without difficulty. Second, it will be claimed that, if there are 
convergences, there are also conspicuous divergences – particularly with regard to 
desire and subjectivity. In consequence, it is proposed through the exploration of a 
range of literary and filmic texts - Brideshead Revisited (Jarrold, UK 2008), Time 
Regained (Ruiz, France 1999), and The Sheltering Sky (Bertolucci, Italy/United 
Kingdom 1990) - that psychoanalysis is useful only in respect of certain texts and that 
in deciding between Lacanian and Deleuzean approaches we must, as always, 
proceed case by case. More broadly, the ambition of this chapter is to bring 
psychoanalysis into the vicinity of Deleuze so that we can read both differently, and, 
more particularly, read Lacan more interestingly than he read himself. If as Klotz 
reminds us, ‘one of the major lessons of Lacan’ is that one should go and look for 
one’s ‘honey outside what is stamped as “true” psychoanalysis in order to clarify it 
indirectly,’ then the ultimate question for this chapter is what ‘honey’ psychoanalysis 
can garner from the thought of Deleuze and Guattari (Klotz, 1994:191). ‘If Derrida’s 
thought is to survive,’ Michael Naas writes, it will do so only by being ‘transformed 
and transplanted elsewhere.’ Derrida ‘must always be elsewhere, repeated 
elsewhere, translated and transformed’ (Michael Naas cited in Royle, 2010:126). The 
same can and will be said of Lacan in this chapter. 
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Section 1: Situating the critique of psychoanalysis 
 
At the outset, it must be stressed that the contribution of Felix Guattari to the joint 
publications with Deleuze must not be underestimated; they would have been 
impossible without him. That said, for present purposes, it is worth noting the 
continuities with Deleuze’s earlier work as a means of situating the critique of 
psychoanalysis within the general orientation set out in the previous chapter.  
 
Vitalism 
 
‘Psychoanalysis,’ Deleuze claims, ‘needs to address a certain “vitality” in the patient, 
which the patient has lost’ (DI:142). Unfortunately, it is unequal to the task for, as 
much as the analysand, ‘the analyst has lost’ his vitality (DI:142). ‘Psychoanalysis 
ought to be a song of life,’ but instead ‘the most defeated, sad song of death 
emanates from it’ (AO:331). Analysts have become the modern counterparts of the 
life-denying priesthood so tellingly denounced by Nietzsche. In their ressentiment, 
‘psychoanalysts teach infinite resignation, they are the last priests’ (D:81-2). In its 
‘hatred of life and of all that is free, of all that passes and flows’ (AO:268) 
psychoanalysis ‘hates desire,’ (TRM:81-2) for as Guattari explains ‘we define [desire] 
as flow’ (Guattari, 1996b:205).  
 ‘Western philosophy,’ Deleuze notes, ‘has always consisted of saying…desire 
is desire for what one does not have; that begins with Plato, it continues with Lacan’ 
(Gilles Deleuze cited in Schuster, 2016:174). Against that tradition, Deleuze and 
Guattari insist ‘desire lacks nothing’ (TP:157).  ‘Desire: who except priests would want 
to call it “lack”? Nietzsche called it will to power,’ (D:91) where Deleuze’s claim is not 
that desire is ‘desire for power’ but rather that ‘it is power itself that is desire’ (K:56). 
Developing Nietzsche’s vitalist claims that ‘the will to power which is the will to life’ 
(Nietzsche, 1886:202) is ‘unexhausted, procreating life-will,’ (Nietzsche, 1891:137) 
and that, consequently, ‘life as such is will to power’ (Nietzsche, 1886:15), Deleuze 
describes the will to power as ‘essentially creative and giving.’ ‘It does not seek’ to 
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possess instead ‘it gives’ for ‘the will itself bestows sense and value’ (NP:80). Rather 
than being ‘on the side of acquisition,’ (AO:25) ‘desire is productive’ (AO:26). 7  
This concept of desire is developed in Deleuze’s Nietzschean reading of 
Spinoza, where, as Miguel de Beistegui notes, desire ‘is not the expression of an 
originary, structural lack, but of plenitude, and an ontological potential (puissance) 
that seeks its own expression’ (de Beistegui, 2010:114). Desire is conatus, ‘the effort 
by which each thing strives to persevere in its being’ (SP:21), more specifically, ‘the 
effort to experience joy, to increase the power of acting…and…an effort to avert 
sadness’ (SP:101). ‘When a body “encounters” another body, or an idea another idea, 
it happens that the two relations sometimes combine to form a more powerful 
whole, and sometimes one decomposes the other, destroying the cohesion of its 
parts’ (SP:19). Desire, as conatus, seeks to maximise the moments ‘when we 
encounter a body that agrees with our nature, one whose relation compounds with 
ours,’ for then ‘the passions that affect us are those of joy, and our power of acting 
is increased or enhanced’ (SP:27-8). 
 
 
                                                          
7 On first acquaintance the notion that desire is not, in all instances, lack can seem 
counter-intuitive. For that reason, it is worth quoting at length Brent Adkins’ 
experience of thinking about the notion that desire is productive: ‘This idea did not 
become clear to me until I had children. I had always assumed that desire was 
predicated on a lack, that the reason I wanted something was because I didn’t have 
it. Watching my children play, however, showed me that this was not the case. A child 
with a toy in each hand, who suddenly drops one in order to pick up a new toy, didn’t 
“lack” the new toy. The child is simply interested in making new connections’ (Adkins, 
2015:105-6). This tallies exactly with my own experience of watching my toddler 
grandchildren. When something untoward occurs, say a fall, they seek out a parent 
for comfort. But otherwise they delight in experimenting with their toys. My 
contention is that, at such moments, they exult in life with a jouissance for which 
psychoanalysis has neither name nor concept.  
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Beyond the Human Condition 
 
More vital forms of existence are accessible beyond the human condition because 
desire is originally an impersonal process whose flows run outside ’personological or 
objectal coordinates’ (D:89). It is not linked ‘to a given person, to a given object in 
the framework of representation’ (AO:300). Desire is no more ‘internal to a subject’ 
than ‘it tends towards an object’ (D:89). Rather than the attribute of a subject seeking 
a missing object, desire is an anterior process. ‘For Gilles Deleuze and me desire is 
everything that exists before the opposition between subject and object’ (Guattari, 
1996b:205). Hence, desire is not, as they claim happens in psychoanalysis, to be 
narrowly conceived as an affair of desiring subjects and the objects they crave, for 
desire ‘does not take as its object persons or things’ (AO:292). As such, desire is 
irreducible to the Oedipal desires and ‘the pitiful little familialist secret’ which 
preoccupy psychoanalysis (AO:292). There are Oedipal desires – ‘psychoanalysis does 
not invent Oedipus’ - but there are desires other than the Oedipal (AO:365). Anti-
Oedipus is a hymn to these anoedipal desires.  
 In respect of subjectivity, as with desire, it is possible to move beyond the 
human. Although subjects (and their correlative objects) exist on the plane of 
organisation there are other planes where subjectivity is swept away. Here ‘the plane 
of consistency’ (TP:43), also termed ‘the plane of immanence’(TRM:130), namely, the 
‘unformed, unorganised, nonstratified, or destratified body and all its flows’ is 
termed the ‘Body without Organs’ (TP:43). A plane of ‘pure intensities, prevital and 
prephysical free singularities’ (TP:43). The body-without-organs ‘opposes all strata of 
organisation, the organism’s organisation as well as power organisations,’ which seek 
to stratify (TRM:130). By ‘constituting a body without organs and bringing forth a 
plane of consistency of desire’, it is possible to know ‘a joy that is immanent to desire’ 
(TP:155).  To attain this ‘vital body,’ (LS:105) Deleuze and Guattari urge us to 
‘destratify’ and ‘desubjectify’ and thereby ‘find your body without organs’ (TP:151), 
but, as always, there is an injunction to proceed cautiously: ‘[e]very undertaking of 
destratification (for example, going beyond the organism, plunging into a becoming) 
must therefore observe concrete rules of extreme caution: a too-sudden 
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destratification may be suicidal’ (TP:503). Not all attempts to ‘make the body without 
organs’ succeed – ‘you can botch it’ (TP:134). Irretrievable breakdown can engulf. 
 
Processual Ontology and Psychoanalysis 
 
In line with Deleuze’s other work, the possibility of our attaining a more vital and 
impersonal mode of existence is underwritten by a processual ontology in which 
nothing is given once and for all, with the consequence that new and unforeseeable 
developments are possible. As noted above, the business of philosophy for Deleuze 
was the creation of concepts to meet the purposes consequent on new encounters. 
This is particularly evident in his critique of psychoanalysis, where he was 
collaborating with Guattari and working with many of the latter’s concepts. The 
result is a different ontology. However, the fundamental orientation remains that 
sketched in the preceding chapter. As before, his approach eschews thinking in terms 
of things. Desire, ‘as opposed to a subjectivity,’ they claim ‘is an event, not a thing or 
a person’ (TRM:130). First and foremost, it is ‘a process as opposed to a structure’ 
(TRM:130). Desire ‘produces’ (AO:379) in an ‘immanent constitutive process’ (Alliez, 
2004:10). What is produced depends on the relationships, that is, on how we affect 
and are affected. Further, ‘desire is never separable from complex assemblages’ 
(TP:215). Contra Žižek, desire is not simply ‘primordial flux’ (Žižek, 2012:620) for it 
always functions in an agencement. Far from being ‘an undifferentiated instinctual 
energy’ it ‘results from a highly engineered setup rich in interactions’ (TP:215). As 
these interactions involve ‘molecular energies,’ they are largely sub-representative 
(TP:215). Deleuze’s notion of desire is, as Žižek observes ‘anti-representationalist’ 
(Žižek, 2012:620). Finally, when ‘desire assembles [agence] something’ it is ‘in 
connection with an Outside’, so it is always part of a dynamic open-ended process 
(D:78). What a body becomes depends upon its encounters with the different, 
disparate and heterogeneous. If the resulting relationships and compositions 
augment its capacity to live, joy prevails. If not, sadness. 
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Section 2: Deleuze as a critic of psychoanalysis 
 
This section advances two arguments. It claims that the proximity of Deleuze to Lacan 
has been masked by Deleuze’s misconstrual of aspects of Lacan’s teaching and that, 
if the misapprehensions are dispelled, Lacanian approaches can be used in 
conjunction with Deleuze’s philosophy to rethink the event of art. There is space to 
consider only one issue in detail: interpretation, which has been chosen because it 
enables the further development of lines of thought explored in chapter two. 
Deleuze and Guattari are damning: psychoanalysis ‘understands nothing,’ (K:66) 
‘hears nothing and listens to nobody’ (TP:34). It silences its patients for ‘all of 
psychoanalysis is designed to keep people from speaking’ (TRM:84). ‘The knowledge 
to which psychoanalysis lays claim is inseparable from a kind of terrorism’ (TRM:62). 
Everything is forced into an Oedipal framework. In evidence, they cite Melanie Klein’s 
treatment of a troubled four-year-old boy who is known as Little Dick. Klein writes 
that, when he came to see her, she gave him some toys to play with, including a big 
train and a smaller one which she called respectively ‘“Daddy-train” and “Dick train.”’ 
(Melanie Klein cited in AO:45). ‘Thereupon,’ she recounts, ‘he picked up the train I 
called “Dick” and made it roll to the window and said “Station”’ (Melanie Klein cited 
in AO:45). She then ‘explained’ to the little boy: ‘The station is mummy. Dick is going 
into mummy.’ Reading this, it is hard to disagree with Deleuze and Guattari’s claim 
that Klein’s conduct, on this occasion, was not so much ‘suggestion’ as ‘terrorism’ 
(Melanie Klein cited in AO:45). However, the question is whether Lacan is similarly 
guilty. Speaking of the case, he is equally damning: ‘She slams the symbolism on him 
with complete brutality, does Melanie Klein… She hits him with a brutal verbalisation 
of the Oedipal myth almost as revolting for us as for any reader – You are the little 
train, you want to fuck your mother’ (S.I:68). 
From a Lacanian perspective such interpretations serve no purpose. As Philip 
Dravers reminds us, both Freud and Lacan began ‘by believing the symptom to be 
entirely soluble to interpretation while later testifying to its ultimate indissolubility 
to analysis’ (Dravers, 2002:145). Instead of (uselessly) telling the patient the 
supposed truth about his or her condition, a Lacanian analyst listens – usually for 
months at a time – before intervening when something is said whose import the 
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analysand appears not to want to know. By repeating the word or ending the session, 
the analyst produces an ‘interpretation’ which ‘is an enunciation without an 
enunciated’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Fink, 2007:80). 
The redoubtable Pierre Skriabine provides a clinical vignette:  
‘He used to have a brother, younger than himself who was autistic and 
handicapped by a cardiac malformation. A very strong bond, both ambiguous 
and ambivalent, had united him to this brother, going as far as constituting a 
particular form of communication that puzzles him. This brother, having 
reached adolescence, had now been dead for two years. The drama had lead 
the whole family, the patient, his sister and the two parents, to a work of 
mourning, which would thereby prolong the psychotherapy undertaken by 
the mother and father during their child’s illness. 
“After his death, all three of us were really able to speak about it”, 
says the patient. 
  “All three?”, I ask. 
“Yes”, he says surprised, “my mum, my dad, my sister and…I forgot to 
count myself!” he adds astonished. 
The “There!” that I then pronounce closes the session, by taking note…of this 
mistake in counting and the enunciation that brings it.’ (Skriabine, 2003:136) 
No interpretation is proffered, for Skriabine – in Socratic fashion - knows only that he 
does not know the significance of the slip. If the barred Other is in operation, nobody 
knows except the analysand and he at once wants and does not want to know. So 
instead of providing an interpretation, Skriabine makes an intervention to enable the 
patient to hear his message in inverted form thereby giving him the opportunity to 
make something else of his brother’s death. To Deleuze’s injunction: ‘experiment, 
never interpret,’ a Lacanian response could be: ‘of course’ (D:48). If there is a lack in 
the Other, every interpretation is necessarily an experiment. As Skriabine could not 
know what would result from his intervention, he was experimenting with a view to 
helping the patient change. The purport of Lacan’s style is precisely that matters are 
never so simple that they can be tied up and labelled in neat little theoretical 
packages. ‘Analytic interpretation,’ Lacan insisted, ‘is not designed to be understood 
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it is designed to make waves’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Fink, 2007:81). Skriabine sought 
to ‘make waves.’ 
To conclude, I want to broaden out the discussion to consider how this 
Lacanian notion of interpretation can help us think the thinking which can occur in 
art. ‘Interpretation,’ Lacan remarked, ‘is not the testing of a truth that would be 
decided by a yes or a no, it unleashes the truth as such’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Fink, 
2007:85). The contention of this thesis is that, while films may contain 
representations whose truth value can be tested, in expanded cinema the powers of 
the false can create truths whose aim is not correctness but the making of waves.  
 
Section 3: Lacan with Deleuze: Degrees of Convergence  
 
Developing the argument in the previous section, the claim here is that there is 
sufficient consonance between Lacan and Deleuze and Guattari for psychoanalysis to 
be able, with little difficulty, to adopt and deploy many Deleuzean concepts. Before 
considering the topics set out as points of emphasis in the previous chapter, we need 
to directly tackle Deleuze’s relation to the axial concept in the first part of this thesis: 
the lack in the Other. No concept with that designation exists in Deleuze’s work and 
at first sight, Lacan’s thinking with its stress on invariance – the subject is never at 
one, never coincides with a signifier, never attains the object a etc. etc. – seems at 
odds with Deleuze’s insistence that time is always novel and that, consequently, 
outside closed systems, the future cannot be foretold – ‘We do not even know of 
what a body is capable’ (Deleuze, 1968a:226). However, there is no unbridgeable 
gap. Notwithstanding the dogmatic appearance of his pronouncements, Lacan held 
to no doctrines. Notions like the lack in the Other were, as we saw above, only 
concepts with which to experiment. His investigations of topological invariants were 
precisely that: investigations. More importantly for this thesis, the hypotheses 
resulting from Lacan’s researches have their echoes in Deleuze’s philosophy. If there 
is a lack in the Other, the way does not exist for the Other, that is an Other with the 
god-like power to ordain such a way does not exist.  Consequently, ineluctable 
problems and questions press upon us. In addressing these problems, we discover 
that the truth does not exist – truths have to be produced. We are condemned, as 
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we have seen in the foregoing discussion of interpretation, to invention and 
experiment. Complicating such creations, is the impossibility of fully representing 
what is at stake – we are called upon to think what cannot be thought. While we 
cannot but think the real, ‘the foundation of the real is that it cannot be thought’ 
(Lacan, 1975-76: Session 16/3/76 p. 10). Now, insofar as Deleuze is a Nietzschean, he 
accepts much of this viewpoint. Like Lacan he insists, in the absence of the way, on 
the necessity of invention: ‘[m]an must invent his relation with the other’ (ECC:59). 
In similar vein, he maintains the language does not exist: ‘there is no Logos; there are 
only hieroglyphs. To think is therefore to interpret’ (PS:65). As the god-like Other 
does not exist, any such interpretation cannot call upon a pre-ordained framework 
which is why Deleuze clarified his earlier position: ‘thinking is always experiencing, 
experimenting, not interpreting but experimenting’ with ‘what’s always new’ 
(N:106). Moreover, and crucially for this thesis, he granted, at least in his structuralist 
phase, that ‘there is no structure without the empty square, which makes everything 
function’ (LS:61). Even more importantly, he accepted that the place does not exist. 
Here he explicitly acknowledges his debt to Lacan for his point of departure is what 
he terms ‘Lacan’s paradox:’, namely the existence in every structure of an ‘empty 
space’ and an element lacking its place, that is, in Lacanese, precisely one of the faces 
of the inconsistent Other (LS:50 footnote 6). ‘As in a game, we participate in the 
combination of the empty place and the perpetual displacement of a piece’ (LS:49). 
Like Lacan, he thinks this disparity in terms of a simultaneous lack and excess: ‘that 
which is in excess in one case is nothing but an extremely mobile empty place; and 
that which is lacking in another case is a rapidly moving object, an occupant without 
a place’ (LS:48-9). Language comprises two heterogeneous series: signifiers (sounds 
and marks) and signifieds (meanings) which, in their disparity never finally marry up 
– there is no one to one relationship of complementarity. In the series of signifiers, 
‘what is in excess […] is literally an empty square and an always displaced place 
without an occupant’ (LS:59-60). While ‘what is lacking in the signified series,’ he 
continues, is ‘an unknown, an occupant without a place, or something always 
displaced’ (LS:60). The affinity with, and influence of, Lacan is palpable. To describe 
‘the paradoxical element’ (LS:60) ‘by means of which the series communicate 
without losing their difference,’ (LS:60), Deleuze cites the proposition: ‘it fails to 
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observe its place (elle manque à sa place). ‘It fails,’ on his account, ‘to observe its own 
identity’ (LS:48). Following Lacan, to an extent we will not, Deleuze designates this 
paradoxical entity the phallus (LS:261). To avoid the obnoxious politics which use of 
this concept can easily introduce, this thesis proposes an alternative approach. While 
retaining the crucial notions of structure, seriality, and the empty square, it explores 
the possibilities for thinking the thinking which occurs in the event of art if we deem 
the item communicating between the series to be not the phallus, but the object a. 
What this conjunction of Lacan and Deleuze affords us is a different 
theoretical perspective on one of the modes of textual functioning explored in 
chapter two, namely the serialism in Hamlet, L’Amour Fou and India Song. Moreover, 
it provides concepts with which to further develop Darian Leader’s account of 
Hamlet. In chapter two it was argued that Leader’s approach could usefully be 
supplemented by consideration of how the work of the work enabled the subject to 
move and be moved through the text in a process of reciprocal metamorphosis. 
Deleuze’s structuralism enables us to elaborate that model: what moves through the 
text is not simply a subject in process. Rather it is a relationship: that between the 
object a and the accompanying subject. Deleuze writes:  
‘if the empty square is not filled by a term, it is nevertheless accompanied 
without being occupied or filled. And the two, the instance and the place do 
not cease to lack each other.’  
He continues:  
‘The subject is precisely the agency [instance] which follows the empty place: 
as Lacan says, it is less subject than subjected [assujetti] – subjected to the 
empty square, subjected to the phallus and to its displacements’ (DI:190).  
By substituting the object a for the phallus, we create a model of textual functioning 
in which the movement, transformations and displacements of ultimately sub-
representative elements – the object a and the barred subject - are as crucial as the 
images and signifiers in the production of sense. By combining Lacan and Deleuze, 
we can think the work of the work as an agencement in which interacting and 
interdependent heterogenous elements – ultimately the body and language – are 
traversed by a subject at once conjoined with and disjoined from the object a. We 
will come back to this approach to the event of art in the next chapter.  
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 For the moment, let’s conclude this discussion of the proximity of Deleuze 
and Lacan in respect of the Ⱥ by considering their shared admiration for Blanchot. In 
a formulation echoing Lacan, Blanchot wrote of ‘this impossibility of thinking which 
is thought’ (Blanchot, 1959:36-7), and this notion was taken up by Deleuze when he 
claimed that thought finds ‘within itself something which it cannot think, something 
which is both unthinkable and…which must be thought’ (DR:192). The echo of Lacan’s 
thinking of the ‘excluded interior’ (S.VII:101) which constitutes das Ding, this 
‘unthinkable in thought,’ that is ‘both its source and barrier’ is unmistakable (C2:168).  
The affinity becomes more pronounced when Deleuze’s philosophy takes a 
topological turn. For Deleuze as for Lacan, we exist in a ‘relation, and indeed 
“nonrelation,” to an Outside that’s further from us than any external world, and 
thereby closer than any inner world’ (N:97). ‘An outside,’ he writes, ‘more distant 
than any exterior,…“twisted”, “folded” and “doubled” by an Inside that is deeper 
than any interior,’ Deleuze maintains, in an echo of Lacan, ‘creates the possibility of 
the derived relation between the interior and the exterior’ (F:110). Both the 
philosopher and the psychoanalyst, therefore, provide materials with which to 
conceive certain artworks as thinking what is impossible to think but which must be 
thought by creating spaces which cannot be envisioned within Euclidean terms. 
 At this juncture, we have already touched on the processual ontology 
outlined in the previous chapter. If what has to be thought cannot be thought we are 
caught up in open-ended structures for we face questions which no answer can close 
down and, if thinking has to think what we cannot think, we have of necessity to deal 
with the sub-representative in establishing relations with what eludes any relation of 
mastery or comprehension. Let’s now examine in more detail the degree of 
convergence. 
 
Lacan in the light of Deleuze’s processual ontology 
 
The purpose of this section is to consider the proximity of Lacan’s teaching to the 
features of Deleuze’s ontology highlighted in chapter three with a view to examining 
how they might inform our thinking of the thinking which occurs in art. Aspects of 
the proximity can be dealt with briefly as they should already be apparent. Lacan like 
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Deleuze was a thinker of process. His teaching was dedicated to thinking the process 
of analysis in which the cure cannot be achieved in ‘one go’ but must move through 
stages. Classically, as we saw above, in the transference, the analysand must imagine 
the analyst is the Other so that at the end of the treatment he can realise the Other 
does not exist, and thereby discover the freedom to experiment. Patently, therefore, 
the treatment turns on relationality. If there is a lack in the Other, the analysand is 
never going to discover the truth. Rather a space and moment are created in which 
the analysand can come to relate differently to the Ⱥ. In so doing, the subject 
changes, both at the level of what can be represented and at the subrepresentative 
level of the barred subject, the drives and the object a. Other aspects, namely 
difference, composition and the open-endedness of all structures are worth 
considering at greater length for in each case the Deleuzean concept suggests ways 
in which psychoanalysis could usefully rethink its approach to art.   
The topic of difference is a good example of how Deleuzean concepts can cast 
Lacan’s teaching in a new light and equip psychoanalysis with the means to be 
worthier of the event of art. At first sight, it seems difference in Lacan takes the 
logicist form, which Deleuze considers to be secondary and derivative, where A is A 
because it is not not-A, where a signifier’s identity is determined by its difference 
from other signifiers. But, as we saw in the preceding chapter, viewed through a 
Deleuzean lens, which focuses on the genesis of such identities from differences, 
inequalities and disparity, another picture emerges. It becomes apparent that these 
identities depend upon processes of differentiation. If the place does not exist, every 
child is born to difference, for it is summoned to occupy a place constituted by the 
desires of its (always singular) caregivers, desires which, in at least some respects, 
are at odds with its own. The subject is the response to those differences, it is what 
is made of them. It might be objected that this is a difference between persons and 
things and, therefore, far from Deleuze, but there are no persons outside the 
imaginary - what are involved are the flows of desire, the trajectories of the 
‘insubstantial subject’ and the movement of the drives as indicated in the graph 
complet (Greenshields, 2017:210). As such, difference is a difference between forces. 
On a first approach, the difference between, on the one hand, the forces inhabiting 
the words of Others, which assign places, prescribe roles and enjoin values, and the 
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forces of the body, which resist the imposition of any such identity by the Other. But 
this account of the disparate and unequal forces in play is overly simplistic for words 
are inhabited by multiple forces and the body is similarly the site of multiple – both 
compatible and conflicting - forces.  Even more importantly, no force exists in 
isolation. On the one hand, desires and drives do not exist independently of signifiers 
and, on the other, the force, value and significance of signifiers depends, in part, on 
the weight ascribed to them by desires and drives. Without acts of selection, 
combination, centring, punctuation, contextualisation, hierarchisation, evaluation 
and interpretation signifiers cannot function, but equally there are no desires and 
drives outside agencements and their signifiers. In this light, subjects – and, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, artworks - can be viewed as attempted solutions to the 
problems posed by the differences between disparate and unequal forces. On this 
reading, for Lacan as for the Deleuze of Difference and Repetition there is no ground 
other than disparity. In both cases, ‘difference is behind everything, but behind 
difference there is nothing’ (DR:57). If this appears something of a stretch, recall that 
seminar eight now published as Le Transfert (Lacan, 2001b) was previously entitled 
‘Le Transfert dans sa Disparité Subjective’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Marini, 1986:179). 
It is, therefore unsurprising to find Lacan’s executor, Jacques-Alain Miller writing: ‘I 
like this word “disparity” – the lack of parity, heterogeneity, dissonance, disharmony’ 
(Miller, J-A, 1999:103). ‘What,’ he asks, ‘is a disparity? Without doubt it is an 
opposition, but one in which inequality enters, where there is an asymmetry’ (Miller, 
J-A, 1999:103). Disparity and asymmetry are cornerstones of Lacan’s teaching. 
This matters for our thinking of art on a number of counts. Most signally at 
the level of content: all narrative-based art begins from disparity and has disparity as 
its theme. More importantly it points up the importance of movement. If there is a 
lack in the Other, there is no point of rest. Difference and disparity launch and impel. 
We have to go on. Art achieves little by attempting to bring matters to a standstill. 
Rather the sense produced is a function of the movement which it enables. A 
movement in which meanings surface but as part of a larger process. In the image of 
the Borromean knot set out below ‘sens’, occupies only a small area outside the real 
(R) where the symbolic (S) and the imaginary (I) overlap 
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Let’s turn now to composition whose importance Lacan recognises as fully as 
Deleuze. ‘The way in which a work touches us […] in the most profound passion, 
namely on the level of the unconscious,’ he insisted, ‘has to do with its composition, 
its arrangement’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Naveau, 2013:49). If the subject is divided, 
it is at one neither with its self(-image) nor with its objects, the Other’s signifiers nor 
other subjects. In consequence, it is a process in which the above elements in all their 
heterogeneity engage in a co-functioning. The subject is a composition: an 
agencement. This matters for our thinking of the thinking in art for it provides an 
insight into how some artworks proceed. For example, when considering the way 
montage functions in modernist works like The Waste Land (Eliot,1963), Pound’s 
Cantos (Pound, 1964) or Éloge de l’amour an obvious conclusion is that the collagist 
form reflects and represents a world in which there are only fragments. Now, while I 
would problematize the notion of fragments insofar as it suggests the existence of 
an original unity which on a Lacanian view exists only in the imaginary, I accept that 
this approach has it uses. However, my argument is such works also constitute forms 
of thinking other than reflection and representation. My question is: who thinks like 
this? Who thinks in terms of AND not IS? My proposal is a subject in the form of a 
composition. Writing of one of Freud’s most famous patients, Philippe van Haute and 
Tomas Geyskens note that ‘the object of Dora’s desire is uncertain’ and ‘the place 
from where she desires is far from univocal’ (van Haute and Geyskens, 2010:150). 
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The same holds for many other subjects – the narrator does and does not want 
Albertine. The equivocity of so much modernism is a function of the heterogeneity 
and disparity at the heart of every subject. The equivocity in the artwork is not a 
representation. Rather it is the making something new of issues which have come to 
be thought in univocal forms of the imaginary.  
Finally, open-ended structures. If there is ‘a hole in the symbolic order,’ then 
the subject confronts unresolvable questions (Julien, 1990a:141). Consequently, the 
subject, as the graph makes clear (Harari, 2001:194), is characterised by a 
constitutive ‘openness’ [ouverture] (Balmès, 1999:57). When in response to the 
exigencies of the real, the subject creates habitats in the form of structures and 
systems, through master-signifiers, identifications and fantasies, something always 
escapes:  the object a. Always departing, Lacan, in seminar twenty-three, elaborates 
an ontology of sacks, knots and events. The body is a sack (or pot) (S.XXIII:10) as 
opposed to a sphere in that it is open to an outside that is at once within and without 
(S.XXIII:10, Lacan 1975-6: Session of 18/11/75 p. 11). At the same time, the subject is 
a knot as in the diagram above because for Lacan, as for Deleuze, the impending 
chaos must be kept at bay by a measure of consistency (S.XXIII:10).  As that 
consistency is never achieved once and for all, any knot is the outcome of an event. 
As Guillaume Collet observes, ‘speech speaks the event’ and ‘it is the event which 
does the knotting’ (Collet, 2017:118). It might be asked how sacks and knots come 
together but, while of interest, that question misses the fundamental point that, if 
the Ⱥ is operating, there can be no all-comprehending theory only experiments. 
 The importance of this for a psychoanalytic criticism which would be worthy 
of the event of art is that it suggests that one function of art can be to create open-
ended structures. Although all subjects are open-ended agencements, they can in 
neurosis and lesser forms of misery feel themselves confined in an airless trap. Art 
can enable them to breathe another air. In seminar seven, Lacan claims that the 
signifier introduces a ‘void’ and more specifically an ‘emptiness and fullness …into 
the world that by itself knows not of them’ (S.VII:120). For the neurotic that 
emptiness can appear a gaping lack caused by all that is missing but in art that created 
emptiness can be the space for further creation. If, at the end of analysis, the 
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analyst’s gift is not the answer but ‘the place he must offer up as vacant to the 
patient’s desire,’ expanded cinema offers analogous vacancies (S.X:104-5). 
 
Section 4: Lacan with Deleuze: Divergences 
 
After establishing the considerable degree of consonance, it is important to 
emphasise that there are also salient divergences: Deleuze and Lacan cannot be 
conflated. There is a reading of Lacan which would insist that our situation is much 
bleaker than Deleuze suggests. Where for Deleuze and Guattari, the unconscious is 
a factory, the productive processes of difference, for Lacan it is Freud’s ‘other 
scene’ (Freud, 1899:112) and, as such it is altogether more troubling. As underlined 
in chapter one, ‘“I don’t want to know anything about it”’ (S.XX:1). Hence Miller 
insists, ‘You are not at home in the Freudian unconscious’ – it is ‘uncanny’ (Miller, J-
A, 1987:18). It is ‘a knowledge that mucks us up’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Julien, 
1990a:117).  Further, in the psychic apparatus, there is a compulsion to repeat and 
‘a curse on sex’ (T:30). ‘Sexuality is always traumatic’ (Lacan, 1976:22). Since the 
desire of the Other (subject) is both opaque and discordant it can be likened to that 
of a ‘giant praying mantis’ (S.X:22). As Žižek - on his Hegelian reading of Lacan’s 
teaching - has it, ‘man is an animal sick unto death’ (Žižek, 1989: 4-5). Human 
existence is burdened by a troubling excess for ‘Civilisation is refuse [déchet], cloaca 
maxima’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Nobus, 2002:40, footnote2). This catalogue could 
be expanded but, in the space available, I will concentrate only on the two most 
important topics for a psychoanalytically-inspired thinking of the event of art: 
desire and subjectivity. If psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art, it must 
significantly revise its thinking on both issues. 
 
A divergence: Desire 
 
Although both agree on what Deleuze terms the ‘the primacy of desire,’ at first glance 
the divergence is marked (TRM:128). Contrary to the Lacanian contention that 
‘where there is no lack, there can be no desire’ (Fink, 2016:35), Deleuze insists that 
desire ‘gives, instead of lacks’ (D:91). On closer examination, however, matters are 
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more complex. Deleuze and Guattari accept that desire as lack exists: ‘If,’ they write, 
‘desire is the lack of the real object, its very nature as a real entity depends upon an 
‘essence of lack’ that produces the fantasised object.’ ‘Desire, thus conceived,’ they 
continue, ‘has been explained perfectly by psychoanalysis’ (AO:25). Similarly, as we 
saw above, they allow for the existence of Oedipal desires (AO:365); their argument 
is only that Oedipus is not the sum of desire. Thus, they acknowledge that the Kafka 
who wrote his ‘Letter to the Father’ was ‘a classic Oedipus of the neurotic sort, where 
the beloved father is hated, accused, and declared to be guilty’ (K:9) to distinguish 
him from the author of the novels where Oedipus is ‘enlarged to the point of 
absurdity, comedy’ (K:10). At the same time, Lacan’s teaching has affinities with 
Deleuze’s philosophy. While Lacan does not describe desire as a ‘“virtue which 
gives,”’ he recognises that desire can be a gift not a bane (D:91). As we saw above, it 
bestows sense. Further, Lacan similarly wishes to rid us of Oedipal desires – which, 
as we saw earlier, are, in at least some modes, only variants of the fantasy operative 
in courtly love, namely that the woman exists – in favour of the desires which speak 
in his ‘gay sçavoir’ (T:22). More radically, Lacan insists that in addition to desire there 
are the drives which, even in the absence of the lost object, obtain jouissance and 
these are ‘acephalous’ (Žižek, 1999:297). ‘The subject,’ whom Deleuze and Guattari 
insist ‘is missing in desire,’ (AO:26) is equally absent in the ‘montage’ of Lacan’s drives 
(E:718). Based on this common ground, I argue that neither approach excludes the 
other. Instead of choosing between them, I propose a division of labour in which 
artworks are considered case by case: Lacan-inspired approaches for texts which, for 
the most part, inhabit the plane of organisation, that is, the plane of subject and 
(missing) object; Deleuzean approaches for texts which attain the plane of 
consistency. Two filmic adaptations can serve as examples: Brideshead Revisited 
(Jarrold, UK 2008) which lends itself to a Lacanian reading insofar as it gives way as 
to desire and Time Regained (Ruiz, France 1999) which is more suited to a Deleuzean 
approach since it goes beyond the modes of desire informed by the more wretched 
forms of lack and becomes a ‘pure process that fulfils itself, and that never ceases to 
reach fulfilment as it proceeds’ (AO:370-1).  
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The Implications for Art  
 
‘Il faut la distance.’ 
Jacques Derrida (Derrida, 1976:41) 
 
On first acquaintance, Brideshead Revisited (Waugh, 1945) seems a deplorably 
nostalgic account of an idealised past created to underwrite and legitimate a 
snobbish contempt for modern society. As our world is freer of many of the 
oppressions all too evident in the society depicted by the novel, the politics of the 
text can only be deplored. The world pined for never existed and, to the extent that 
it did, it is – in Richard Rorty’s famous phrase – a ‘world well lost’ (Rorty, 1982:3). 
However, dismissal on these grounds would be a mistake for the text is altogether 
more interesting than this critique suggests. In musical terms, inside a tonal work 
intent upon returning to its home key - as figured by Brideshead – there is a serial 
work, for which there is no home only approaches – trying to escape. Insofar as this 
serial text does not give way as to desire it is an instance of bien-dire.  
What exactly is Brideshead? At first sight the answer seems obvious:  it is the 
family seat of the Marchmain family which functions as the symbol for a particular 
form of Catholic faith (Heath, 1982:163). For a reader prone to reductionist 
psychoanalytic readings, it is equally obvious that Brideshead is the voracious mother 
– whose love Lacan likens to the jaws of a ‘crocodile’ (S.VII:112). The trouble with 
these poverty-stricken content analyses is that they miss the work of the work. To 
understand that work it is useful to recall Lacan’s approach to the notion of La Chose 
in seminar seven. Instead of providing a single and final  determination, Lacan defines 
La Chose operationally and variously through its effects.  Similarly, the work of the 
work of the novel, prior to its conclusion, establishes the sense of Brideshead 
operationally and variously through its effects. That work hinges on the tension 
between the centrifugal and the centripetal movements of the text. The principal 
characters all take their distance from Brideshead/Catholicism. Sebastian retreats 
into alcohol and North Africa, Julia marries Rex, and Charles, by giving Sebastian 
money in contravention of Lady Marchmain’s instructions, ensures his banishment. 
At the same time, they find they are never done with the place and are constantly 
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drawn to return to either the house or their mother’s faith: Sebastian retires to a 
monastery, Julia rediscovers her faith and Charles finds himself repeatedly back at 
Brideshead – finally converting to Catholicism. hinges on the tension between the 
centrifugal and the centripetal movements of the text. The principal characters all 
take their distance from Brideshead/Catholicism. Sebastian retreats into alcohol and 
North Africa, Julia marries Rex, and Charles, by giving Sebastian money in 
contravention of Lady Marchmain’s instructions, ensures his banishment. At the 
same time, they find they are never done with the place and are constantly drawn to 
return to either the house or their mother’s faith: Sebastian retires to a monastery, 
Julia embraces her Catholic heritage and Charles finds himself repeatedly back at 
Brideshead – finally converting to Catholicism. Each trajectory is a series and the 
relations between these series constitute a thinking of the impossibility of finding the 
place and the necessity of doing so. Sense is grounded in nothing beyond the work 
of the work, specifically, the series, vectors and trajectories in which desire proceeds. 
But, at the last, Waugh gives way on desire and takes refuge in a mythical authentic 
Catholic past. The senses generated by the bien-dire of, in this instance, seriality are 
overtaken and eclipsed by those dependent upon fantasy. 
In the recent film adaptation, there is no such ‘fall from grace” for the text is 
captive from the first to the fantasy of a mythical loss and, therefore, even more 
plaintive (a register antinomic to bien-dire). Worse, the narrative structure is that 
lucidly explicated by Žižek and discussed above: but for a contingent obstacle… The 
work becomes just another story of doomed love: Sebastian’s for Charles and 
Charles’s for Julia. More importantly, a trite psychology explains everything. 
Sebastian’s distress is attributed not only to an over-controlling mother but also to 
his seeing Charles kiss Julia in Venice. Julia’s refusal of Charles is explained by her 
father’s deathbed act of contrition but equally by her disillusion with Charles after, 
as she interpreted it, he lowered himself by engaging in financial bargaining with her 
husband, Rex, to obtain his consent to their divorce. With enigma dispelled, there is 
neither the requirement nor the opportunity for a thinking creative of sense. 
Moreover, with the coordinates of well-established fantasies in place, the thinking 
which can occur when ‘there is only the travelling’ is arrested. The novel’s prologue 
becomes the film’s coda – Jarrold’s adaptation begins on the Atlantic liner where 
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Charles and Julia initiate their affair so the focus is on their doomed romance. 
‘Proust’s work,’ Deleuze and Guattari wrote ‘is the complicated path of a road that 
never stops approaching while moving away’ (K:34). While, as we have seen, similar 
paths are to be found in Waugh’s novel even if they are finally closed off, none exist 
in the film which is rivalled in its failure only by the recent adaptation of Ulysses, 
Bloom (Walsh, Ireland 2003), which parcels up the narrative(s) as a flashback 
anchored in Molly’s monologue! 
We come now to the second example, Time Regained, where desire assumes 
forms other than yearning for what, because mythical, is irreparably lost and where 
Deleuze’s philosophy is more valuable. Time Regained begins with desire as lack but 
then launches desires which are, at best, undertheorized by psychoanalysis. Ruiz’s 
film, while visiting episodes from earlier parts of A La Recherche du Temps Perdu, 
concentrates on the wartime Paris of the concluding volume. Uniforms are 
everywhere, the personnel in the brothel are servicemen and it is a recurrent topic 
in the prattle of the salons. This quickly establishes the extent to which this society 
has always been at war: deception, cruelty and viciousness mark almost every 
relationship. However, if the enounced is disappointment, duplicity and suffering, 
the mode of enunciation speaks of something beyond the wretched passions on 
display.  The narrator is at once a participant in the social scene and a detached 
observer. As there is a place without an occupant and an occupant without a place, 
the empty square circulates more palpably than in texts largely sealed by fantasies 
and identifications. The gap is the possibility for creation. That creation situates the 
griefs, betrayals and sufferings associated with the dismal events in the narrative in 
a space and time which eludes the Euclidean world of representation. The crucial 
component of that creation is the extraordinarily fluid style. At the level of the 
enounced, time is often, as in the bal des têtes, devastating: the figures whose world 
the narrator had once aspired to enter have now all aged beyond recognition, but, at 
the level of the enunciation, time is the possibility of creation and the new. Crucially, 
what is created by the movement is a sense which is as dependent on 
temporalisation as a joke upon timing.  This sense is not propounded as a thesis at 
the level of extractable content. Rather it is argued for by a style creative of durations 
in which this dual process of creation and destruction becomes a line of flight. At this 
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juncture, Deleuze becomes a more useful reader, for Time Regained ends not with a 
person but with a ‘haecceity’   that is, a mode of ‘individuality’ which is ‘different from 
that of a thing or a subject’ (TP:261) – in Time Regained it is the sea at Balbec on a 
grey summer day. At this moment, it is possible to depart the world of subjectivity 
for the realm of ‘the infinitive’, where the infinitive designates a process apart from 
the world of subject and object intrinsic to the other tenses (TP:263). At such 
moments, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, ‘we are not in the world, we become with 
the world; we become by contemplating it. Everything is vision, becoming. We 
become universes’ (WP:169).  
 
A divergence: subjectivity 
 
Echoing the earlier discussion of desire this section argues that, although there is 
more common ground than initially appears, the thinking of Deleuze and Lacan, in 
respect of subjectivity, significantly diverges and then proposes a further division of 
labour. 
As we have seen, there is a profound consonance insofar as Lacan, Deleuze 
and Guattari are equally dedicated to the dismantling of existing modes of 
subjectivity - while prudently retaining sufficient structure to avoid collapses into 
psychosis – in the interests of inventing, other, more vital, modes of existence. 
Beyond that, however, the gap between Deleuze and Lacan in relation to the notion 
of the subject might seem unbridgeable. Deleuze, in his concern to go beyond the 
human condition, repeatedly emphasizes that the role of the subject is more limited 
than psychoanalysis suggests. In thinking desire, for example, Deleuze and Guattari 
insist that ‘there is no subject of desire, and no object either’ (TRM:81). Desire must 
be thought outside the coordinates of subjectivity: ‘the objectivity of desire itself is 
only its flows’ (TRM:81). In contrast, as we saw in chapter two, Lacan claims that 
‘subjectivity cannot be eliminated from our experience as analysts’ (Lacan, 1998:94). 
Although he insisted that the subject ‘is always and only ever a supposition’ (Lacan, 
2005e:30), he claimed we ‘must speak about one if speaking there is,’ and 
experimented with various conceptualisations until the ascendancy of the 
Borromean knots in the late seminars (S.X:40). At times those experiments bring him 
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close to Deleuze. For example, as Christian Fierens observes, the ‘I’ of the subject of 
the enunciation ‘is not a personified “I”’ (Fierens, 2008b:25). On occasion, Lacan 
remarks, an utterance is better conceived of not as speech [parole] but as an act of 
speaking [un dire] which is to be thought of as ‘an event’ (Jacques Lacan cited in Fink, 
2007:14). At such moments, Lacan’s use of the infinitive is close to Deleuze when he 
uses the term to indicate a plane freed from ‘personal subjectifications’ (TP:263). 
Further, Lacan stresses ‘the fundamentally acephalic character of the subject,’ 
(S.II:170) describing the ‘the manifestation of the drive’ as ‘the mode of a headless 
subject’ (S.XI:181).  For Lacan, as Monique David-Ménard observes, no one can say 
‘“je jouis”’ - jouissance is always of the Other (David-Ménard, 1983:178). Finally, 
Lacan allows that the human condition can be surpassed. He speaks respectfully of 
mysticism and even suggests his Écrits can be numbered among their writings 
(S.XX:76).  It is therefore unsurprising that Lacan declared himself ‘flattered’ by the 
attribution ‘“a-human,” to what he had said’ (E:701).  
But there is nothing as radical as Deleuze’s injunction to ‘desubjectify 
consciousness and passion’ (TP:134), and no belief comparable to Deleuze’s claim 
that ‘a powerful, nonorganic vitality’ (ECC:131) is accessible if you ‘find your body 
without organs’ (TP:151). For Lacan, the body is indeed organised by, and in 
insurrection against, the Other but he would consider Artaud’s notion - cited by 
Deleuze (TP:162) – that ‘”the judgement of God”’ makes a body ‘an organism, a 
signification, a subject,’ a neurotic misconstrual of the process, a variant on the belief 
the Other exists (TP:159). Lacan aimed to dismantle existing organisations of the 
body by the Other’s signifiers by inducing a state of ‘subjective destitution’ but only 
as a prelude to the invention of new and happier forms of subjectivity (Lacan, 
1995:8).   
However, this divergence, as with that in respect of desire, does not require 
the choice of one at the expense of the other. On the contrary, it again suggests a 
division of labour: Lacan-inspired approaches for art encounters where subjectivity, 
albeit transformed, continues to function; Deleuze for those where it is surpassed.  
This possibility is allowed by Deleuze’s thinking of the subject in relation to the planes 
of ‘organisation’ (TP:269) and ‘consistency’ (TP:269-270) set out in chapter three 
above.  Deleuze’s claim is not that subjects do not exist but that ‘forms and subjects’  
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are  ‘strata’  confined to the ‘plane of organisation’ (TP:269). On the ‘the plane of 
consistency,’ (TP:269-270) which is characterised less by ‘stratification’ (TP:269) than 
‘destratification,’ (TP:270) particles spin off the strata, ‘sweeping up…forms and 
subjects’ (TP:271) in ‘movements of deterritorialisation’ (TP:270). According to this 
view, there are subjects but they are caught up in the larger process where the plane 
of consistency ‘is constantly extricating itself from the plane of organisation’ in the 
perpetual play of stratification and destratification (TP:270). So Deleuze is far from 
denying the existence and functioning of subjects. Indeed, in his customary spirit of 
caution, he suggests ‘a minimal subject’ may be necessary to stave off ‘a regression 
to the undifferentiatiated’ (TP:270). Consequently, the argument is that, on the one 
hand, Lacan’s teaching can be useful when considering films clinging to fantasy and 
filmic instances of bien-dire where the problem at issue, while revalued by a 
transformation of the subject, remains in view. When, on the other hand, the work 
sweeps us beyond the human condition and when, in consequence, subjective 
concerns no longer obtain, Deleuze’s orientation may be more useful. 
 
The Implications for Art  
 
Departing the world of subject and object for that of haecceities, is rare in cinema. In 
Éloge de l’amour, it occurs only in counterpoint, that is, on one of the staves, for 
example, in the sequence where the colours of the dashboard in the night are set 
against the text. The concerns, which constitute the problem addressed by the film, 
retain some purchase, and consequently spectators are only briefly without bearings. 
In India Song the step beyond personhood occurs only in the inconclusion of the 
conclusion. As the problems of desire posed by the film are irresolvable any 
resolution could only be an encounter with a dead end. The work of the work is a 
struggle with the undertow that is the impulse, in the face of the suffering, to give 
way as to desire. It concludes, therefore, with a desire in excess of any fantasy, a 
desire which while articulated is inarticulable, that is, it concludes with the open: a 
gap which is not lack but expanse. 
The best example of a filmic duration which achieves desubjectification is, as 
Anna Powell astutely discerned, (Powell, 2007:168) the Stargate sequence of 2001: 
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A Space Odyssey (Kubrick, US/UK 1968). As I cannot improve on her brilliant reading, 
let’s consider another example:  The Sheltering Sky (Bertolucci, Italy/United Kingdom 
1990).  Based on the Paul Bowles novel, this is the story of three American travellers 
– they insist they are not tourists – in Morocco just after World War Two: Porter 
Moresby (known as ‘Port’) his wife Kit and their boringly, unimaginative, and prosaic, 
companion, Tunner. In some undefined way, Port and Kit hope to repair their 
marriage by travelling into an inhospitable and alien environment. Catastrophe 
ensues. He dies of typhus and she, in a post-traumatic condition, goes off with an 
Arab caravan, becomes the lover of its leader, Belqassim, and is then attacked by his 
uncomprehending wives and other members of the tribe. Rescued by the American 
consulate, she is brought back, mute and withdrawn, to Tangier but rather than a 
reunion with Tunner she takes flight with no notion of where to go.  
On a first approach, the film seems to illustrate the Lacanian thesis that 
between us and the real we need the protective veil of fantasy, that is the sheltering 
sky of which Port remarks it is ‘so strange’ and continues ‘it’s almost solid as if it were 
protecting us from what is behind’ – namely ‘nothing,’ ‘just night’.   In other words, 
the film takes as its theme the insistence of both Lacan and Deleuze that we must 
keep enough structure in place to ward of psychotic breakdown. Like Brideshead 
Revisited, it is a film about distances: the necessity of finding the right distance and 
the difficulty of doing so. Both Port and Kit go beyond the sheltering sky and find a 
lethal desert. Most notably, in relation to the alien culture of North Africa but much 
more importantly when they encounter the otherness of others. Port is at once in 
flight from his wife – they have separate rooms – and in search of something new but 
unspecifiable. All he discovers is physical discomfort (the heat and the flies), the 
other’s discordant desires (the young Moroccan woman with whom he has sex tries 
to steal his wallet and an English travelling companion, Eric Lyle, robs him of his 
passport), a lost object of desire, when too late he falls back in love with Kit, and 
death. Kit is more interesting. Her voyage into the Other is more in the direction of 
Port than the Sahara. At the end the choice is Tunner and conventional bourgeois 
existence or the desert and trauma – she finds another way – she goes into the bar 
which she and Port visited at the beginning of their journey and Paul Bowles – making 
a cameo appearance – asks her, ‘are you lost?’ She replies: ‘Yes.’ but with a smile 
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which expresses her satisfaction with her condition – we have left the world of 
determinacy for that of indeterminacy – this is reinforced by the famous lines of Paul 
Bowles which end the film: ‘ 
‘Because we don’t know when we will die we get to think of life as an 
inexhaustible wealth but everything happens only a certain number of times 
and a very small number at that…and yet it all seems limitless.’ 
Whereas in the novel (Bowles, 1949) these articulate one of the principal thematic 
concerns, in the film, where there is no such focus on the apparent limitlessness of 
time they are beside the point. However, the very disparity of the lines with the 
foregoing narrative underscores the impossibility of the emergence of any whole or 
the detection of an essence. Instead of concluding with a signification, the film ends 
with an effect of openness – a sense without need of a subject: a haecceity. 
To conclude – the argument of the second part of this thesis is that, if 
psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art it must learn from Deleuze. In 
support of that argument this chapter has demonstrated that the degree of 
convergence between Deleuze’s philosophy and the teaching of Lacan renders the 
incorporation of many Deleuzean concepts into psychoanalysis unproblematic. At 
the same time, the divergences suggest a division of labour. My claim is that, in many 
instances, psychoanalysis can continue to perform a useful role in determining the 
concern(s) and issue(s) which explain why a narrative initially matters to us: it can 
identify the ‘hook’. As we have seen this initial point of interest is no more than that. 
What counts is what is made of it. The same issue, for example, the lack in the Other, 
can as easily give rise to a neurotic symptom as to a joke or an artwork. In many 
instances psychoanalysis can contribute to our thinking of the work of the work, 
whether that work is a taking refuge in fantasy and idealisation or bien-dire.  
Where psychoanalysis needs to reinvent itself in light of Deleuze is with 
respect to texts where desire and jouissance do not turn on lack and which depart 
the human condition. Ultimately, as argued above, the question is Nietzschean: 
Who? Who wills, thinks and desires in this manner? From this viewpoint every word, 
belief and act is symptomatic of a mode or style of existence. For example, if the 
Other does not exist, nor does the Woman – there are only singular women - so the 
question arises what sort of subject believes the Other exists and what sort of 
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heterosexual male searches for La Femme? Lacan recognized something of this when 
he declared ‘a woman is a symptom for man’ (Lacan, 1976:60) and ‘the Oedipus 
complex, as such, is a symptom’ (Lacan, 1975-76: Session of 18/11/75 p. 15).  
However, in answering the question who desires in this or that fashion the tendency 
of psychoanalytic criticism has been to draw solely on the clinic. Consequently, when 
considering the event(s) of art it does not allow for the possibility that art encounters 
can be creative of modes of desire and subjectivity very different from the wretched 
forms articulated in neurosis. It misses the joy, unique to art, celebrated by Deleuze.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter is the crux of the thesis for it examines the relationship of the work of 
Deleuze to psychoanalytically-inspired approaches to cinema and considers what 
each can bring to the other. Addressing the question posed at the outset as to the 
future of psychoanalytic criticism after Deleuze it further develops the argument that 
if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the event of art it must work with Deleuze. The 
chapter has a similar structure to the preceding one. It begins with an exposition of 
Deleuze’s thinking on art and more particularly cinema. After examining the degree 
of consonance between his concepts and the psychoanalytic approaches explored in 
part one, it proposes, a further division of labour, and concludes with a consideration 
of how the creativity of Deleuze’s approach points up the limitations of 
psychoanalytic theories of art.   
 
Section 1 Deleuze on Art and Cinema 
 
Vitalism 
 
In the cinema books Deleuze most powerfully articulates his Nietzschean contention 
that there is no higher value than life itself, no ‘higher authority’ such as ‘the good’ 
or ‘the true’ by which it can be judged (C2:141). Thus, he argues that in the films of 
Orson Welles ‘there is no value superior to life, life is not to be judged or justified, it 
is innocent, it has the “innocence of becoming” beyond good and evil’ (C2:137). More 
generally, this line of thought informs Deleuze’s vitalist conception and evaluation of 
art. ‘Any work of art,’ he claimed, ‘finds a way through for life, finds a way through 
the cracks’ (N:143). Of course, Deleuze did not believe life found a way through in all 
artworks. In film, for example, he distinguished more vital modes from the cinema of 
cliché. In developing this distinction, Deleuze drew as much upon Bergson as upon 
Nietzsche. In Bergson’s account, much of our commerce with the world is governed 
by utilitarian concerns. As a result, we focus on what is pertinent to our pragmatic 
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purposes and ignore everything else. Perception is subtractive (Bergson, 1919:113-
114). In a cosmos where, as we shall see, everything perceives, and interacts with, 
everything else human perception tends to be narrowly selective. Elaborating on this 
Bergsonian thesis Deleuze claims: ‘we do not perceive the thing or the image in its 
entirety, we always perceive less of it, we perceive only what we are interested in 
perceiving, or rather what is in our interest to perceive, by virtue of our economic 
interests, ideological beliefs and psychological demands’ (C2:20). This narrowness of 
focus is particularly evident in what Bergson terms ‘sensori-motor’ activities 
(Bergson, 1896:138). Here we perceive a situation, have an affective reaction and 
respond with an action. As, for the most part, these responses are habitual or 
automatic, our horizons are circumscribed and we miss much of what is happening 
and, more importantly, what could happen. In light of this, for Bergson, the role of 
art was to enlarge perception by enabling us ‘to discover in things more qualities and 
more shades than we naturally perceive’ (Bergson, 1919:131).  Drawing on this line 
of thought, Deleuze claimed that the cinema of cliché is in most –although, as we 
shall see, not all – cases, rooted in sensori-motor schemas. ‘A cliché’ Deleuze writes, 
‘is a sensory-motor image of the thing’ (C2:20). The majority of mainstream films are 
of this ilk: a protagonist apprehends a situation, say the villain mistreating the female 
lead, is affected by righteous fury and reacts by setting about the villain (just about 
any Bond film). Identifying with the hero, spectators are similarly locked into the 
predictable and confined world of the sensori-motor. In Nietzschean terms, such 
films display modes of an ‘exhausted and degenerating life’ (C2:141). But if there is 
the ‘bad’ (C2:172), there is also the ‘good’: art in which there is  
‘outpouring, ascending life, the kind which knows how to transform itself, to 
metamorphose itself according to the forces it encounters, and which forms 
a constantly larger force with them, always increasing the power to live, 
always opening new “possibilities”’ (C2:141).  
If there is the cinema which ‘has drowned in the nullity of its productions,’ (C2:164) 
there is also a cinema like that of the new wave which, by repudiating the clichés of 
taken for granted realities, ‘deliberately broke with the form of the true to replace 
them with ‘the powers of life’ (C2:135). 
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However, it is, as always, a matter of cases. Life ‘finds a way through,’ in very 
different ways in different films (N:143). As David Deamer so admirably 
demonstrates in his magisterial study (Deamer, 2016), one of the most impressive 
features of the cinema books is their refusal to reduce the different to the same. 
Cinema assumes forms as diverse as life. If in the crystal-image, that is an image in 
which the virtual and the actual cannot be distinguished, (C2:335) we encounter ‘the 
powerful non-organic Life which grips the world’ (C2:81), in the films of Dreyer we 
find the ‘spiritual’ for films such as The Passion of Joan of Arc (Dreyer, Denmark 1928) 
put us ‘into immediate relation with…a fourth and fifth dimension, Time and Spirit’ 
(C1:107). 
Two aspects of Deleuze’s vitalism are worth reiterating and underlining here 
as they relate the conception back to the two previous chapters. First, as in 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, life is not some simple primordial force or flow to 
which we must become attuned. Rather vitalism is again a ‘machinism,’ that is, life is 
always in play within assemblages of the heterogeneous (C1:59). ‘The material 
universe,’ of the cinema books is described as ‘the machine assemblage of 
movement-images’ (C1:59). Second, as in A Thousand Plateaus, his concern is with 
‘the vital as potent pre-organic germinality, common to the animate and the 
inanimate, to a matter which raises itself to the point of life, and to a life which 
spreads itself through all matter’ (C1:51).   By way of an example, ‘the first principle 
of Expressionism,’ he claims, is ‘the non-organic life of things, a frightful life, which is 
oblivious to the wisdom and limits of the organism’ (C1:50-51). 
 
Beyond the Human Condition 
 
A key thread running through Deleuze’s works is the contention that more vital 
modes of existence are possible beyond the human condition. Art, he contends, is 
one of the areas where this can be achieved.  
‘Art is never an end in itself; it is only a tool for blazing lines, in other words, 
all of those real becomings that are not produced only in art, and all of those 
active escapes that do not consist in fleeing into art, taking refuge in art, and 
all of those positive deterritorialisations that never reterritorialise on art, but 
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instead sweep it away with them toward the realm of the asignifying, 
asubjective, and faceless’ (TP:187).  
Art can attain a ‘celestial state that no longer retains anything of the personal or 
rational’ (ECC:65).  
The cinema books similarly eschew what Anna Powell terms ‘a psychological 
model of subjectivity,’ and proceed on the premise that we can go beyond the human 
condition (Powell, 2007:149-150). Their mainspring is what Deleuze perceives to be 
the Foucauldian ambition: ‘to get free of oneself’ (F:95-6). As Stephen Zepke astutely 
observes, ‘The trajectory of the cinema books can perhaps be summarized by 
Deleuze’s question: “how can we rid ourselves of ourselves, and demolish 
ourselves?”’ (Zepke, 2005:99) We have already encountered two cinematic modes of 
surpassing the human condition, namely the ‘spiritual life’ (TRM:283), that is, ‘non-
psychological life,’ (C1:54) manifested by cinema and ‘the powerful non-organic Life 
which grips the world’ (C2:81). Let’s now consider the two most prominent forms: 
first affects and percepts, then durations.  
Earlier it was suggested that, in thinking about art, Deleuze’s point of 
departure was Bergson’s claim that art expands perception (TRM:296). As Valentine 
Moulard-Leonard notes,  
‘The central insight animating Deleuze’s cinema books is precisely that the 
cinema does not imitate natural perception; on the contrary, it frees itself 
from it, thereby presenting us with the means to go beyond everyday 
experience’ (Moulard-Leonard, 2008:106).  
However, Deleuze’s thinking is altogether more radical than this formulation 
suggests. In breaking with the utilitarian bias of natural perception, Deleuze does not 
simply want to expand the horizons of a pre-constituted individual. Rather he wishes 
to leave behind the personal world of perceptions and, as we shall see even more 
crucially, affections for the impersonal world of percepts and affects. ‘Percepts aren’t 
perceptions, they’re packets of sensations and relations that live on independently 
of whoever experiences them.’ ‘Affects aren’t feelings, they’re becomings that spill 
over beyond whoever lives through them (thereby becoming someone else)’ (N:137). 
Hence art, in creating ‘nonsubjectified affects’ (SP:129) and wresting ‘the percept 
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from perceptions of objects and the states of a perceiving subject,’ can enable us to 
go beyond the human (WP:167).  
Cinema has the capacity to break with natural perception. ‘Cinema,’ Deleuze 
writes, ‘lacks a centre of anchorage and horizon’ and consequently can depart natural 
‘centred perception,’ which obtains in our pragmatic dealings with the world, and 
goes ‘towards the acentred state of things and get[s] closer to it’(C1:58). In contrast 
to the cinema of cliché governed by sensori-motor schemas, there are modes of 
cinema, where vision is no longer that of a human being with a bias toward utility but 
‘of a non-human eye which would be in things’ that is, an eye capable of seeing ‘the 
world before man’. Such a cinema ‘constructs’ an eye, which, when immersed in the 
sensory-motor, ‘we do not have’ (C1:81). In the pre-war French School, for example, 
there is a ‘a more than human perception’ (C1:80). Similarly, the work of Dziga-Vertov 
‘goes beyond human perception toward another perception’, that of ‘the overman 
of the future’ (C1:83).   Finally, and similarly, he writes that experimental cinema 
‘tends toward a perception as it was before men’ (C1:122). 
Equally cinema can go beyond the human condition at the level of affects. Just as 
cinema can depart the world of human perception for the asubjectivity of the percept 
– that is ‘perception in becoming’ (ECC:87-8) – so it can create affects which are 
impersonal (TP:240). Affects ‘imply an enterprise of desubjectification’ (TP:270): they 
are ‘precisely the nonhuman becomings of man’ (WP:169).  As ‘pre-subjective 
processes,’ (Powell, 2007:2) affects, as Guattari claims, exist ‘“before” the 
circumscription of identities’ (Guattari, 1996a:158). With art we can leave the 
subjects and molar identities of the plane of organisation for the plane of consistency 
where ‘there are only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations’ (TP:266).  
 This brings us to durations.  Deleuze’s Bergsonian concern ‘to open us up to the 
inhuman and the superhuman’ in the form of ‘durations which are inferior and 
superior to our own’ and thereby ‘go beyond the human condition’ inspires the 
cinema books (B:28). These ‘very different “durations”’ can introduce us to ‘a reality 
specific to becoming’ (TP:238). As ‘becoming lacks a subject distinct from itself,’ 
(TP:238) we then leave the human world of subject and object and are opened up to 
what Levi Bryant describes as the ‘greater and lesser rhythms of time or difference 
which go beyond our own subject-centred experience’ (Bryant, 2008:77). If, in the 
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cinema of the sensori-motor, time is measured and constructed in terms of the time 
that elapses between the ascertained original situation and the elicited response, in 
other cinematic modes we can leave the world of the sensori-motor and go  
‘beyond the human limits of the sensory-motor schema towards a non-human 
world where movement equals matter, or else in the direction of a super-human 
world which speaks for a new spirit’ (C2:40),  
and even, on occasion become with the ‘superhuman cosmos’ (C2:118).    
 Deleuze theorises the ‘radical plurality of durations’ in cinema primarily in terms 
of the distinction between two modes of cinema: those of the movement-image and 
the time-image (B:76). In the bulk of the cinema of the movement-image, the 
sensory-motor preponderates. This is particularly apparent in the matrixial mode of 
the movement-image: the action-image. Here the durations in play are, for the most 
part, so familiar as to be clichéd: ‘someone on the screen perceives, feels, reacts’ 
(N:123). Typically – and this is the prevalent mode of what I have termed ‘contracted 
cinema’ – ‘the hero in a given situation, reacts’ and ‘always knows how to react’ 
(N:123). Shane, in the eponymous film (Stevens, USA 1953), perceiving how the 
rancher is maltreating the homesteaders, is affected. Impelled by a feeling of 
solidarity with the good folk and outraged by the wickedness visited upon them, he 
buckles on his gun belt and puts matters right. In contrast, in the cinema of the time-
image, - for example, films like India Song and Éloge de l’amour - characters typically 
encountered a situation which ‘was beyond them,’ that is, a situation which was not 
immediately intelligible and to which there was no ready-made response (N:123). In 
such films, a character typically finds himself ‘in a situation, however ordinary or 
extraordinary, that’s beyond any possible action, or to which he can’t react.’ Here, 
‘he’s no longer in a sensory-motor, but in a purely optical and aural situation (N:51). 
Different durations then obtain. This ‘slackening of the sensory-motor connections’ 
enables us to see and hear more (C2:3). If ‘our sensory-motor schemata jam or 
break,’ time-images can appear which bring ‘out the thing itself’ and we can move 
beyond the human condition (C2:20). 
Although – hopefully - clear, Deleuze’s thinking on cinema, as set out above, 
is Hamlet without the prince for, at the heart of the cinema books, is an altogether 
more complex and profound theory of time. On this account: ‘[s]ubjectivity is never 
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ours, it is time’ (C2:82-3). Becoming is prior to and in excess of any temporalization 
articulated in terms of subjects and objects. Hence time is (non-psychological) ‘spirit’ 
and the ‘virtual’ which undoes any particular actualization (C2:82-3). For much of its 
existence philosophy has missed this possibility. From the ancients to Descartes time 
has been deemed to be the measure of change. Thinking in terms of things not 
events, philosophers viewed time as measuring the alteration and transformation of 
things. Only with Nietzsche and, more importantly, Bergson was this subordination 
of time to movement reversed (C2:xi). Time ceased ‘to be derived from …movement’ 
and appeared ‘in itself’ (C2:xi). No longer the measurement of movement, it was 
now, in Hamlet’s famous phrase, ‘out of joint’ (C2:xi ). ‘Hamlet’s words,’ Deleuze 
comments, ‘signify that time is no longer subordinated to movement’ (C2:xi). 
Deleuze’s distinctive hypothesis is that the history of film repeats this 
reversal. The subordination of time to movement in the cinema of the movement 
image ‘gave way in the post-war period, to a direct time-image’ (C2:xi). In the former, 
time is measured by the actions on screen - think of those action-image films where, 
for example, our hero must download the crucial information before the villains can 
thwart him (Clear and Present Danger, Noyce, USA 1994). In this mode, the cinema 
of the movement image moves from one state of affairs to another giving us only an 
indirect image of time. In contrast, in the cinema of the time-image, time is given ‘in 
a pure state’ (C2:169). With the ‘loosening of the sensory-motor linkage,’ he claims, 
‘time ceases to be derived from the movement, it appears in itself’ (C2:xi). Instead of 
an indirect representation of time, the cinema of the time-image gives us time 
directly. 
Put like that, it might appear that the cinema of the movement-image is 
superior to that of the time-image but Deleuze is insistent this is not the case: ‘It 
cannot be said that one is more important than the other, whether more beautiful 
or more profound. All that can be said is that the movement-image does not give us 
a time-image’ (C2:270). There is no privileging of time over movement images for 
two reasons. First, clichéd modes are to be found in the cinema of the time-image 
just as in movement-image films. If the latter are all too often ‘commercial 
configurations of sex and blood,’ the latter are frequently ‘overlaid with, “formalist 
antics”’ (C2:157). Secondly, and more importantly for present purposes, not all of the 
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cinema of the movement image is organised by the sensori-motor systems 
characteristic of the Hollywood factory. The cinema of the movement-image is 
principally concerned with three types of image: perception-images, affection-
images and action-images. Now, while these images can be components of standard 
multiplex fare they can also assume modes carrying us beyond the human condition. 
There are, as we saw above, instances where percepts and affects displace 
perceptions and affections. Furthermore, open-ended systems exist in both cinemas 
so in each there is the possibility of going beyond the human. Vital sub-
representational forces are at work in both when we encounter the unassignable and 
indeterminate. As we have repeatedly seen, no system is closed – all movement 
image films are open to the ‘cosmic eddying of movement-images’ (C1:68). If in the 
majority of cases this opening is almost indiscernible, in other instances, most 
notably Film (Beckett, USA 1966) cinema can enable us to go beyond personhood 
and attain ‘once more the world before man’ (C1:68).  
 
The need for caution 
 
‘The problem of philosophy,’ Deleuze and Guattari write, ‘is to acquire a consistency 
without losing the infinite’ (WP:42). A similar approach is evident in Deleuze’s 
thinking on art and existence. In each case it is a matter of keeping the dangers posed 
by chaos at bay without losing the movement that is life.  As Badiou observes, 
thinking for Deleuze whether in the register of art, philosophy or science involves 
making ‘a section in the chaos’, for the aspiration is ‘to be as close as possible to 
chaos, and nonetheless to shelter oneself from it’ (Badiou, 2012:339). 
 
Section 2: Deleuze and Ideological Critique 
 
The argument of this section is that Deleuze’s approach to cinema is not to the 
exclusion of others, not even that of ideological critique as set out in chapter one. At 
first glance, Deleuze and Guattari appear to take their distance. They proclaim that 
‘there is no ideology and never has been’ (TP:4). However, such polemics are 
misleading insofar as Deleuze’s practice like that of 1970s ideological critique, seeks 
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to enable us to ‘unhook ourselves from the points of subjectification that secure us, 
nail us down to a dominant reality’ (TP:160).  In addition, he has, as we saw earlier, 
recourse to the notion of ideology. By way of further examples, consider Anti-
Oedipus, where he and Guattari describe the notion of Oedipus as ‘a completely 
ideological beginning, for the sake of ideology’ (AO:101), and the discussion in 
Cinema 2 of ‘the ideology of the coloniser’ (C2:223). Moreover, in thinking of 
ideology, he and Guattari acknowledge the importance of Althusser’s notion of 
‘interpellation.’ ‘Althusser’ they write, ‘clearly brings out this constitution of social 
individuals,’ and ‘analyses the “specular doubling” of subjects’ at ‘the point of 
subjectification’ (TP:130). 
Further he, at times, accepts the principal terms of 70s film theory’s analysis 
of cinema as an ideological operation. Cinema, he notes, can produce captivation by 
the imaginary. It ‘is true,’ he acknowledges, that bad cinema (and sometimes good) 
limits itself to a dream state induced in the viewer or – as has been the subject of 
frequent analysis – to an imaginary participation’ (C2:168). A cinema spectator is 
always ‘in danger of becoming the dummy of every kind of propaganda’ (C2:157). As 
such, there is a role for psychoanalysis insofar as such capture relies on fantasies 
whose production, as we noted above, he acknowledges ‘has been explained 
perfectly by psychoanalysis’ (AO:25). Finally, despite his concern to go beyond the 
human condition, Deleuze accepts the need, in certain circumstances, for a politics 
of the subject. ‘You have,’ he and Guattari write, ‘to keep small rations of subjectivity 
in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality’ (TP:160). 
Hence, they accept that, while the enterprise may be hedged around with dangers, 
‘It is, of course indispensable for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to 
winning back their own organism, their own history their own subjectivity’ (TP:276). 
To conclude, Deleuze was as persuaded of the centrality of politics as post ’68 
film theorists: ‘politics,’ he and Guattari wrote, ‘precedes being’ (TP:203). Although, 
for the most part, his political interventions were dedicated to the invention of ‘a 
people to come’ (ECC:4) - rather than the analysis of the workings of ideology in 
specific conjunctures - he was far from discounting the value of such work, and no 
more averse to its deployment of psychoanalysis in certain circumstances than this 
thesis. 
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Section 3: Deleuze, a psychoanalysis to come and the event of art 
 
This section considers the degree of consonance between Deleuze’s thinking on art 
and the psychoanalytic approaches explored earlier with a view to suggesting new 
directions for the latter. Deleuze’s claim that ‘something in the world forces us to 
think’ holds as much for thinking in art as elsewhere (DR:139). Art equally occurs in 
‘the question-problem complex’. ‘The question animates works of art as much as 
philosophical thought’ (DR:195). Ultimately the problem impelling thought is that of 
difference, asymmetry and disparity: heterogeneous forces in disequilibrium. The 
earlier claim that it is always ‘a question of forces’ is reprised in Cinema 2 (TP:155). 
‘Is this to say,’ he asks, ‘that, in life, everything is a matter of forces?’ and answers 
‘Yes’ (C2:140). Initially this might appear at some remove from psychoanalysis but 
there is a proximity which this thesis seeks to develop. ‘Something essential to our 
experience,’ Lacan wrote, ‘forces psychoanalytic thought to be creationist’ (E:559). 
This is not, as he makes clear, to adopt an ignorant, anti-Darwinian stance but to 
stress the need to create new responses to the new problems presented by each 
individual patient. In other words, Deleuze and Lacan are at one in their recognition 
of the exigency to invent in each encounter with singularity. On the psychoanalytic 
account of art proposed in part one, thinking in art similarly creates in response to 
singular problems deriving from differences, asymmetries and disparities. Now Lacan 
would never, like Deleuze, have said ‘it has always been a question of forces,’ for he 
was wary of the term force (TP:346). ‘Force,’ he wrote ‘is used to designate a locus 
of opacity’ (S.XI:21). His insistence on ‘the primacy of topology over dynamics’ 
derives, as Bartlett, Clemens and Roffe observe, from ‘a hostility to privileging forces, 
energies and powers’ (Bartlett et al., 2014:61). However, as we saw earlier, he did 
use the term elsewhere (S.II:60) for, whether he was conscious of this or not, it is 
indispensable to his teaching. Lacanian psychoanalysis concerns the ‘force’ 
constituted by the object a (Lacan, 2011:87), the ‘force’ exerted by master signifiers 
(Bracher, 1994:112) and, more generally, the force with which the signifiers of the 
Other arrive in our lives. The treatment functions to alter existing force-fields so that, 
for example, certain images cease to captivate and the master-signifiers to enslave 
(S.XVII:188). In light of this, psychoanalysis should accept that art can be, as Celan 
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puts it, a ‘counterword,’ that is words, images and sounds countering prevailing 
forces (Celan, 1999:3).  
 In part one, it was argued that art is a response to the problems arising from 
the real as impossible and, in particular the impossibilities associated with the lack in 
the Other such as the impossibility of saying it all. Now, while this vocabulary is alien 
to Deleuze the line of thought is not. Creation, for Deleuze, depends on impossibility:  
‘A creator who isn’t grabbed around the throat by a set of impossibilities is 
no creator. A creator is someone who creates their own impossibilities and 
thereby creates possibilities.’  
He continues: ‘You have to work on the wall, because without a set of impossibilities, 
you won’t have the line of flight, the exit that is creation’ (N:133). The consonance is 
even more manifest in respect of my argument that, if there is a lack in the Other, 
there is no fore-ordained way, for this is precisely the situation of many of the 
protagonists of the cinema of the time-image. Unable to find their bearings and 
uncertain how to react to events, these characters are ‘struck by something 
intolerable in the world and confronted by something unthinkable in thought’ 
(C2:168). Like Lacanian subjects addressing the lack in the Other, they have to 
undertake, as we saw in the previous chapter, the task described by Maurice 
Blanchot (Blanchot, 1959:36-7) and cited by Deleuze: ‘the impossibility of thinking 
that is thought’ (Maurice Blanchot cited in DR:199). What a psychoanalysis to come 
should learn from Deleuze is that art can be one of the most joyful means of 
performing this task. 
While Deleuze never argued that the truth can only be ‘half-said,’ (Lacan, 
1975-76: Session of 9/12/75 p. 4) and Lacan never spoke of ‘the power of the false’ 
(C2:168), they agreed on the underlying contention, namely that matters will never 
be settled once and for all. As there is no final word, no ultimate truth, both are 
committed to the view that we need ‘to produce something new’ (C2:147). This 
explains why Lacan contributed ‘something wholly new at each class’ (E:412) of his 
seminar and why Deleuze asserts ‘there is no other truth than the creation of the 
New’ (C2:146-7). For both, there are realms where ‘truth is a matter of production, 
not of adequation’ (DR:154), and in Lacan’s phrase ‘always new’ (E:157). The 
argument of this thesis is, of course, that new truths can also occur in the event of 
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art, that is, truths which are to be measured not in terms of correctness but according 
to their power to disclose new horizons, possibilities, orientations, evaluations, and 
senses. Developing this claim, the present thesis further argues that the work of the 
work in expanded cinema is the creation of an element in which such truths can 
happen. Central to this process is the dismantling of existing structures. As we saw in 
the previous chapter, there is a fundamental consonance between Lacan and 
Deleuze on this score insofar as they are agreed on the need, while dismantling, for 
prudence and caution as the sine qua non is the fending off of chaos. Artworks 
according to Deleuze and Guattari, ‘crosscut the chaos, …confront it’, and construct 
a ‘sectional plane’ to keep it at bay (WP:66). As we saw in the discussion of the 
sinthome in chapter two, Lacanian psychoanalysis similarly views artworks as putting 
in place structures warding off chaos. They further agree on the indispensability of 
style and ‘technique’ in the creation of the new (TP:345). As Deleuze and Guattari 
insist, percepts and affects do not pre-exist the work.  
‘Style is needed – the writer’s syntax, the musician’s modes and rhythms, the 
painter’s lines and colours – to raise lived perceptions to the percept and lived 
affections to the affect’ (WP:170).  
They are equally agreed that the creation of an element, in which new truths can 
occur, is possible because no element is the element: others are possible. Both hold 
that in any structure or system constitutive of such an element there is an 
ineradicable gap, hole or space which permits creation. Lacan thinks this in terms of 
the lack in the Other. As we saw in the previous chapter, while no such concept 
features in Deleuze’s philosophy, the orientation is, at least in places, similar. Writing 
of art in Difference and Repetition he maintains: ‘works are developed around or on 
the basis of a fracture that they never succeed in filling’ (DR:195), and this is echoed 
later when he claims that in modern cinema ‘the fissure has become primary’ 
(C2:180). Crucially the fissure renders possible. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
he holds, that ‘there is no structure without an empty square.’ In The Logic of Sense 
he claims that it is this gap, this ‘empty square, which makes everything function’ 
(LS:61). The gap is the possibility of the new. The consonance with psychoanalysis is 
evident. Lacanian psychoanalysis is premised on this gap: it is because both Other 
and subject are barred and, therefore, incomplete, that the analysand can abandon 
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the identifications and traverse the fantasies previously employed to make sense of 
the world and invent anew. Hence, as Lacan insists ‘a certain void is always to be 
preserved’ (S.XX:65). Taking up this notion regarding art in seminar seven, Lacan 
argues ‘the existence of the emptiness at the centre of the real that is called the 
Thing’ constitutes the condition for creation. ‘The potter’ as the representative of 
every artist, ‘creates the vase’ emblematic of every artwork ‘with his hand around 
this emptiness.’ He ‘creates it, just like the mythical creator, ex nihilo, starting with a 
hole’ (S.VII:121). Along similar lines, Deleuze argues that if, as he claims, art is blocs 
of sensation, these ‘blocs need pockets of air and emptiness’ for ‘all sensation is 
composed with the void’ (WP:165). But, as always, the accent is more affirmative for, 
he continues, a work ‘is only a work of art if, as the Chinese painter says, it 
nonetheless saves enough empty space for horses to prance in’ (WP:165-166). If, for 
the neurotic, emptiness is a frightful lack and the occasion for despair, for an artist it 
is the opportunity to create. To be worthy of the event of art, psychoanalysis should 
recognise that one of the achievements of art like Éloge de l’amour is the creation of 
spaces in which horses can prance. 
In the latter part of Cinema 2 Deleuze explores this line of thought in ways to 
which psychoanalytic thinking on art could usefully attend. After citing Blanchot’s 
claim that ‘what comes first is not the fullness of being, but the crack and the fissure’ 
(Maurice Blanchot cited in C2:310 footnote 22), Deleuze proceeds to distinguish two 
modes of cinema: ‘classical cinema’ where ‘the whole is the open’, and ‘modern 
cinema’ where ‘the whole is the outside.’ In the former, which is governed by sensori-
motor schemas, perceptions and affections select with a view to action from within 
the ‘changing whole’ of the cosmos (C2:179). Like every system, the systems thereby 
created are ‘never absolutely closed;’ they open on to ‘the Open’ (C1:17). In contrast, 
modern cinema is open not to ‘the Open’ but to an ‘outside beyond the outside 
world’ (C2:181). This is the Outside of Blanchot, encountered in the previous chapter 
which ‘is something more distant than any external world’ but ‘also something closer 
than any inner world’ (N:110). As such, like the Lacanian real in the form of das Ding, 
if it is to be thought it must be thought topologically but even this can only be an 
approximation for ultimately the outside remains the ‘unthought in thought’ 
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(C2:181). It is, for example, ‘the impossible of Marguerite Duras, or again what might 
be called the incommensurable of Godard (between two things)’ (C2:182). 
On Deleuze’s account, ‘modern cinema develops new relations with thought from 
three points of view’ (C2:187-8). Each of these at once chimes with psychoanalytic 
theories of art premised on the lack in the Other and advances such thinking. First, 
as sensori-motor schemas have broken down, ‘the link between man and the world 
is broken’ (C2:171-2). Consequently, men and women no longer know how to react. 
The terrain of modern cinema is, therefore, Lacanian insofar as it is a world where, 
as no god-like Other can act as guarantor, we are condemned to experimentation. 
Deleuze’s contribution in this regard is to emphasise a consequence of this absent 
Other missed by Lacanian thinking on the arts: namely that ‘the reaction of which 
man has been dispossessed can be replaced only by belief.’ ‘Only belief in the world,’ 
he writes, ‘can reconnect man to what sees and hears’ (C2:172). This is a Nietzschean 
affirmation not an argument for religious faith. Nietzsche’s achievement, for Deleuze 
is to have ‘torn belief from every faith in order to give it back to rigorous thought’ 
(C2:176). To believe in this world is precisely not to subscribe to the existence of 
some heavenly elsewhere. Rather it is to affirm existence. And this is not easy: ‘it may 
be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult task’ (WP:75).  
 Art can assist in this task. According to Deleuze, the vocation of certain 
artworks, he instances the films of Rossellini (C2:171), is the restoration of our 
capacity ‘to believe in this world’ (C2:173). If ‘the modern fact is that we no longer 
believe in this world,’ (C2:171) ‘we need reasons to believe’ and cinema can provide 
them. ‘Restoring our belief in the world – this,’ he writes, ‘is the power of cinema 
(when it stops being bad)’ (C2:172). Cinema can give us reasons to believe not ‘in 
another world’ – that is, some fantasmatic construction – but ‘in this world as it is’ 
(C2:172). This need to believe is under-theorised in Lacanian psychoanalysis. In the 
clinic, the emphasis is on dispelling a patient’s existing beliefs for they are, almost 
certainly, components of a world-view which is part of the problem. If the subject’s 
beliefs were working, he or she would not have become an analysand. The cure 
depends upon the patient’s abandonment of the sense and significance he or she has 
previously lent the world. Hence Miller’s advice to analysts:  
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‘What we call the real is something that cannot be made sense of. And that is 
why we use the category of the real. So, beware of making sense’ (Miller, J-
A., 2009:159). 
Given this focus, psychoanalysis has paid less attention to the subsequent need to 
forge new beliefs and invent new senses, which, as this thesis has argued, can be an 
achievement of art. Belief in this world is not absent from psychoanalysis: it is implicit 
in Lacan’s description of Joyce’s work as a jouis-sens, explicit in his tribute to the 
‘faith’ displayed by Duras in her celebration of ‘the taciturn wedding of an empty life 
with an indescribable object,’ and it speaks in every line Lacan wrote but it is not 
foregrounded (Lacan, 1987:129). So again, a psychoanalytic criticism to come must 
draw on Deleuze. Specifically, on his notion of choice. The condition of belief is a 
choice made outside the security of knowledge. ‘It is characteristic of the problem 
that it is inseparable from a choice’ (C2:176). Belief requires a particular form of 
decision, ‘a decision on which everything depends, deeper than all the explanations 
that can be given for it’ (C2:175).  
The claim of this thesis is that such decisions rather than being the conscious 
act of a sovereign master, are unfathomable and that art can contribute to the 
making of this decision. Every decision occurs in a particular situation and is made on 
the basis of desires and their concomitant evaluations. One of the achievements of 
artworks like Éloge de l’amour is to create an element which can enable the making 
of that decision in a more affirmative manner. In composition with such works, 
authors and audiences can find in art an unfathomable way of responding to ‘an 
unfathomable problem’ (C2:175). When art creates sense it also creates a belief in 
this world – for sense just is belief in this world. With that belief we can ‘discover the 
identity of thought and life’ for thought becomes a mode of bien-dire creative of new 
senses and values (C2:170). 
The second point of view from which ‘modern cinema develops new relations 
with thought’ is – that Lacanian commonplace – the absence of the whole (C2:187-
8). On Deleuze’s account, classical cinema ‘works by totalisation’ (C2:213): ‘[t]he 
whole’ is ‘being continually made’ (C2:179). Images are linked by association and 
rendered ‘commensurable’   by the montage. Cuts are traversed by and subordinated 
to this ‘linkage of images’ (C2:213). Montage is a ‘synthesis’ (C2:210-211) integrating 
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‘associated images in an always open totality’ (C2:213). In contrast, with modern 
cinema there is ‘the obliteration of a whole or of a totalization of images, in favour 
of an outside which is inserted between them’ (C2:188-9). In place of any supposed 
whole there is ‘irreducible difference.’ As ‘the fissure has become primary,’ the gap 
between images takes on a new status (C2:180). ‘What counts’ is no longer the 
principle of ‘association’ linking images but ‘the interstice between images, between 
two images.’ (C2:179). In modern cinema the gap between shots becomes ‘a spacing 
which means that each image is plucked from the void and falls back into it’ (C2:179). 
Instead of the ‘organic process,’ (C2:211) characteristic of classical cinema, there is, 
most notably in Godard, ‘constructivism’ (C2:179). Without totalisation. ‘Each of 
Godard’s films’ as Susan Sontag famously observed, ‘is a totality that undermines 
itself, a de-totalised totality (to borrow Sartre’s phrase)’ (Sontag, 1966:163).  
The consonance with Lacan’s teaching is apparent. Recall the slogan: ‘no 
whole’ (T:133). If in the beginning is ‘the cut’, the One no more exists than the Other. 
Further, as the place does not exist, the subject is interstitial. Instead of unified, 
whole subjects there are compositions of the heterogeneous and disparate: the 
signifiers, the barred subject and the object a. For Lacan, as for Deleuze, ‘the 
interstice is primary:’ the subject is always between (C2:180). The proximity to 
modern cinema as described by Deleuze is patent. When, summarising Lacan, Miller 
writes ‘before being system, structure is division’ and continues ‘that is why structure 
is never synthesis’, he could equally be characterising Godard’s constructivism 
(Miller, J-A, 2017:109). 
Where Deleuze can contribute to a psychoanalysis, which seeks to be worthy 
of the event of art, is with his indications of ‘the new relations with thought’ made 
possible by such interstices. His exemplar is Godard, for in his cinema, when any 
image is ‘given’ another is ‘chosen which will induce an interstice between the two’ 
(C2:179). By making this choice the interstice becomes part of a process of 
‘differentiation… which will be productive…of something new’ (C2:179-180). 
Godard’s ‘method of BETWEEN, “between two images”’ dispels ‘all cinema of the 
One.’ His ‘method of AND “this and then that”’ through the deposition of existing 
identifications and determinations ‘does away with all the cinema of Being = is’ 
(C2:180). After ‘the whole has ceased to be the One-Being’, it mutates, according to 
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Deleuze, becoming ‘the constitutive “and” of things, the constitutive between-two 
of images.’ This merging of the whole ‘with what Blanchot calls the force of “dispersal 
of the Outside”’ entails ‘the radical calling into question of the image’ (C2:180). No 
image is the image. Similarly, in Lacan no formulation is the formulation. But equally, 
as we are always at grips with the real of impossibility, not just any image or 
formulation will do. The achievement of Deleuze, Lacan and Godard, is the 
demonstration that, in the absence of the way, we can find ways in the form of 
images and formulations which work. ‘The constitutive “and” of things’ explicitly 
proclaimed by Deleuze and implicit in every paragraph of Lacan and every sequence 
in Godard is not the occasion for despair but our opportunity to create new ways. 
Godard does not merely put in question and make self-reflexive gestures rather his 
film-work, like the joke-work, makes something of the issue(s). For example, he 
constructs ways of being between the series of image, sound, music and citations 
such that where and when the subject happens can be creative of new senses 
Finally, for Deleuze, modern cinema is characterised by ‘a free indirect 
discourse and vision.’ (C2:188-189). In both direct speech, where what is said is 
rendered directly, and in indirect speech, where the utterance is ‘reported by a third 
party,’ the identity of the speaker is plain (C2:183). In free indirect discourse, which 
‘cannot be affixed to any subjectivity’ matters are less straightforward (Boljkovac, 
2013:23). Deleuze explains: the free indirect style 
‘consists in slipping another expressing subject in a statement which already 
has an expressing subject. “I realised that she was about to leave. She would 
take every precaution to ensure she was not followed…” The second ‘she’ is 
a new expressing subject emerging in a statement that already has ‘I’ as its 
expressing subject. It is almost as if every expressing subject contained 
others, each of which speaks a diverse language, the one in the other’ 
(TRM:367).  
In free indirect discourse8 there is no monologue and the identity of the speaker 
becomes indeterminate. This is Deleuze’s style in his books on Spinoza, Nietzsche and 
                                                          
8 Further clarification of the notion of free indirect discourse is usefully provided by 
Ronald Bogue: ‘Linguists have discussed passages from fiction in which a narrative 
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Bergson, where it is often unclear if the viewpoint expressed is that of Deleuze or his 
subject, and uncertain where paraphrase ends and innovation begins. What is clear 
is that those whom Deleuze termed his ‘intercessors’ (WP:64) and ‘mediators’ 
(N:125) – that is, philosophers like Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson – enabled him to 
speak, write and think in ways which would otherwise have been unavailable.9 On 
Deleuze’s account, a similar process can occur in modern cinema where ‘either the 
author expresses himself through the intercession of an autonomous, independent 
character other than the author or any role fixed by the author, or the character acts 
and speaks himself as if his own gestures and his own words were already reported 
by a third party’ (C2:183).  Thus, in Godard, ‘the characters express themselves freely 
in the author’s discourse-vision, and the author, indirectly, in that of the characters’ 
(C2:187). This style enables Godard to think the issues at stake in a particular film by 
adopting a reflexive distance from his characters’ responses, words and actions. He 
thereby ‘provides himself with…reflexive types as so many interceders through 
whom I is always another’ (C2:187).  
The importance of Deleuze’s concept of free indirect discourse for a 
psychoanalysis to come should be evident. It provides an example of a form of 
                                                          
voice slides imperceptibly into a character’s voice such that one cannot distinguish 
clearly between “indirect discourse” (As she looked out the train window she thought 
her loneliness was unbearable) and “direct discourse” (As she looked out of the train 
window she thought. “This loneliness is unbearable”) but must speak of a “free 
indirect discourse” (She looked out the train window, such loneliness was 
unbearable).  Pasolini, following Bakhtin’s analysis, argues this is not a simple 
mingling of two fully constituted subjective voices, a narrator’s and a character’s, but, 
as Deleuze phrases it, “a differentiation of two correlative subjects in a system itself 
heterogeneous” an “assemblage of enunciation [agencement d’enonciation], putting 
into effect at the same time two inseparable acts of subjectivation” (Bogue, 
2003b:72). 
9 As Paul Patton noted, his rule with intercessors like Spinoza, Nietzsche and Bergson 
‘was to say nothing that the author in question had not in fact said, but to do so in a 
manner which produced unrecognisable facsimiles’ (Patton, 1996:3).  
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thinking, which is at once consonant with psychoanalysis where language is always 
the language of the Other and hence when a subject speaks, ‘I is an other’, and which 
is irreducible to any other form (S.II:9). The enunciation does not refer to a pre-given, 
unitary subject for as Deleuze claims, ‘There is no expressing subject, i.e. subject of 
utterance, but only assemblages in which “processes of subjectivation”” (TRM:201) 
occur whereby subjects become other (WP:64). In free indirect style, the 
composition, the agencement, of the heterogeneous elements (C1:73) becomes 
what Deleuze terms ‘a heterogenesis’, which transforms the who, where, when and 
how of the subject and thereby alters how the real registers (TRM:367). Free indirect 
style is a reminder that the words of others can liberate as well as alienate. It is one 
of the innumerable modes in which art, like a joke, can, not merely represent an 
issue, but make something new of it such that it can be thought otherwise and matter 
differently. 
To recapitulate - the argument of this section is that, if psychoanalysis is to be 
worthy of the event of art, it must draw upon Deleuze’s philosophy and that this is 
possible because of its consonance with strands of Lacan’s teaching. For example, 
both are committed to the perpetual (re)construction of stylistic and spatio-temporal 
elements in which new truths can emerge. More specifically, Deleuze’s 
characterisation of modern cinema usefully delineates one such element. Modern 
cinema responds to the problems (apparently) posed by the absence of both a whole 
and the link with the world by a form of thinking in which the primacy of the interstice 
and the free indirect style enables the subject to be between differently. In the terms 
proposed by this thesis where, who and how the subject are thereby altered in ways 
rendering possible the finding of reasons to believe in this world.  
Integral to the formation of elements in which new truths can happen is the 
construction of new temporalities, durations and spaces. As Deleuze notes ‘a work is 
always the creation of a new space-time’, and the cinema books set out, as never 
before, the extraordinary range of spaces and durations created by film (TRM:289). 
If psychoanalytic approaches are to be worthy of the event of art, they must conceive 
such spaces and durations not as frameworks but as dynamisms. ‘There is,’ Deleuze 
notes, ‘always a trajectory in the work of art’ (ECC:66). ‘Every work is a voyage, a 
journey, but one that travels along this or that external path only by virtue of the 
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internal paths and trajectories that compose it’ (ECC:lvi). Psychoanalysis, as the graph 
complet and the diagram with the three vectors cited in chapter four make clear, is 
similarly concerned with vectors and trajectories rather than merely meanings and 
significations. As Lacan points out, all of his schemas are or can be ‘vectorialised’ 
(Lacan, 1965-66: Session of 8/12/65 p. 5). If psychoanalysis is to be worthy of the 
event of art when thinking the work of the work, it needs to think in similarly 
processual terms. ‘Poems,’ Celan wrote ‘are en route’ (Celan, 1983:35). My argument 
is that artworks, like India Song and Éloge de l’amour, are similarly ‘en route’ and that 
the sense(s) –as opposed to the meanings – created are contingent upon that ‘way-
making’ of vectors and trajectories which are in turn dependent upon the creation of 
new spaces and durations. As always, the subject happens between. Explicating the 
graph complet, Lacan claims that the ‘interval’ between the vectors of speech and 
the drives,  
‘constructs for the subject the distance that he (sic) can maintain between 
the two lines in order to be able to breathe there while he is still alive; and 
this is what we call desire’ (Lacan, 1958-59: Session of 8/4/59 p. 9).  
Between the lines of the itinerary of art, the subject, breathing another air and 
desiring differently, can engage in the co-creation of new senses.  
This brings us to difference and relationality. If the first achievement of the 
cinema books is to set out the durations and spaces of the cinemas of the movement-
image and the time-image, the second is their explication in terms of signs. There is 
not the space here to expound this extraordinarily complex and subtle taxonomy in 
any detail.10 For present purposes, what matters is that each sign is a point of view. 
Cinema, Deleuze writes, ‘consists of movements and thought-processes (pre-
linguistic images), and of points of view on these movements and processes (pre-
signifying signs)’ (C2:262). If the Ⱥ functions, if the link between man and world is 
broken, if ‘the fissure has become primary,’ (C2:180) if, as in the world of Godard’s 
cinema there is ‘irreducible difference’ there are only points of view, that is, 
perspectives (C2:180). This line of thought echoes the apparatus theories discussed 
in chapter one, where similarly the perspectival relationship is constitutive of both 
                                                          
10 A brilliant exposition can be found in Deamer (2016). 
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the reality and the subject, and provides an alternative theoretical means of 
surpassing any simplistic perspectivism. 
First, because the perspectives are no more given than the subjects and realities 
constituted by them. For Deleuze, as Nathan Widder perspicaciously observes, 
‘perspectives are not chosen by subjects; rather, they condition the emergence of 
subjectivities’ (Widder, 2012:41). In a cosmos of universal variation, a perspective is 
‘the condition in which an eventual subject apprehends a variation’ (Deleuze, 
1988:21). As such, a perspective is ‘not a variation of truth according to the subject, 
but the condition in which the truth of a variation appears to the subject’ (Deleuze, 
1988:21). This ‘“[p]erspectivism”’ in the cinema books is therefore ‘not defined by 
variation of external points of view on a supposedly invariable object.’ Rather ‘the 
point of view’ is ‘constant, but always internal to the different objects’ which are 
‘presented as the metamorphosis of one and the same thing in the process of 
becoming’ (C2:143). The perspectives designated by the various signs are constituted 
within the universal variation, as always in Deleuze, by a process of differentiation. 
For that reason, every cinematic sign has, at least, three components: ‘at least two 
signs of composition, and at least one sign of genesis for each type of image’ (C2:32). 
Where the sign of genesis manifests the sign’s emergence from the ‘universal 
variation,’ (C2:81) – that is ‘the differential element of movement’ (C1:83) - the two 
signs of composition continue the process in an agencement in which, as in every 
agencement, one sign tends toward stratification and the other to destratification 
(Adkins, 2015:44). Signs are as processual as they are perspectival. 
 As many films contain a number of signs they are polyperspectival. Rather 
than envisioning a whole they create a number of pathways on which new 
perspectives are disclosed. According to the Lacan of seminar eighteen, we inhabit 
not the universe but ‘un désunivers’ (Lacan, 2007:12), that is, a universe which is 
never one, for as Lacan points out, his neologism, while not equivalent to ‘diversity’ 
and ‘diversion,’ is intended to imply both (Lacan, 1971: Session of 13/1/71 p. 5). In 
this light, the universe no more exists than the way. Art through polyperspectivity 
can be a way of inhabiting that universe otherwise. A film like Éloge de l’amour does 
not merely register the impossibility of attaining the perspective it opens a way of 
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thinking and, therefore, proceeding in the spatio-temporal elements made possible 
by its absence. 
In our consideration of how art can create an element in which new truths 
can happen, we come now to composition. For Deleuze art is composition. ‘The work 
of art,’ he and Guattari write, ‘is a block of sensations, that is, a compound…of 
percepts and affects’ (WP:164). Similarly cinema on Deleuze’s account is ‘a 
composition of images and signs’ (C1:ix). As will be apparent, this notion has 
informed much of this thesis for it has been argued that, in relation to issues which 
escape representation, artworks think by creating new compositions which by, for 
example, recontextualising items through montage create new senses. As we have 
seen, compositions in Éloge de l’amour, juxtaposing music and image, revalue both. 
If problems, that is differences, force us to think, in the images and signs of expanded 
cinema we can think by means of differences, that is, with compositions of the 
heterogeneous.  
In the context of psychoanalytic approaches to film, however, even more 
important than intratextual compositions are those between text and spectator and 
it is here that Deleuze’s philosophy can make a signal contribution. For Deleuze, to 
exist is to form compositions with the world. Learning to swim is his most famous 
example. We solve the problem of learning to swim not on land listening to an 
instructor but by entering the water and forming a composition with the 
heterogeneity of the water’s currents. As Deleuze writes,  
‘The movement of the swimmer does not resemble that of the wave, in 
particular the movements of the swimming instructor which we reproduce on 
the sand bear no relation to the movements of the wave, which we learn to 
deal with only by grasping the former in practice’ (DR:23).  
‘Learning to swim,’ he writes  
‘means composing the singular points of one’s own body…with those of 
another shape or element, which tears us apart but also propels us into a 
hitherto unknown and unheard-of world of problems’(DR:192).  
With this as a point of departure, psychoanalysis could rethink both its notion of art 
as a form of savoir-faire and its concepts of spectatorship. First, savoir-faire. On this 
view, the problem with which every social being is tasked is to form a composition 
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not with waters of the sea but with the waters of the Other(s). An altogether more 
problematic task than learning to swim. It is not just that as the work of Proust, Joyce, 
Kafka, Ozu, Godard and Duras testify, navigating the heterogeneous currents and 
disparate forces incarnated in the utterances, actions and institutions of Other(s) can 
be fraught, difficult and painful. The forces encountered in others can deceive, 
disappoint and hurt. The savoir-faire of the artist consists in learning how to make 
his or her way in composition with those forces. Art as way-making not only 
representation. Famously Proust thought the betrayals, sufferings and 
disappointments he had experienced in society in the form of his novel. Equally 
Godard, when not engaged in the direct critique of the evils of late capitalism, 
imperialism, neo-liberalism and racism, made out of his disappointment in his 
intimate relationships, his creative projects and himself a form of cinematic poetry. 
 Deleuze’s notion of art as composition also enables a rethinking of 
psychoanalytic accounts of spectatorship. As we saw in chapter one, psychoanalytic 
film theory has tended to conceive the compositions constructed between film and 
spectator in terms of identifications, fantasies and voyeurism. While apposite in the 
preponderance of cases, there are occasions where other forms of composition with 
the text deserve attention. In conjunction with the durations set out in the cinema 
books, in compositions which exceed the work of identification, the subject can 
happen differently. In composition, for example, with the extraordinary variety of 
durations proposed by Deleuze in the cinema books, the subject can be transformed 
such that new truths can happen. 
As we have already touched on the sub-representative several times in this 
section, consideration of this topic can be briefer. Deleuze thinks of art primarily in 
terms not of subjects, with their perceptions and affections, but of impersonal affects 
and percepts. Even if, on the plane of organization, representations obtain, on other 
levels what counts is the sub-representative. From, as we have seen, a very different 
viewpoint, the Lacanian approaches to art explored above similarly emphasise that 
the work of the work involves not only representations but the rearrangement in new 
compositions of such sub-representational elements as the barred subject, the 
object a and jouissance. 
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When thinking problems which occur in a topological space, representations 
alone do not suffice. As the flows, currents and forces to be negotiated are at once 
within and without they cannot be arrayed before us. We are dealing with a real 
which, as Deleuze puts it in his description of the films of Duras, ‘involves…an outside 
more distant than any exterior, and…an inside deeper than any interior’ (C2:261). 
Thinking this real is a matter not of representation but of altering how it matters. 
Lacan’s style demonstrates the existence of this possibility.  Although his signifiers 
and schemas do not capture the real they still affect it and alter its import. Similarly, 
the work of Godard and Duras, while engaging on one level in political struggles 
around representation, also functions at the level of the sub-representative. The 
elliptical structures of Éloge de l’amour are not just an acknowledgement that not all 
can be made clear – what purpose would that serve? Rather, like the enigmas and 
citations, which are the essence of Lacan’s equivocal interpretations, they relaunch 
desire so that en route the who, where, when and how of the subject alters. Similarly, 
in the films of Duras, the composition of what Deleuze describes as ‘two 
dissymmetric, non-totalisable sides…here where a musical speech rises and is torn 
away, there where the visible is covered over or buried’ is not merely the registration 
of the impossibility of all being represented in a whole (C2:261). More importantly, 
it is a thinking of the real, which by bringing the disparate into new relationships 
within the compositions, is creative of sense such that, in some instances, the 
questions become their own answers. 
Finally, open-ended systems. For Deleuze every system, including artworks, is 
open. As we have seen, in the cinema of the movement-image films - when not 
almost immured in cliché - are open in vital modes to the Open and the cinema of 
the time-image is open to the outside. Again, there is a consonance with the Lacanian 
approaches proposed in part one of this thesis where it was argued that one of the 
functions of art can be to open pathways such that desire(s) can run in new courses 
creating new senses and revaluing. So, on a first approach, this thesis aligned itself 
with Celan.  ‘Poems,’ Celan wrote ‘are headed toward.’ ‘Toward what? Toward 
something open’ (Celan, 1983:35). A claim of this thesis is that artworks, like the films 
of Duras and Godard, can constitute more open structures than we would otherwise 
inhabit. However, my further argument is that, in light of Deleuze’s philosophy and 
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Lacan’s teaching, this can only be an initial approach to thinking the event of art. On 
two counts. First thinking in artworks like Éloge de l’amour is not merely linear. 
Rather it is a play in which, while structuration holds chaos at bay, processes of 
destructuration open every work to events no organisation can capture. Second the 
open is no more pre-given than the truths to which it gives access. Like such truths, 
it has to be won by the work of the work and perpetually re-won. The open is 
indissociable from the senses and truths which depend upon the work of the work. 
Art here is a making. 
Missing from this discussion of how the consonance of Deleuze’s philosophy 
with Lacan’s teaching enables the former to contribute psychoanalytically-inspired 
approaches to the event of art is the notion of bien-dire. No such term is to be found 
in Deleuze’s philosophy but, while it is nowhere, it is also everywhere. The practice 
of bien-dire is not only consonant with, but exemplary of, Deleuze’s ethics of being 
worthy of the event. Everything Deleuze wrote aspired to, and achieved, this status. 
What are the cinema books but instances of bien-dire in that they make something 
new and vital of cinema? On Deleuze’s account, one of Proust’s achievements was 
precisely to create the new: ‘Combray reappears’ in the novel ‘not as it was or as it 
could be, but in a splendour which was never lived’ (DR:85). Similarly, Deleuze, in 
writing of art, reinvents each work in a novel and singular fashion. To point up the 
limitations of psychoanalysis in comparison, let’s consider a specific example: Last 
Year at Marienbad (Resnais, France 1961) – a work which Deleuze discusses at length 
in Cinema 2 (C2:117-123). 
 
Section 4: ‘It’s impossible. I have never been to Frederiksbad’: Deleuze, the limits 
of psychoanalysis and Last Year at Marienbad 
 
   ‘Ain’t never going to be what it was.’ 
   Unnamed stevedore in The Wire: Series 2, episode 1 
 
Through a consideration of Last Year at Marienbad this section examines the 
limitations of psychoanalysis. It argues that, where being worthy of the event of art 
is making something new of the work, psychoanalysis cannot match the 
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achievements of Deleuze. Last Year at Marienbad has famously been described by its 
scriptwriter, Alain Robbe-Grillet as ‘the story of a persuading’ (Robbe-Grillet, 1961:9). 
In the film, a man – unnamed in the film but designated in the script as ‘X’ - at a 
German spa approaches a woman, A, and tries to convince her that the previous year 
– possibly at Marienbad but it may have been at Frederiksbad or Karlstadt - they had 
had an affair and that she had undertaken, at a future date to go away with him. As 
that date has arrived, he pleads with her to make good on her promise. Instead she 
refuses his approaches, challenges his account of their history and denies giving any 
such undertaking. The situation is complicated by the presence of a third figure, M, 
who may be her husband, lover, brother or even, possibly, her carer. At the end of 
the film she seems finally to accede to X’s demands. I say ‘seems’ because very little 
is certain in this ambiguous text. It is impossible to tell where what counts as ‘reality’ 
ends and fantasy and hallucination begin. Even the co-creators differed: while 
Resnais believed the affair really had occurred the previous year, the script-writer, 
Alain Robbe-Grillet held that we know only what happens in the minds of the 
protagonists and nothing of the actuality (C2:103).  
What could psychoanalytic approaches achieve? To begin with, they might 
suggest why a story about an extraordinarily wealthy and privileged social stratum at 
a very considerable remove from the lives of all but a minute fraction of spectators 
might matter, and then show how, through the work of the text, it could come to 
matter differently. An unsurprising Freudian explanation could be that the couple is 
part of an Oedipal triad:  X’s object of desire is a woman who belongs to another man 
from whom he tries to wrest her. The film, therefore, could be conceived as at once 
the rehearsal of the Oedipal fantasy that complete satisfaction would be possible, if 
the obstacle, namely the father as figured by M, was removed, and the registration 
of the impossibility of that move. The father is not so easily circumvented. A recurring 
motif is a game, Nim, introduced to X by M and which X always loses. In the game 
which can be played with either cards or matchsticks, each player in turn has to 
remove an object from one of the rows. The loser is the one who must pick up the 
last remaining unit. This is invariably X who is left, like every Lacanian subject, with a 
loss – he is defeated – and a troubling remainder – he must pick up what remains on 
the table after M’s winning move. On this view, an Oedipal logic governs the text: no 
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existence is possible outside the symbolic order. So, when the couple finally act upon 
desires transgressive of the law – when they run off – they find themselves ‘lost in 
the night’. The ruin of their future figured by a broken balustrade.  
A Lacanian explanation would suggest that the obvious point of interest is the 
conflict between X and A as to what happened the previous year. At first sight, their 
dispute might appear so out of the ordinary as to be inexplicable, but in a Lacanian 
perspective it figures a commonplace.  If there is a lack in the Other, every subject 
constructs a reality – an account of whom he or she is, of their relationships with 
others and the history of those relationships – and, if that reality is inflected by 
desire, narcissistic misrecognition and fantasy, then realities clash and the 
relationship of X and A is far from exceptional. Their community in this respect with 
others is foreshadowed by both the stage play and the overheard conversations at 
the outset of the narrative. Few couples do not, at some point, debate the history of 
their relationship and the nature of the aspirations, demands, desires, and 
misrecognitions in play. In short, the text is of interest because, as emblematic of 
disputes within many sexual couples, it pertains to problems unconfined to 
plutocrats insulated in a spa hotel. On this account, the key to the film is not what 
happened the previous year but the impossibility of their agreeing as to what 
happened. The film is not, as it became for many audiences ‘a riddle, a parlour game’ 
(Leutrat, 2000:19), where it was believed that spectators had to follow the clues to 
find out what really happened. Rather it is a way of thinking cinematically the 
impossibility of reconciling contending realities inflected by conflicting desires. While 
the film is unintelligible if the spectator does not attempt to establish what 
happened, the work of the work begins from the real of the impossibility of doing so, 
for the real addressed by the film is the impossibility, outside a folie á deux, of 
establishing wholly commensurate realities within sexual relations.  
If the Ⱥ is functioning, the work of the film is to think what cannot be thought 
but must be thought, namely the indeterminacies and uncertainties entailed by the 
enigma of the Other. As almost every text is multi-linear and multi-stranded, a Lacan-
inspired approach could then consider other issues consequent upon the real as 
impossible which explain the text’s interest. There is time to mention only three. 
First, there is the impossibility of demarcating the nature of things and persons from 
  205 
what we have contributed to their construction through our identifications, desires, 
fantasies, and anxieties. Resnais, in discussing the film asked, ‘can one ever know, in 
fact, whether one projects one’s own fantasies onto the other’ (Alain Resnais cited 
in Wilson, 2006:71). The text suggests we cannot for it is impossible to tell which 
images in the film are simply X’s fantasies or hallucinations. This is taken up most 
tellingly in relation to the statue of a man and a woman in classical garb which X 
claims he discussed with A in their first encounter. They could, X tells A ‘be you and 
I’ before proffering the interpretation that the man had perceived a danger and 
‘wanted to keep the young woman from venturing any further’ which A counters with 
the claim that on the contrary it is the woman who has seen something – ‘something 
marvellous’ - and is pointing it out to the man. M then arrives to inform them that 
‘the statue represents Charles III and his wife’ that ‘the scene is that of the oath 
before the diet’ and that ‘the classical costumes are purely conventional’. On one 
level this settles the question but, on another, the issue is less the statue than the 
real of the impossibility – on at least some occasions - of reconciling opposed 
interpretations within sexual relations. 
Then there is the absence, if the Other is barred, of the place for the subject. 
Like every Lacanian subject, X is at once in a place and not of it. He is frequently set 
apart from others most notably when they are immobilised, and he is in motion. In 
the shooting gallery sequence he is the only tieless man lined up to participate. As he 
insistently remarks in the voice-over he repeatedly walks the ‘same corridors’ and 
‘same empty rooms’ ‘alone’. Similarly, A is at once included and excluded: she often 
appears in the company of others but she seems apart and there are recurrent shots 
in which she alone is moving through groups of transfixed guests. Like X she too does 
not wholly belong. Plainly the hotel is not the place. The question is whether – in 
terms of this film’s problematic - there is another.  
We have, of course, met these concerns in earlier textual analyses. And that 
underscores the argument of this thesis in respect of psychoanalytically-inspired 
approaches. Such approaches are of continuing value because they can help identify 
what is at stake in a text. However, the fact that such issues are to be found in 
innumerable works emphasises the need to go beyond thematic determinations. If 
the issues descried are found in many texts and not all of those texts are of interest, 
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it is evident that the presence of such issues is not sufficient to render a text valuable. 
What counts is not merely the presence of our concerns but what the text does with 
them. Hence the basis for the further argument of this thesis, namely that if 
psychoanalytic approaches are to be worthy of the event of art they must attend to 
the work of the text. As that work is a mode of thinking irreducible to any other, a 
psychoanalysis worthy of the event of art must show more than tell. 
 What it can show are forms of cinematic thinking which do not merely 
register the real as impossible but make something of a particular issue. So, what 
does the text do with the problems? How are the problems figured and how does the 
text deal with them? What does the work achieve? The figuration, as we have seen, 
is in terms of a couple in a baroque hotel. In respect of the couple, the most 
important component of the figuration is their irreducibility to psychology. ‘We know 
absolutely nothing about them, nothing about their lives’ (Robbe-Grillet, 1961:9). We 
perceive his passion and her resistance but otherwise they are blank and 
unfathomable. We learn nothing of their history or backgrounds other than what is 
debated between them. We do not even know the nature of M’s relationship to A. 
In opposition to much contracted cinema where the obscure exists only to be made 
clear – we discover, for example, whodunnit – in Last Year at Marienbad not 
everything is determined, explained and settled. On T Jefferson Kline’s account, the 
key to the text is that A is the victim of paternal incest (Kline, 2006:224-5). ‘Seen in 
this light,’ he claims, ‘her ambivalent behaviour becomes much more 
understandable’ for incest would explain why she is afraid of X ‘yet unable to leave 
him’ (Kline, 2006:224). My argument is that there is no such key. The behaviour of X 
and A cannot be explained away. To reduce it to psychology and hence pre-existent 
meanings is to stymie the work of a text, conjuring away the very issue the text seeks 
to think. Only if psychological categorization is jammed and a degree of enigma 
persists, can the text spring the trap of the imaginary and enable us to go on beyond 
what we have already thought.   
As for what the voice-over describes as this ‘dismal baroque hotel’ it 
embodies a number of features of the reality created by the film. ‘Overloaded,’ as 
the voice-over has it, ‘with a dim, cold, ornamentation of woodwork, stucco, 
mouldings, marbles, dark mirrors, dim paintings, columns, heavy hangings’ it figures 
  207 
one of the poles between which the film moves, namely petrification as opposed to 
the mobility, at the other pole, of X’s restless desire. The hotel is the stasis in 
conflict with the kinesis of (X’s) desire. As we have seen, for X it is the world of the 
Other in which he is an outsider as is underlined in the scenes where all the other 
denizens of the hotel appear in frozen poses and he alone is in motion – desire is 
movement. It is ‘the locus of the Other’ (S.X:102) - which he must enter to find the 
object of his desire, but which threatens the obliteration of individuality for the 
thick carpets muffle the sound of footsteps and in the ‘same conversations the 
voices are always ‘missing’. For the Lacanian subject the Other, that is the social 
world constructed around language, is the condition of desire – desire is the desire 
of the Other – but the Other is also what debars the subject from finding the object 
of his desire. This is X’s predicament in the Other of the hotel for its architecture at 
once holds open the space of desire, excludes the subject from the object of desire 
and threatens to entomb. As, on a Lacanian account, the Other is always in deficit, 
in the smoothly functioning world of the spa there is something that does not work. 
This is figured metaphorically by the shoe without a heel, but this trope is only a 
counterpoint to X and the recalcitrance of his intentions to the functioning of the 
hotel’s conventional social functions. He is destined by his desires – in the most 
frequently repeated shots of the film – to resume again and again his advance 
down ‘the same corridors’ leading nowhere. 
Put like that, the film might appear to be just another modernist narrative 
about a subject who feels an exile in relation to a social milieu. It is lifted above such 
commonplaces by the fact that for her he is not simply the longed-for rescuer from 
a suffocating social order destructive of her individuality. Whatever his self-
conception he is also a representative of just such a mortifying order insofar as he is 
one of those heterosexual males who arrives in a woman’s life with a narrative 
organised around narcissistic misrecognition and a fantasy structured around an 
idealised female figure which he demands each woman incarnate. ‘Why me?’ she 
demands, ‘Why does it have to be me?’ Why have you decided on me as the one to 
meet your fantasmatic desires? Time is organized by his desires and space by the 
place he has assigned for her. A place she can occupy only at the cost of her 
annihilation. Emma Wilson makes the argument with insight and intelligence. 
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Drawing on Žižek’s Lacanian thesis that in the absence of a universal formula or 
matrix guaranteeing  a ‘harmonious sexual relationship with one’s partner,’ - that is, 
if there is a lack in the Other – ‘every subject has to invent a fantasy of his or her own’ 
(Žižek, 1997:7), she claims that X’s approach to A is a demand that she occupy the 
place reserved for her in his fantasy (Wilson, 2006:71). As Wilson astutely observes, 
this explains his ‘claim that she is familiar’ for he knew her in fantasy before their 
meeting (Wilson, 2006:71). As X has it, ‘I was already waiting for you’ – he has elected 
her the One. Unsurprisingly, therefore, when confronted with a man who is wedded 
to a rigid imaginary construction of reality and intent on dictating how she should 
desire, A, at least initially, recoils. If he enters a setting where he risks becoming as 
set as the frozen guests it is to set her. He claims to be rescuing her from social 
pressures where, as he sees it, her ‘sparkling conversation seemed forced’ but he is 
equally forcing her. Similarly, she is at once the order to be escaped and his elected 
escape route: as object of his desire she is set ‘apart’ from all the others who do not 
concern him, but she is also part of that world. Her haute couture seems to burden 
her as much as the ornamentation overloads the hotel and her awkward, almost 
grotesquely rigid poses echo the shots of the guests when transfixed and motionless. 
She is at once the promise of escape from society’s deadening regime and the threat 
of death: on his account, as she finally came to him she became motionless – like the 
statue he wishes and does not wish her to be.  
In ‘a thoroughly unlocatable space’ (Kline, 2010:98) the hotel, where ‘corridor 
follows corridor,’ also figures the ‘perfect labyrinth of false trails, variants, failures 
and repetitions,’ which constitutes the narrative (Robbe-Grillet, 1961:9). So vast as 
to be disorientating – it is impossible to get one’s bearings – the structure with its 
‘false doors’ and ‘deceiving views’ seems to be, as X, echoing an unidentified woman, 
surmises, a place ‘there’s no way of escaping.’ If, X fancies himself Orpheus leading 
A as Eurydice from the underworld – when she protests she was not waiting for him, 
he insists that in that case she would have been dead and instead she was alive and 
waiting for him - he is, at the same time, a Theseus who looks to her as the Ariadne 
who will guide him from what is ‘a kind of limbo’ (Leutrat, 2000:28).  The problem is 
that he is both escapee and warder. On the one hand, he wishes to take flight from 
the hotel and on the other he is the hotel insofar as he is similarly imprisoned by the 
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past. As for A, he imagines her thread will guide him to the exit, but she is herself a 
labyrinth: it is impossible to tell where she leads. If, for psychoanalysis, these 
figurations constitute the terms in which the problem is posed, the next question is 
where, on a psychoanalytic account, can the text go and what can it do? Given the 
terms in which they are posed, the problems cannot be overcome in feelgood 
fashion. ‘What do you want?’ X asks, ‘You know it’s impossible.’ Hence, as Wilson 
emphasises: ‘the end of the film offers no resolution’ (Wilson, 2006:80). 
The task of the text therefore is to find a way of thinking which, while not 
resolving the issue, answers rather better than other responses. Here various forms 
of thought are in play. While none functions in isolation – they all interact – they can, 
as an initial step be distinguished. At the level of narrative there is the composition 
of series. First, there is the performance of the actors in the stage play. Like X, the 
male actor informs the object of his desire that he has come to find her down endless 
corridors, through empty salons and past frozen indifferent faces and she replies like 
A that they ‘must still wait’ before, again like A relenting and announcing in hollow 
tones, ‘I am yours’. In the screenplay – although less so in the film - the parallel is 
underlined by a shot of A in ‘precisely the position of the actress on the stage’ (Robbe-
Grillet, 1961:23). Then there is the overheard conversation of a couple framed by a 
mirror and almost overwhelmed in the shot by the oppressive decor which echoes 
that of X and A. His reproach, that she confines him in a ‘whispering silence worse 
than death’, that they are ‘like coffins buried side by side in a frozen garden’ and her 
response: ‘Be still. Be still’ anticipates the later exchanges between X and A.  Further 
there is the discussion of Frank, who may or may not be X and who tried, the previous 
year, to enter the room of the young woman who had been placed in his safe-keeping 
– an action which anticipates X’s similar attempt. Much more significantly there is 
the series which dominates the narrative in which X implores A to leave with him and 
the final series where - in a paradoxical reversal redolent of those discussed above in 
The Portrait of a Lady and The Searchers – she finally accedes to his wishes. 
Then there are the more specifically cinematic modes of thought such as the 
nodal moments in which several thoughts are condensed in a single image. The final 
shot of the shooting gallery series is a signal example. A line of male guests engaged 
in pistol-shooting stand facing the camera. Each, in order, turns to fire at the target. 
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In one of the rare occurrences of an established pattern in the film, shots of the men 
are intercut with the targets. But when, in the second line of shooters, X turns and 
levels his gun the cut is not to a target but to a shot of A emerging from the darkness. 
At that moment she is, at once, his fantasmatic creation, a subject, the real of whose 
desires he is intent upon annihilating and a being who will never be in the place 
assigned by him or any other. Such moments occur throughout the film when there 
is a disjunction between image and soundtrack. The moment when X is again playing 
against M while describing on the soundtrack the episode in which, while walking in 
the grounds, she breaks her heel. So, knotted together we have what he recalls as a 
moment of intimacy, a rebuff – she laughs at his suggestion he carry her back – pain, 
for as a result of her going with him she has to walk back in stockinged feet on gravel, 
and failure for, as always, he loses to M. At one and the same time there is a coming 
together and a separation.  
Next this psychoanalytic approach would consider how space and time are 
organized to allow the advent of the subject otherwise. The diegesis contains 
compelling illustrations of the thesis advanced in chapter two that space and time 
are organized by our concerns. X inhabits a space where, apart from the occasional 
intrusion of M and others, there is only himself and A – it was ‘as though in all this 
garden there were only you and I.’ Similarly, time is temporalized by his desires; it is 
measured by the recollected encounters with A. However, the times and spaces of X 
are exceeded by the locations available to the spectator. As we have noted, the 
spectator is between series – no narrative being the narrative – and between the 
strands of nodal moments. Further the spectator is situated between knowledge and 
non-knowledge. On the one hand knowledge is foreclosed. As Resnais observed, ‘one 
never knows if the images are in the man’s head or in the woman’s. There is 
throughout a movement between the two (Alain Resnais cited in Wilson, 2006:76). 
The opacity of others consequent upon the Ⱥ is undispelled. On the other, the 
spectator has access to a form of knowledge insofar as he or she can observe the 
disjunction between what X describes and what is rendered by the images. As he tells 
her in the voice-over that she was always the same, she is depicted in very different 
clothes in different situations. In the famous bedroom scene A’s every movement 
contradicts X’s account. However, such knowledge brings neither assurance nor 
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security for the movement of the film exposes any imagined mastery as illusory. The 
editing repeatedly confounds spectatorial expectation. Although there are instances 
of conventional cuts to tighter close-ups and shot/countershot procedures for much 
of the film no shot can be foretold. If there is the repetition of the same – the hotel, 
the corridors, the grounds - in counterpoint there is the novel and unanticipable. In 
relation to the real at issue this mode of editing constitutes a form of cinematic 
thinking which does not merely represent the impasses of the real – no thesis is 
propounded or illustrated - but through perpetual displacement seeks, as every 
subject must, to transform impasse into passage. 
As importantly the spectator can be identified with camera movements 
which, as X observes of himself, can find no ‘stopping place’. Inexorably proceeding, 
each camera movement is checked: on occasion after occasion there is a cut which 
displaces the camera to another site where the Sisyphean progress resumes. This 
cut/flow pattern does not represent the collision of desire with the impasses of the 
real rather it is another form of that desiring movement – another (cinematic) way 
of thinking where thinking is itself always and only a way of being underway. There 
is something that does not work, that cannot be thought and must be thought. In 
Last Year at Marienbad that task falls as much to the camera movement and editing 
as to the script.  
Coming to the organization of time - the temporalisations – the happenings 
of the spectator – can be even more complex. They occur in the tension between 
stasis and kinesis: a repeated shot counterposes X’s advance and a schematic 
peculiarly inert picture of a building. Between those poles of movement and fixity 
there is a play between the scansions – points de capiton - in which movement is 
momentarily arrested and a meaning emerges which, by revaluing what has gone 
before, appears to settle matters – for example, when M intervenes in the discussion 
of X and A as to the meaning of the statue - and the disruptions to the flow which 
throw into disarray all attempts to unify the events of the narrative into a single, 
comprehensible history.  Complicating this pattern of flow and interruption is the 
existence of an underlying rhythm which affords what Deleuze would term a 
‘consistency’ to the process. Then, complicating matters still further, within these 
overall patterns there are different trajectories. These occur, most significantly, in 
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the long central section during which X repeatedly tries and fails to persuade A of the 
truth of his account and where she resists, protesting she is not the woman he takes 
her to be, pleads to be left alone, and, in reply to his proposals, insists ‘you know it’s 
impossible.’ The violence which ensues is the logical extension of the force with 
which X has pressed his case and the menace of M’s interventions. Both X and M 
enter A’s room. In the case of M, the violence is patent – he shoots at her and she is 
shown in corpse-like positions in the succeeding series – in the case of X it is more 
ambiguous, for the rape in Robbe-Grillet’s screenplay is replaced by a series of 
particularly indecipherable shots of her opening her arms to X. What is clear is that a 
trajectory has run its course. However, as in joke-work, where the taking of a 
particular direction lends a more powerful sense to the change of direction in the 
punch-line, so here the failure of the central narrative to resolve the issue has 
constituted the spectator at a moment where the change of direction – the narrative 
of her accession to his demands – takes on a particular and more powerful 
significance. Whether or not this works is an even more open question here than 
usual. For some spectators it may be that the switch from the circling movement of 
the narrative - the repetition of social rituals, the game, the shots of X advancing 
down corridors and, above all his demands upon A – to the linearity of their 
departure is a line of flight from the enclosed space of the hotel. For others the move 
may seem too low key to be a counterpoint to the earlier crescendo of violence.  
Similar questions arise in relation to the style – the how – of the film. The 
work of the film is primarily in the play between the discourse of X on the soundtrack 
and the images. The two enunciations are in tension. Crucially what is said by X is 
revalued by the recontextualisations effected by the images or rather by framing, 
movement and editing of those images. The scene in which, sharing a bench in the 
garden, X tells A that she had asked him, possibly as a test, to wait for a year can 
serve as an example. As he tells her that ‘time is unimportant’ and that he has now 
‘come back’ for her so that they can go away, the camera ‘goes away’, rising above 
the bench until they are left behind, and the screen is filled by a shot of the hotel. 
This reframing makes a difference which, while eluding signification, is productive of 
sense. Without reducing elements to any simple meaning, it takes a distance from 
what X has said, it places his words in the context of the hotel which in its massive 
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inert presence suggests that escape will not be as straightforward as he claims and 
further that she may be exchanging one prison for another – whatever they do they 
will find they have returned to its confines. But the work of the film is far in excess of 
any such account. The shot is part of a sequence which is inaugurated by the scene 
in which, while walking with X, her heel breaks and for a moment they touch before 
turning back to the hotel in a move which prefigures the camera movement under 
discussion. In response there is a series of shots which can be briefly listed: first of 
the statue, secondly of X and M in a card-playing group while an unidentified woman, 
to whom they pay no heed passes, thirdly of X and A dancing in near darkness their 
parted lips close to kissing, fourthly of A walking alone amongst indifferent guests in 
a moment which rhymes with the woman ignored in the second shot, and finally a 
shot of M, who is plainly on edge, almost frenetically dealing cards. This series and 
the subsequent shot of X and A on a terrace - in which A’s ‘No…No…No…No. It’s 
impossible’ overlaps the cut - enframes X’s words on the bench. For present purposes 
what matters is that the sequence does not merely recapitulate existing concerns: 
the statue as at once the promise of fixing matters once and for all and the danger of 
mortification, the game as a society of winners and losers, the dance and the 
unremarked women as the coexistence of passion for and indifference to the real of 
others. Rather there is a revaluation in a form which escapes lexical meaning. Further 
there is the movement of the enunciation which goes beyond what is enunciated and 
can carry the spectator beyond existing imaginaries. Here, as so often with expanded 
cinema, the point being made by this form of psychoanalytic criticism requires 
Deleuzean terminology. The sequence is a process of deterritorialisation. Elements 
of each shot have their forerunners earlier in the film. These are now removed from 
their earlier contexts and reterritorialised in the new sequence. As always, this 
territorialisation is plied by a process of deterritorialisation (TP:334). The film does 
not merely establish new values it traverses them. Ultimately psychoanalysis should 
think of enunciation in such instances of expanded cinema as this movement of 
capture and liberation. The gathering of the elements in a new configuration also 
involves a release – there is a line of flight. Enunciation, in imparting a new 
significance to what is enunciated, at the same time goes beyond any fixed 
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significations, designations or manifestations. In such enunciations desire is 
relaunched, takes another direction, and creates new senses and truths. 
In summary, this psychoanalytic approach conceives of Last Year at 
Marienbad as a paradigmatic instance of a modernist film where, given the terms in 
which the problem is posed, there can be no easy resolution. This impossibility is the 
impetus behind the work of the text and the condition of its possibility. If harmony 
was miraculously conjured out of disharmony, the achievement of that work would 
be dissipated. Similarly, if the enigma was dispelled – if for example, a reliable witness 
came forward to inform us what really happened the previous year – the work would 
collapse. So, what is achieved? In these circumstances the only possible achievement 
of the work of the work is revaluation through the creation of a certain tonality. Here 
psychoanalysis advances on Bergson’s notion that the function of art is ‘precisely to 
see and to make us see what we do not naturally perceive’ (Bergson, 1919:112). 
Perception, for psychoanalysis is always also an evaluation. Art in the mode of bien-
dire, is not only ‘an extension of the faculties of perceiving’ (Bergson, 1919:113) but 
a means of evaluating differently. 
Whether in any particular instance the text functions as bien-dire in this 
manner - as emphasized in the theoretical preliminary – cannot be predicted. Last 
Year at Marienbad may constitute an instance of bien-dire for some spectators but 
not for others. Some may feel that after the extraordinarily inventive opening 
sequences it finds itself at a loss as to how to proceed. Increasingly a repetition of 
the same, it becomes as cold as the empty corridors and oppressive decor. As Wilson 
notes the film has a reputation for ‘glacial lifelessness’ (Wilson, 2006:77). For some 
an ‘intellectual coldness’ overtakes the narrative (Armes, 1981:27). As the characters 
remain blank, indifference sets in. A comfortable, apparent externality affords the 
spectator a security so detached the work can no longer work.  Other spectators 
might feel that although the film seems dedicated to deterritorialisation – the couple 
appear to leave – it is territorialisation which wins out. Paradoxically, the more 
frenzied the style the more entropic the effect. For such spectators there is the 
danger that the film in its repetitions of the central impasse becomes as crushingly 
earthbound as the lugubrious hotel. 
  215 
In contrast, for others, there may be sufficient narrative dynamic to keep the 
text moving so that it escapes the inertia which has overtaken most of the guests at 
the hotel. Such spectators might consider that the enigma keeps open a text which 
might otherwise collapse into a dismal Oedipalism. If, as Emma Wilson remarks, ‘we 
have no sense of how to categorise any image we see’ there is the possibility of the 
film breaking with the existing imaginaries of such spectators (Wilson, 2006:75). For 
these subjects ‘the basic structure of a void or hole’ which as Roy Armes notes, 
‘invades the entire text’ (Armes,1981:26) might allow Deleuze’s ‘empty square’ 
(LS:82) to circulate and through that movement enable them to breathe another air. 
Further they might feel that the reversal, that is, her acquiescence as to his demands 
– like the paradoxical reversals in A Portrait of a Lady and The Searchers discussed in 
chapter one -  sustains the dynamic. In this perspective, the stylistic innovations 
would constitute a sustained instance of bien-dire whose syntax would enable the 
work to move free of ossifying capture.  
 The argument of the above section is that, while psychoanalysis can still 
usefully contribute to our thinking of what happens in artworks like Last Year at 
Marienbad by, for example, identifying, the forms of the real as impossible which 
form a work’s impetus it currently lacks a vocabulary worthy of the ways in which, 
for the duration, the work transforms impasse into passage. Cinematic thinking is 
first and foremost a making. To think that making and movement, it needs, as we 
have seen, Deleuzean concepts. But, as importantly, it needs Deleuze as a reminder 
of the inventiveness of Lacan’s teaching – and the lesson it holds: namely that 
thinking about cinema can be as creative as cinema itself. This brings us to Deleuze’s 
account of Last Year at Marienbad.  
 
Gilles Deleuze on Last Year at Marienbad 
 
If we now turn from what psychoanalysis might do with Last Year at Marienbad to 
Deleuze’s discussion in Cinema 2, it becomes apparent that Deleuze’s creative 
treatment is worthy of the event in ways unequalled by existing modes of 
psychoanalysis. Singled out in Difference and Repetition as a key work of its time 
(DR:293-4), Last Year at Marienbad became, in Cinema 2, one of the most important 
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instances of the time-image where ‘time is no longer subordinated to movement, but 
movement to time’ (C2:106). In consequence, we can encounter ‘durations which are 
inferior and superior to man, all coexisting’ (C2:118). In Last Year at Marienbad, those 
durations relate to questions of memory and the relationship(s) of past, present and 
future. In each instance, Deleuze uses Bergson to take us beyond our common-sense 
notion of chronological time as linear succession. As Deleuze’s thinking here is 
profoundly counter-intuitive - hinging as it does on Bergson’s notion ‘of a pure past 
that was never present,’ (Rölli, 2003:232) - it may be useful, at least initially, to take 
as a guiding thread the distinction between the virtual and the actual. In our 
pragmatic engagement with the world we can easily come to believe that the actual 
constitutes the limits of the possible. For Deleuze, the importance of films like Last 
Year at Marienbad resides in their capacity to surpass such limits and reveal a beyond 
of the actual very different from common-sensical notions. With that in mind, let’s 
turn to the ways in which memory and the past function in Resnais’ film. 
 
Resnais and the Past 
 
In respect of memory, Resnais’ achievement, according to Deleuze, is to carry us 
beyond the human condition for, ‘throughout Resnais’ work we plunge into a 
memory which overflows the conditions of psychology’ (C2:119).  Instead of 
memories tributary upon subjectivity there are memories which surpass 
personhood: ‘a world-memory’ (C2:98).  To think this overcoming of the subjective, 
Deleuze draws on Bergson’s distinction between the past, which is virtual, and ‘the 
mental existence of recollection-images which actualise it in us’ (C2:98). On this 
account, the past is ‘the virtual element into which we penetrate to look for the ‘pure 
recollection’ which will become actual in a ‘recollection-image’ (C2:98). Ordinarily in 
cinema, subjectivity prevails for ‘memory is reduced to the recollection-image and 
flashback’ (C2:122), but in Resnais, memory is no longer anchored in a subjective 
present. In his films, memory is prior to the subject. On Deleuze’s account, Resnais 
draws on Bergson to claim ‘memory is not in us’ it is already there: we ‘move in a 
Being-memory.’ ‘Our recollections presuppose’ a virtual pre-existent past (C2:98), 
which Deleuze describes ‘as the coexistence of circles which are more or less dilated 
  217 
or contracted, each one of which contains everything at the same time’ (C2:98-99). 
When we seek a memory, we go to these ‘virtual zones of past, to find, choose and 
bring it back’ (C2:110). The crucial point here is ‘the coexistence of sheets of past’ 
(C2:101). Beyond the sheet which is actualised there are ‘virtual regions of the past’ 
(C2:109). Following Bergson, he distinguishes ‘between the pure recollection’, which 
is always virtual, and ‘the recollection-image’ which makes it actual only in relation 
to a present’ (C2:123-4). Resnais’ cinema ‘prevents the past from being debased into 
recollection. Each sheet of past, each age, calls up all the mental functions 
simultaneously: recollection, but equally forgetting, false recollection, imagination, 
planning, judgement’ (C2:124). In the film X and A are on different sheets of the past: 
‘In Last year at Marienbad we are in a situation for two characters, A and X, such that 
X settles on a sheet where he is very close to A, whilst A is on a sheet of a different 
age where she is on the contrary distant and separated from X’ (C2:119). This forms 
a direct time-image since the past into which we plunge is ‘not at the mercy of a 
psychological memory that would give us only an indirect representation, nor at the 
mercy of a recollection-image that would refer us back to a former present.’ Rather 
it follows ‘a deeper memory, a memory of the world directly exploring time, reaching 
in the past that which conceals itself from memory’ (C2:38-9). So, the human 
condition is surpassed: with the ‘coexistence of all the sheets of the past’ and ‘the 
topological transformation of these sheets,’ there is an ‘overtaking of psychological 
memory towards a world memory’ (C2:274). 
  
Robbe-Grillet and the present 
 
On Deleuze’s account, Robbe-Grillet’s contribution similarly enables us to depart 
personhood. Robbe-Grillet’s practice stands in opposition to traditional realism 
whose descriptions claim to mirror the external world. Realist description 
‘presupposes the independence of its object’ (C2:7) and, in consequence, its 
representations can be measured against the pre-existing reality of the supposedly 
distinct object (C2:68). Description for Robbe-Grillet, in contrast, does not mirror but 
rather ‘tends to replace the thing;’ it 'erases’ the ‘concrete object’ (C2:44-5). Since 
such a description ‘constantly both absorbs and creates its own object’ there is no 
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independent reality to serve as a yardstick C2:68). Consequently, in quasi-
Nietzschean fashion, there are only descriptions and no description is the description. 
So, descriptions ‘are always provisional, always in question’ (C2:44-5). It is impossible 
to disentangle within a description what concrete objects contribute from what ‘the 
imaginary or mental create through speech and vision’ (C2:7). As Deleuze puts it, in 
the work of Robbe-Grillet ‘the imaginary and the real become indiscernible’. He 
continues, ‘we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in the 
situation not because they are confused, but because we do not have to know and 
there is no longer even a place from which to ask’ (C2:7). Put bluntly, we do not know 
and cannot know what happened last year at Marienbad (or Fredericksbad) and 
those hung up on this question miss most of what is happening in the film. The 
undecidability is not a puzzle to be solved. Rather it is a thinking of the event. 
Deleuze develops this line of thought through a consideration of Robbe-
Grillet’s practice. In accordance with his theory of descriptions, Robbe-Grillet’s 
fictions are characterised by discontinuity and achronology. For example, instead of 
representing an event as if recording a pre-given, unitary reality, Robbe-Grillet 
frequently produced variations on an event such that, as in Last Year at Marienbad 
‘what really happens’ becomes indeterminate. Episodes are presented in multiple 
and contradictory forms. In Deleuze’s examples:  
‘Two people know each other, but already knew each other and do not yet 
know each other. Betrayal happens, it never happened, and yet has happened 
and will happen, sometimes one betraying the other and sometimes the 
other betraying the first – all at the same time’ (C2:101).  
Characteristically, Deleuze makes something new of this narrative strategy. For 
Deleuze the variations in the depiction of an event are not just an argument for a 
mode of solipsism – Deleuze himself remarks that, for Robbe-Grillet everything 
happens ‘in the head’ of the character, or, better, of the viewer himself – nor a mere 
self-reflexive reminder that the order instituted by the work is neither natural nor 
God-given but an artificial, authorial construct. Rather they constitute a rethinking of 
the event as more than ‘the actual present which is passing’ (C2:100).  
Again, the virtual/actual distinction can help to explicate what is at stake. As 
Véronique Bergen reminds us ‘the fibre of becoming is made of a virtual thread and 
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an actual thread’ (Bergen, 2006:21 footnote 12). Consequently, in the event there is 
both the actuality of determinate actions and states of affairs and a virtuality in 
excess of the actualised. Usually we miss the virtual because we view the present 
from within our ‘pragmatic’ concerns, that is, in terms of ‘a future, present and past 
in succession’ (C2:100). However, if for this common-sense conception, ‘we 
substitute a vision which is purely optical, vertical’ (C2:100), we discover that, as 
Miguel de Beistegui succinctly puts it, events ‘always involve a dimension in excess 
of mere actuality’ (de Beistegui, 2004:255). Beyond the actual present there is an 
‘implication of presents’ (C2:100), what Deleuze terms a ‘simultaneity of peaks of 
present’ (C2:101). Just as the virtual past is in excess of any actual recollection, so 
beyond any actualised present there are other virtual presents. If we treat ‘the world 
or life…as one single event’   it is possible to ‘break up what is actual’ (C2:100). The 
event is then ‘no longer confused with the space which serves as its place, nor with 
the actual present which is passing’ (C2:100). With this de-actualisation ‘a time is 
revealed inside the event which is made from the simultaneity of…implicated 
presents’ (C2:100).  Thus, in an event, as opposed to what of the event is actualised 
in a situation, ‘an accident is about to happen, it happens, it has happened; but 
equally it is at the same time that it will take place, has already taken place and is in 
the process of taking place; so that, before taking place, it has not taken place, and, 
taking place, will not take place’ (C2:100). This informs Robbe-Grillet’s narratives 
where ‘there is never a succession of passing presents, but a simultaneity of a present 
of past, a present of present and a present of future, which make time frightening 
and inexplicable’ (C2:101). The result is a new mode of narration which, abstracted 
from ‘all successive action,’ distributes ‘different presents to different characters, so 
that each forms a combination that is plausible and possible in itself, but where all of 
them together are “incompossible’” (C2:101). Deleuze takes the notion of 
incompossibility from Leibniz who envisaged the logical possibility of the same event 
having very different – incompossible - outcomes in different – incompossible –
universes.11 However, as always, Deleuze uses his sources creatively. So here the 
                                                          
11 Sean Bowden explains: for Leibniz, while other worlds are possible, ‘not all of these 
possibles can be thought together without contradiction, for what is possible in itself 
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incompossible relates not to different universes but to a single one. Consequently, in 
Robbe-Grillet ‘the inexplicable’ is ‘maintained and created’ (C2:101). ‘In Last Year…, 
it is X who knew A [so A does not remember or is lying], and it is A who does not 
know X (so X is mistaken or playing a trick on her)’ (C2:101).  
‘Ultimately, the three characters correspond to the three different presents, 
but in such a way as to complicate the “inexplicable” instead of throwing light 
on it; in such a way as to bring about its existence instead of suppressing it: 
what X lives in a present of the past, A lives in a present of the future, so that 
the difference exudes or assumes a present of present [the third, the 
husband], all implicated in each other. The repetition distributes its variations 
on the three presents’ (C2:101).  
Consequently, there is a ‘plurality of simultaneous worlds, a simultaneity of presents 
in different worlds’ which on Deleuze’s account ‘are not subjective [imaginary] points 
of view in one and the same world, but one and the same event in different objective 
worlds, all implicated in the event’ (C2:103).  
So, Robbe-Grillet, like Resnais, can take us beyond the human condition. In 
the work of both, the actual, whether a recollection-image or a present, is revealed 
to be an actualisation not the actualisation and a time emerges which is no longer 
subordinate to the movements tributary to sensori-motor schemas. ‘It always comes 
down,’ Deleuze writes ‘to Blanchot’s fine phrase: to release “the part of the event 
which its accomplishment cannot realise.”’ (D:73). On Deleuze’s account, Last Year 
at Marienbad can release that part and thereby us from the toils of subjectivity. 
 
 
                                                          
is not necessarily ‘compossible’ with other such possibles.’ Bowden elucidates with 
‘one of Leibniz’s preferred examples’: ‘whilst it can be said that an Adam who does 
not sin is possible in itself, the concept of such an individual is nevertheless 
“incompossible” with other possible individuals such as, for example, a Christ who 
redeems Adam’s original sin’ (Bowden, 2011:58).  
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Deleuze, Lacan and creation 
 
Deleuze’s achievement is to create a Last Year at Marienbad which had no previous 
existence. He does not, as in the tradition of ideological critique seek to tell the truth 
about the film. Rather he seeks to create new truths. This is, of course, something 
Lacan achieved with his style, where there is always something new but 
psychoanalytic criticism has tended to situate texts in existing bodies of (supposed) 
knowledge rather than produce new truths. Deleuze’s final lesson for psychoanalysis 
therefore is the reminder that an artwork like the cure can become a way of being 
more alive. Consequently, where the exigencies of the political are not immediate 
and pressing and where, in consequence, issues around representation and ideology 
are not paramount, the task of the critic can be to enable the work of the work to 
function differently. 
What psychoanalysis cannot do, if it merely applies supposed Lacanian 
doctrines, is, in the manner of Deleuze, to make something new of the text. It cannot 
create new truths irreducible to what is taken – however provisionally – to be 
psychoanalytic knowledge. In his treatment of texts, Lacan, as Harari (Harari, 1996:1, 
26), Fink (Fink, 2011:86), and Hoens (Hoens, 2016:103) have pointed out, always 
sought to ‘learn from’ texts and enable the works to ‘engender…creations’ within 
psychoanalytic thought (Fink, 2011:86). More importantly I claim, in a characteristic 
double movement, something is always captured – a thesis is advanced with the 
promise of understanding – while at the same time something opens on to a 
topological outside which eludes understanding. With Lacan there is no closure, 
always a gap between his reading and the text – a space for readers to create. One 
of his strategies for accomplishing this was to introduce concepts from elsewhere. In 
seminar seven, for example, when considering art, he introduces notions from 
Heidegger (S.VII:120). The result is a play of proximity and distance: there is a 
consonance in that both Heidegger and Lacan conceive of art as organised around a 
void and at the same time there is disjunction for Heidegger’s distaste for 
psychoanalysis precluded anything comparable to Lacan’s thinking of desire, the 
drives and jouissance from his thought. The argument of this thesis is that, one way 
in which psychoanalysis, at this juncture, could become worthy of the event of art is 
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to create a similar inclusive disjunction with Deleuze. Like Heidegger, Deleuze’s 
philosophy at once converges with and diverges from forms of psychoanalytic 
thinking. In this topological space, created by the interplay of closeness and 
apartness, there is the space to create new truths. Just as sense is in the making, such 
truths are in the creating. The gift of the text is the construction of the element, in 
which that making and creating can occur. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has argued that there is a continuing role for psychoanalysis in thinking 
about cinema insofar as psychoanalysis has useful things to say about cinema, when 
cinema is the construction of fantasies or the practice of bien-dire or, more generally, 
when cinema is viewed as making something of the problems associated with the 
real as impossible. It further argued that, as psychoanalysis cannot account for the 
joy in art which does not depend on fantasy and idealisation, it must learn from 
Deleuze. To be worthy of the event of art psychoanalysis must, following Deleuze, 
expand its notion of desire and revise its thinking on the limits of subjectivity. 
Chapter one claimed that the poverty of thematic analyses demonstrated the 
importance for the thinking, which occurs in art, of the work of the work. In 
conceiving that work, we should often ask not What? but Who? When? Where? and 
How? Revisiting 70s film theory, it was argued that its notion of subject positionality 
was of continuing value insofar as the situation – the where -  of the subject can 
revalue the problem(s) addressed by the text. Although, as the subsequent chapter 
makes clear, the notion of space, framing such theories, was not always sufficiently 
topological, apparatus theory harboured a profound insight and an argument for the 
continuing relevance of psychoanalytic approaches.  
Chapter two opened up new pathways.  A re-reading of Freud explored the 
analogies between the work of the work in art and the joke-work. In both cases, a 
sense without antecedent is produced by a style which, by altering where, when and 
how the subject exists (and ek-sists), transforms the subject. The remainder of the 
chapter developed this approach through Lacan’s teaching. Lacan’s style was held to 
be key. In his teaching there is a saying in excess of any said (that is, any abstractable 
content). This saying bespeaks desires which have no anterior existence and which 
are constitutive of new senses. In the art of bien-dire a similar saying occurs. In their 
enunciation, where, when and how the subject relates to the real alters, 
metamorphosing the subject and revaluing the questions posed by existence. 
 While Lacanian psychoanalysis recognises that desire is constitutive of sense, 
its conception of desire is too rooted in the clinic to be worthy of the event of art. 
Consequently, – and this is the second argument of the thesis - it must draw on other 
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lines of thought, for example, the philosophy of Deleuze. Part two demonstrated that 
the importation of many Deleuzean concepts, such as agencement, is unproblematic. 
Using the framework established in chapter three, the subsequent chapter 
demonstrated, both the profound consonance of Lacan and Deleuze in fundamental 
respects and their divergent views on desire and subjectivity. In light of this, it 
proposed a division of labour: on the one hand, Lacanian approaches for work which 
begins from issues associated with desire as lack and which, while revaluing, keep 
them in view. On the other hand, Deleuzean concepts for works which leave 
subjectivity and its concerns in their wake. Finally, chapter five pointed up the 
limitations of psychoanalytically inspired approaches in comparison with Deleuzean 
readings. While Lacan assiduously makes psychoanalysis new on every page, the 
application of his thinking can reduce the other to the same – betraying both his 
teaching and the artwork.  
Overall the argument is that psychoanalysis can become worthier of the event 
of art in a disjunctive synthesis with Deleuze. A final example can further make this 
case. Consider Deleuze’s argument that philosophy should seek to disengage events 
from states of affairs. ‘The task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities,’ he 
and Guattari write ‘is always to extract an event from things and beings, to set up the 
new event from things and beings, always to give them a new event’ (WP:33). No 
such concept exists (explicitly) in Lacan but it is implicit in (and between) every line 
of his teaching. When he says ‘there is no metalanguage’ he does not propound this 
thesis from a metalinguistic position. Rather, he demonstrates it with a style which 
finds no resting place and which has effects in excess of any concepts. A 
psychoanalysis seeking to be worthier of the event of art could usefully think the 
work of the work in this light. Art in this perspective becomes the extraction of the 
event from the states of affairs constituted by identifications, fantasies and the 
realities they subtend. Art as event is the departure of the fixations produced by 
identifications, the inertial force of fantasy scenarios and the stagnant modes of 
jouissance attendant on both. Here, to adapt a formulation of Nietzsche, ‘the form is 
fluid but the “meaning” [what I term ‘sense’] is even more so’ (Nietzsche, 1887b:78). 
In the movement, that is the event of art, sense and life are indissociable. 
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Reportedly the final words written by Foucault were: ‘there is no 
establishment of the truth without an essential position of otherness; the truth is 
never the same; there can be truth only in the form of the other world and the other 
life (l’autre monde et de la vie autre) (Foucault, 2008:356). Deterritorialising 
Foucault’s claim from his discussion of pagan and Christian truth-telling, (Foucault, 
2008:325-342) the argument of this thesis is that if psychoanalysis is to be worthy of 
what can happen to us with art, it must recognise that, where art assumes the mode 
of bien-dire, ‘the truth is never the same’ and consequently cannot be spoken in any 
other form. No putative metalanguage can tell the truth about the truths of such art. 
To reduce these truths to the categories of the clinic is to miss the constitution in the 
event of art of other spaces and time and, therefore, the ‘other life’ this ‘other world’ 
makes possible. 
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